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SOVIET UNION MILITARY AFFAIRS

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PARTY ORGANIZATION SEEN MAIN LINK IN FIGHT FOR RESTRUCTURING

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 7, Apr 87 signed to press 17 Mar 87) pp 20-25

[Article by Lieutenant General V. Plekhanov, member of the military council--chief of the political directorate of the Red Banner Odessa Military District: "Party Organization--The Main Link In The Fight For Restructuring"]

[Text] Analysis of the results of the first months of this academic year, which was conducted recently by the military council, indicates that the quality of accomplished operational training tasks has increased. By comparison with last year's results, a definite step forward has been made. As for the state of organization and discipline, as heretofore, no progress is being made. Moreover, breaches of order have even increased in individual subunits

Unfortunately, not everyone has learned yet to work in the new way and under conditions of restructuring. Some military collectives have shown a tendency to pass off insignificant successes in combat and political training as serious achievements. And this is not simply inaccuracy in evaluations. It is a position in which one can easily conjecture that there is an attempt to cover with fine accounts a reluctance to do additional work, to overcome indifference and to adopt decisive measures to strengthen organization and order.

The precise and clear directions of the January (1987) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee on giving restructuring a business-like, dynamic and irreversible character demands that we fight resolutely against complacency and stop any attempts to embellish the true situation and present what is desirable as fact. Called on to play an important role here are the primary party organizations, which at the plenum were named the main link in the fight for restructuring. Increasing their assertiveness, adherence to principles, responsibility for the quality of training, the condition of military discipline, and boldly opposing everything that hinders living and working in the new way, they are rallying people around themselves, impelling them to work conscientiously and to make a real contribution in fulfilling the party's needs.

For example, take the party organization of the guards artillery regiment where officer N. Gladkiy is a member of the party committee. After the 27th CPSU Congress, notable accomplishments occurred here. There are no serious breaches of discipline, personnel are steadfastly studying equipment and weapons and handle them skillfully in complex combat training situations. This is in no small measure promoted by the fact that the party organization is a reliable support for the commander in soldier training and education. Communists set a personal example in service and discipline, and they assist their comrades in enhancing operational training and mastering the art of modern combined arms battle. The party committee and the party buro of subunits make a strict evaluation of the personal contribution of each of them in strengthening military discipline, improving the quality of tactical and fire preparation and field training. Relationships guided by principles have become established in the party collective. This was furthered by listening to accounts of CPSU members at meetings of the party committee, the party buro, individual conversations and by the keen reaction of party activists to the slightest shortcomings.

Thus, when symptoms of deteriorating military discipline surfaced in the battalion in which Major V. Kuzmichev was party buro secretary, the party committee looked closely into how the party organization is teaching communists responsibility for fulfilling the requirements of CPSU regulations and supporting strict order in subunits. It turned out that some communist officers kept themselves aloof from the concerns of the collective, paid no heed to departures from regulations, did not study the attitude and needs of subordinates and isolated themselves from people. And members of the buro did not evaluate this neglect properly, nor did they bring it out into the open. At a meeting of the party committee to which Maj V. Kuzmichev was invited with a report of the party buro on strengthening discipline, he was held strictly responsible for being undemanding, and he was advised what had to be done to establish a condition of implacability towards deficiencies in the party collective. Subsequently, members of the party committee, officers Yu. Kuptsov and V. Platkovskiy, visited this battalion regularly. They helped the secretary to organize execution of assigned plans and carried out individual work with members of the party and candidate members. In many respects owing to this, firm regulation procedures were established here, and personnel are successfully fulfilling assumed socialist responsibilities.

The growing influence of the party organization of the regiment on the life and affairs of the military collective is also indicated by the fact that the party committee did not make one decision, however serious, without previous discussions with communists and nonparty servicemen. Guided by their opinion, and utilizing their knowledge and experience, activists are finding effective approaches to the solution of problems surfacing in the collective, and they are creating an atmosphere of irreconcilability toward inertia, carelessness and any manifestation of failure to be demanding and closing one's eyes to problems.

Many party organizations of the district are now also restructuring their work in this direction. Many, but not all. In some places, they only talk about restructuring, but they do little to change the forms and methods of activity and to master the style that corresponds to the spirit of the times. In a

number of places one still does not sense an attitude of serious self-critical analysis, lessons are not being learned from mistakes committed earlier, and critical comments and proposals expressed at report and election meetings are being implemented slowly.

Workers of the political directorate encountered a similar situation while studying the activity of the party organization in which Maj N. Kovalenko is registered. An increase in its role could hardly have been considered when communist supervisors A. Mitreykin, P. Kuyevda, L. Logovoy and other party activists did not even properly try to understand the party's current requirements and did not see the prospects in their own work. It is for this reason that they were unable to inspire CPSU members and candidate members to creativity, initiative and the search for a potential increase in operational readiness. In comparison with the past training year, the number of communists who have committed themselves to become outstanding in combat and political training has decreased. The drive to build a strict system of regulations was carried out very poorly in the collective for a long time. And the main reason for deficiencies was the fact that the party organization did not demand that its members carry out restructuring, and that it did not become a genuine center of ideological and educational work.

The conciliatory attitude of the political section of the combined unit, which substituted general instructions for the party organization instruction manual, also played a role. Its workers rarely visited subunits, had little intercourse with personnel about the work of party committees and the party buro, and made judgments based on inquiries and reports.

These facts compelled us to study carefully the style of activity of political organs in primary party organizations. At assemblies of chiefs of political sections, the question was raised concerning the impermissibility of passivity and inertia, and the names were called out of those who had not yet found their place in restructuring. We demanded that political organs concentrate their efforts on increasing the aggressiveness and liveliness of party organizations. We recommended that they earnestly get involved in the training of active party members on the spot and with the development of the activity of each communist. At the same time, workers of political directorates looked critically into their own methods of organized work. Indeed, our representatives had visited the aforementioned unit. But they restricted themselves mainly to a statement of deficiencies, and so did not take the matter to a conclusion. And only because they did not help workers of political sections in time to reject a theoretical style of management. Indeed, we will say straight out that up until recently we did not visit the troops very frequently. Routine daily business and the paper mill precluded workers of the political directorate from tearing themselves away from their desks.

After analyzing the structure of their worktime, they came to the conclusion that it was entirely possible to do without many meetings, conferences and inquiries without damage to the job. This made it possible to change the regulation of work, to reduce the number of summons of personnel to the political directorate, and to visit more frequently the places where the problems, successes and shortcomings are more visible. Now more than half of

the official time of the instructor-inspector staff is conducted in political bodies and in primary party organizations. But the number of official duty trips is still not a good indicator of effective work. There is another criterion here: what the worker of the political directorate accomplished during his stay in the unit, and whom and what he taught. At staff meetings, we hear reports about the findings of trips to the troops without fail. We do not ignore any critical comments; we consider everything that is new, what is progressive and what happened in party work, and we take operational measures to correct deficiencies.

The political sections of units and combined units have increased their ties to primary party organizations noticeably. However, tendencies have appeared in their work to replace secretaries of party committees and party buros and to interfere in their activities without particular need. But one of the main conditions for increasing the aggressive activity of party organizations is the development of their initiative and independence. It must be admitted that previously almost every meeting agenda was passed to the party committees from above, and instructions that were not always sound on when and how to implement measures poured in. Therefore, we demanded that political organs refrain from extreme regulation of the internal life of party organizations, that they reduce the flow of paper, and that they not interfere in the plans of secretaries without need. As yet not everything is going as planned. But this approach is the only correct one: to raise the aggressiveness of communists themselves, and to create an atmosphere in each party organization which would inspire everyone to seek effective solutions and an open and frank exchange of opinions.

A full-blooded life for a party organization is unthinkable without strict adherence to intraparty democracy and an increased role of organs of collective leadership--party committees and buros, and meetings for working up well thought-out and sound decisions. It is difficult to expect unity of views and actions and, of course, the perceptible influence of communists on the state of affairs and the moral climate in a military collective, when the party organization permits private resolution of questions and when there is an absence of openness, criticism and self-criticism. Communists of a unit in which Maj A. Motrenko was the secretary of the party committee saw this at one time with their own eyes. Meetings of the party committee and party assemblies were held here regularly in which important questions were raised on the quality of operational and political training of personnel. However, some communist managers, including the secretary himself, who were confident of their own infallibility that they understood the situation better than those on the scene and could by themselves determine the disposition of forces and the direction of work of CPSU members and candidate members, stopped relying on the collective experience of party organizations and listening to people's opinions. Severe and domineering faint notes that hindered a free and business-like exchange of opinions and that nipped creative thought and initiative in the bud could be heard more and more frequently at meetings of the party committee and party assemblies. As a result, the aggressiveness of

party organizations decreased, some communists stood aloof from personnel, and they did not know the actual state of affairs in subunits. As a consequence, educational work weakened in platoons and companies, and the party organization stopped having any kind of influence on the course of combat training and the moral climate in the collective.

Unfortunately, all of these negative phenomena escaped the attention of the political section. Officer Yu. Stasyuk and other workers who occasionally visited this party organization were not able to examine mutual interrelationships in the collective, and they placed their trust in paper reports that evidently embellished the true picture. Urgent measures had to be employed jointly with the political section. First of all, a communist was recommended for the position of secretary of the party committee who possesses solid experience in party work and who understands people well. He began by motivating members of the party committee to reject the armchair style of work. Party activists who were supported by new unit commanders concentrated on practical activity in local military collectives. By means of party assignments and bringing adopted resolutions into reality, the secretary brought unit direction of communists closer to platoons and companies. I will note that not everyone liked this at first. However, the collective approach to the resolution of vital problems, steadfastness and a strict and continuous demand from the communists in the end enabled achieving that which they understood: one cannot live only with personal official concerns and find out about the state of affairs by hearsay--a living, continuous and close relationship with people is needed. The communists of the unit gave a lot of attention to individual work. Their political influence on soldiers gradually but truly had its impact and inspired people to conscientious military work. Now unit personnel successfully fulfill combat training tasks facing them.

In this connection, I cannot help touching on a problem which, in my view, plays a special role among many important component transformations of party organizations into a genuine combat vanguard of the military collective. This is its active participation in conducting the personnel policy of the party that is provided in CPSU regulations. The CPSU Central Committee January plenum set a clear purpose: not to permit any deviations from the Lenin principles of selection, placement and education of personnel; decisive criteria in assignments and transfers must be the ideological and moral qualities of workers, their actual deeds and the ability to put the political line of the party into practice. Those qualities that should distinguish each manager are also clear. These are ideological firmness, high political culture, competence, an ability to organize collective work and to inspire people through personal example, loyalty to principles, solid moral convictions, a continuous requirement to communicate with the masses and to live by the interests and needs of the people. It is hardly necessary to prove that if a commander, the political worker and the secretary of the party organization possess such qualities the job will be a success and that a healthy atmosphere will reign.

It should be acknowledged that not everything in the work of selecting, assigning, training and educating personnel of the district is being done as required by the directions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the January plenum of the Central Committee. Some political bodies, party committees and party

buros are not always objective in their evaluation of the professional, political and moral qualities of the communists who are nominated for leadership positions. Therefore, people sometimes are found among CPSU members occupying responsible posts who because of their immoral behavior in many respects do not at all contribute to the formation of a healthy and united collective. Not long ago, officer A. Gontu had to be held strictly accountable to the party. His coarseness and lack of self-control in contacts with subordinates, his self-conceit and hard-heartedness and disregard for the opinions of the party organization led to the fact that an unhealthy situation developed in the units in which he served: breaches of military discipline and ethical standards in the relationships among servicemen became more frequent.

The real concern about personnel, it was emphasized at the January plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, has nothing to do with being kind and forgiving. We have no right to forget this lesson. We have to show those who want to work in the new way greater trust and react to their opinions and suggestions more respectfully. At the same time, we must not lower party demands, and we must strengthen control over the execution by communists of their service responsibilities.

We spoke about this at a recently held meeting of party activists in the district. Its participants associated success in restructuring directly with an increase in the role of political bodies and primary party organizations in educating personnel. And this, in my view, is an indication of the growing political maturity of communists and their responsibility for the state of affairs in their own subunits and units. Take, for example, the political section in which officer A. Makarenko serves. Here they started to study more intensively the professional and moral-political qualities of communists who were nominated for supervisory work, and they began to give them more active assistance and support. All of this in an indirect way has an effect on increased responsibility and the creative activity of those to whom the teaching and education of soldiers is entrusted.

Thus, when the question of promoting political worker officer N. Ibragimov to a new position was under review, the commanders and workers of the political section thoroughly evaluated his professional and moral-political qualities, found out about the opinion of the party organization, and considered his non-utilization of opportunities in professional training. And then the political body of the combined unit did not lose sight of this officer. When it was suddenly disclosed that the communist supervisor began to conceal facts of breaches of military discipline in order to appear in a better light, the political section immediately reacted to the officer's improper attitude. He was severely called to task in a service and party manner, and at the same time it helped set straight the objective-oriented party political work in the interests of strengthening discipline.

Criticism and self-criticism are a tested means of increasing the activity and assertiveness of communists. The political directorate tries every day to see to it that openness, an atmosphere of frankness and adherence to principles in evaluating achievements prevails in party collectives. Practice confirms that those collectives in which the sharp edge of criticism is dulled

inevitably sprout roots of complacency and irresponsibility, which leads to stagnation on the job. One time this situation developed in a missile battalion. To the credit of party members, they gave battle at their meetings to all-forgiveness and impunity, and they severely criticized communist Maj A. Zverev for non-compliance with the requirements of CPSU regulations and weakening attention to increasing the professional training of soldiers of the leading specialties.

It was not long ago that not one of the communists of a battalion would dare so openly and in plain terms state his view on the execution of party responsibility to the immediate commander. But it is precisely this that is the crux of innovation in the approach of party members to an evaluation of the results of collective work. Frank and honest criticism of deficiencies helped eliminate them operationally and to achieve high results in the training of personnel. Without this work, which Zverev promoted after the meeting, attentively listening to the opinion of the party organization, it would hardly have been possible for the missilemen on the eve of firings to operationally make up for a deficiency in firing and tactical training.

However, by far not all party organizations have firmly established constructive criticism and principled self-criticism and a call to action as the standard in party life. Some utilize them as a shield to cover their inactivity: they admit mistakes, promise to correct them, but nothing changes. A unique division of criticism according to the principle "this is for the rank and file and this is for the leaders" is still noticeable. You listen to another reporting official and speakers--and it seems that everything is there: the severity of raised problems, dissatisfaction with what has been accomplished and the striving of people to look to tomorrow. But, then, the evaluations of and demands on communists are according to rank. We encountered such an approach in the party organization headed by Maj V. Vyalets. The secretary of the party buro took a strange position when in a report to a party meeting he gave an evaluation of the personal contribution of communists to the resolution of tasks confronting the military collective. Speaking of the "directors," criticism sounded like empty chatter, and it was tactful, as though it was meant not to hurt anyone's feelings and not to touch a sore spot. But when the talk was about communists of subunits, then, as the saying goes, thunder and lightning raged.

In a word, a lot of work has yet to be done so that all aspects of the activity of one or another communist, of one or another party organization receives an objective evaluation, so that existing deficiencies are subjected to thorough analysis and liberal attitudes toward breaches and their perpetrators are not permitted. Because all-forgiveness, like corrosion, eats away at the party collective, and it undermines its unity.

Strengthening the role of party organizations as the basic link in restructuring is inseparably tied to inspection and verification of execution. Qualified, specific and objective inspection helps strengthen executive discipline in a party collective, and it increases the personal responsibility of communists for sector assignments and for overall success. Here, I am confident, there is more than a little potential for increasing the assertiveness of primary party organizations. But, unfortunately, here also

the political organs frequently still display formalism and limit themselves to the study of secondary questions, avoiding the critical problems of increasing party influence on the state of military discipline. Sometimes a check on execution is understood by individual workers of political organs to be only a recording of deficiencies and neglect.

We view the further ideological and organizational strengthening of primary party organizations and increasing their activity, aggressiveness and independence as a main condition for strengthening party influence on the state of discipline and the level of combat readiness of units and subunits. Utilizing basic experience and getting rid of deficiencies, we will steadily follow the policy outlined by the plenum to achieve real results in restructuring.

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PROFESSIONAL SELECTION TO HIGHER MILITARY-POLITICAL SCHOOLS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 7, Apr 87 (Signed to press 17 Mar 97) pp 71-76

[Article under rubric "In the Military Academies and Schools" by Col P. Abramov, deputy chief of the personnel directorate of the main political directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, and Maj A. Suvorov, senior instructor of the personnel directorate of the main political directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: "Professional Selection to Higher Military-Political Schools: Facets of the Problem"]

[Text] Accomplishing the task of restructuring party political work in the Soviet armed forces in the light of the requirements of the 27th CPSU Congress is inseparably tied to further improvement in the system of training political workers for the army and navy, in particular one of its most important links--the professional psychological selection of candidates for training in higher military political schools. This selection is dictated by life itself and by the tasks of training and educating highly qualified cadres of officer political workers. Increased demands are made in their training today. Modern managers, it was noted in the January plenum of the central committee of the party, must be distinguished by profound ideological conviction, professional maturity, firm moral principles, and an ability to convince people and lead them and to establish restructuring in work.

When they join the troops, many graduates of VVPU's [Higher Military Political Schools], as practice shows, make a good showing in their work. They are characterized by responsibility, initiative and the acquired habits of organizers and educators. It is impossible not to notice their enthusiasm for political work and the desire to be in the thick of things and among people. In the final analysis, all of this makes up the foundation of the successful job-related activity of young officer political workers and calls forth their considerable contribution to combat training and to strengthening discipline.

At the same time, facts of another kind are known. The professional development of some graduates of military political schools is not easy. After completing a VUZ, they cannot "find themselves" in work for a long time. And this is explained in significant measure by the fact that they do not

have a sincere enthusiasm and interest in the work--the young people simply made a mistake in selecting the profession. Owing to their individual psychological makeup, they are not disposed to successfully mastery of the profession of political worker of the army and navy.

After the completion of a military political school, Lt K. Sushkov arrived in one of the military units for further service in the position of company deputy commander for political affairs. He had an efficiency report that was not bad and a good diploma evaluation. Many thought that the young officer with appropriate help could successfully join the combat ranks of a subunit. But it soon became apparent: things were not going well for the young political worker. The officer was not able to deal with people, and he did not try to use the variety of pedagogical means in the education of soldiers and to mobilize them to accomplish operational and political training tasks. And the reason for this was not only the lack of necessary experience. Sushkov's words and actions attested to his reluctance to meet people half way, to understand them and to delve deeply into the essence of problems that troubled soldiers. Each day the distance between the young political worker and personnel of the subunit increased.

Later it turned out that Sushkov was never inclined to work with people. He enrolled in school at the urging of his parents. From his early youth he was interested in electrical engineering and radio instrument designing. It is possible that this would have become his calling. But, submitting to parental persuasion, the youth made a vital error, which was not simple to correct.

We will say right out: similar cases are not just isolated occurrences. Therefore, the problem of improving professional psychological selection of servicemen and persons from among civilian youth for training in a VVPU takes on a special topical interest. One of the most important tasks of selection is a deep and comprehensive evaluation of the social and psychophysiological qualities of candidates and the identification of abilities in them to master the future specialty. Thereby, as research data demonstrate, the necessary prerequisites are created for the successful formation in future political workers of the acquired habits of organizers and educators and their solid development in the primary officer duty. It can be said with full justification that it is because of good professional psychological selection in many higher military political schools that the activity of the training and educational process and the quality of training of graduates in practical work with the troops have been improved.

The experience of professional psychological selection in the Donetsk Higher Military Political School of Engineer Troops and Signals Troops imeni General of the Army A. A. Yepishev deserves our attention. Quite a lot is being done here to improve this work. The command element, the political and training sections and party organizations of the departments continuously concern themselves about perfecting professional selection. This question is examined periodically in the school council, conferences and party meetings. Specific measures are determined that are directed at increasing the responsibility of communists for efficient professional selection. Through the joint efforts of professional selection specialists, teachers in the school and scientists of the Donetsk state medical institute, a psychophysiological method of

selection has been developed which includes a broad profile questionnaire, a set of tasking forms and instrument analysis. Time has confirmed the effectiveness of this method.

We would especially like to remark on the role of the political section of the school. It does more than steer researchers to qualitative execution of professional selection. Officers of the political body, frequently not sparing their personal time, study the social and psychophysiological qualities of enrolling students and their individual features, and they provide real assistance to officers of the professional selection group in the organization and conduct of work in determining the professional suitability of candidates to enroll in the school.

The Kiev higher naval political school has also acquired undoubted positive experience. Here they cooperate closely with the UkSSR Academy of Sciences scientific research institute of psychology. A result of this fruitful cooperation are the recommendations to study the psychophysiological qualities of servicemen and persons from among civilian youth who show a desire to become military political workers. These recommendations are now applied widely in the selection of candidates for training in the school.

Many other similar examples can be given. And they all convince one that today there can be no doubt about the outlook for the military psychological work being conducted in selection for the VVPU. The task is to see to it that this work is carried on continuously, purposefully and qualitatively. However, its level does not meet current requirements.

At the present time, in our view, a discrepancy exists between available capabilities for selection to higher military political schools and the degree of realization of these capabilities in practice. In the first place, in determining the professional suitability of candidates for political worker activity in the army and navy, effective use is not always made by far of tried methods of investigating a person's social and psychophysiological qualities. Secondly, higher military political schools are still poorly conducting scientific research which would make it possible to increase significantly the quality of professional psychological selection. Some political bodies do not display the necessary concern about its improvement. In particular, this has to do with political sections of the Sverdlovsk Higher Military Political Tank and Artillery School imeni L. I. Brezhnev and the Novosibirsk Higher Military Political Combined Arms School imeni 60th Anniversary of Great October. They were not able to get workers of political sections themselves to conduct qualitative work in the study of the social and political activity and moral qualities of future cadets during VUZ recruitment periods. Sometimes formalism is allowed in this work. Individual communists deal irresponsibly with an assigned job; however, known facts are not evaluated on the basis of principles.

In a number of VUZ's one can hear the opinion: they say that professional selection is a relatively new thing, and so, costs are inevitable. They say that everything will turn out all right with time. Such a view is incorrect. And this is especially apparent in the light of the restructuring that is taking place in the country. We must not expect that everything "will turn

out all right" with time; energetic and real measures are needed by political bodies and party organizations so that professional selection work is also accelerated and raised to a higher qualitative level.

The problem of perfecting professional selection also dictates the need for appropriate methodological support. There is a substantial number of methods now available in higher military political schools in the equipment of professional selection groups. But do they all clearly define the qualities which have to be considered in accepting a youth for the school, and afterwards develop these qualities in the process of training? Because if the methods are general, professional selection lacks specificity and purposefulness.

Today each higher military political school has a professional graphic description of the activity of an officer political worker--a professiongram [professiogram]. It makes it possible to establish the distinctive makeup of a VVPU graduate, the ideal political worker. Naturally, the need arises in professional selection to bring out the conformity of the abilities of a candidate for school enrollment with the conditions of the professiongram. And therefore it is important that the professiongram fully reflect requirements for the personal qualities of political workers.

We will say it is absolutely clear that an officer political worker must possess ideological conviction, that he must be honest and truthful and a person who is dedicated to his military duty, and that he have such qualities as devotion to the motherland and be ready for self-sacrifice in the defense of its interests, etc.

At the same time, the professiongram must give an absolutely clear answer to the question of military professional qualities of an officer political worker and his special qualities. Whether the candidate for VVPU training has a steadfast military political orientation, an inclination to work with people, the habits and skills of an organizer, propagandist abilities and, for example, whether he is naturally sociable and has a sense of collectivism.

It would seem that use of the professiongram should remove many questions associated with professional selection. However, not all problems have been resolved. Sometimes facts are encountered which indicate an incorrect selection of evaluation criteria of some qualities of the personality of a youth entering a VVPU. It happens that in one school they are lowered and in another they are raised unjustifiably. Unquestionably, this reflects negatively on the level of professional selection.

As is known, VVPU recruitment is made from among servicemen and civilian youths. Absolutely the same requirements must be applied for moral political, military professional and individual psychological qualities of all candidates, regardless of the military district or group of forces in which they undergo professional psychological selection for one or another VUZ. The same requirements must also be applied to civilian youths who undergo professional psychological analysis right in the schools. Therefore, the organizers of selection both in military units and combined formations, districts and groups of forces, military commissariats and in military

political schools must be armed with the very same methods of psychodiagnostics.

This does not mean, however, that organizers of local selection will be limited in independence and creative search. As is known, the special qualities which a candidate certainly should possess are determined by the specific type of VUZ. Their evaluation has been and will be in the future a prerogative of the professional selection group of one or another school. Consequently, the task of improving professiongrams is moved to the forefront, so that they more fully reflect both the requirements for military professional qualities of a political worker and the specifics of his activity employed in an individual service or combat arm.

On the other hand, the development by researchers of new highly informative methods for determining the level of development of the personal qualities of candidates will make it possible everywhere to introduce progressive experience in the practice of professional selection.

One of the most important trends in increasing its effectiveness is the training of specialists who are capable of conducting psychological research skillfully in higher military political schools, in troop units and in military commissariats. There are not enough such specialists, it must be said outright. While this problem is resolved in schools at the expense of creating regular professional selection groups and the involvement of teachers of the leading departments in research, and first and foremost, the departments of military pedagogy and psychology, matters dealing with the training of psychology specialists and psychophysicologists are more complex.

In essence, it is mainly political workers who are engaged in professional selection. They conduct individual educational work with candidates, and they study thoroughly the individual psychological features of individual young servicemen. This, understandably, requires a deep understanding of military psychology, and not just general knowledge, but also especially specific knowledge applicable to the tasks of professional selection. And in this connection, the importance of thorough study in a military VUZ of the psychological analysis of data on social and psychophysiological qualities of candidates and the essence and content of psychological and mathematical methods employed in the study of the personality of servicemen and the psychology of military collectives become completely obvious to those who throw light on the selection method.

Of course, resolution of this question will require a certain amount of time. But even now students and cadets can arm themselves with the necessary knowledge by means of elective studies and by way of utilizing the opportunities of military scientific work, etc.

To a large extent, an increase in the effectiveness of professional psychological selection depends on how responsibly political bodies and party and Komsomol organizations of subunits and units approach the issuance of objective recommendations for enrollment in a VVPU and in appropriate efficiency reports in which an evaluation is given of the moral-political, military professional and individual psychological qualities of servicemen and

their professional suitability for the activities of a political worker. Unfortunately, the recommendations of political sections and job-related and Komsomol efficiency reports frequently abound in standard phrases, and individual features of the future political workers are not disclosed. Many efficiency reports do not show whether the candidates are disposed to working with people or whether they possess the skills for organizational work. Frequent also are cases where military service training records submitted by military units to political directorates of districts and groups of forces, as well as to the political directorates of field examining boards, lack the necessary documents. Thus, for example, almost half of the training records of candidates who enrolled last year in the Odessa Military District VVPU did not contain the recommendations of the political sections when the field examining board began its work. In the Transbaykal Military District, a majority of the training records of candidates were formulated with errors that had to be eliminated when the servicemen went through the process of professional selection.

All of this indicates that the problems of professional selection have not yet become a subject of permanent concern of political bodies and party and Komsomol organizations. At the same time, we have standards on how to deal with this important matter.

For example, this can be said about the political section of the combined unit in which Lt Col G. Bondarev serves. Questions of professional selection are thoroughly discussed at meetings in the political section. Briefings of the party and Komsomol active members are held in which discussions are conducted on measures for improving VVPU selection. Besides, emphasis is placed on intensifying individual educational work with candidates in training. Conversations about political schools and meetings with graduates and teachers of VVPU's are organized in units and subunits of combined large units in accordance with the professional selection plan. Political organs, party committees and the party buro place a heavy demand on those who irresponsibly and formally approach the resolution of professional psychological selection tasks.

Life also gives us quite a few examples of capable organization of professional psychological selection in military commissariats. Real work in this direction is being conducted by the Zhitomir Oblast military commissariat. Here a system was created for the selection and preparation of candidates from among civilian youths for enrollment in higher military political institutions. It includes diverse measures for the military and patriotic education of youth and their professional orientation and physical training. Meetings of youth with veterans of the armed forces of the USSR, officers of units, instructors and cadets of military schools and photo exhibits are organized which vividly display the modern life of the army. The military patriotic school "Sputnik," in which youths get ready to enter military VUZ's, operates on the base of the Zhitomir Higher PVO School of Radioelectronics imeni the Lenin Komsomol.

The command element and the political section of the oblast military commissariat try to see to it that all city and rayon military commissariats conduct active and fruitful work in the selection of candidates for enrollment

in military schools, including VVPU. However, this oblast military commissariat has a number of unresolved problems that relate to professional selection. At times, measures directed at the military-patriotic education of youths are conducted at a low organizational level and with elements of formalism. Because of the irresponsibility of individual workers of rayon military commissariats, systematic lively work with youths is replaced by campaigning. In some military commissariats, selection is made, as the saying goes, by eye. Representatives of higher military political schools are frequently limited in their opportunities to teach the candidates, inasmuch as the periods of their temporary duty assignments are short. Sometimes, because of organizational lack of coordination, they are unable to travel to places that are remote, and they work essentially in oblast centers. All of this, of course, does not promote an improvement in professional psychological selection.

It is not out of place also to touch on this facet of the problem. The professional psychological selection today of candidates to higher military political schools is inconceivable without the employment of modern computer systems. It is possible with their help to obtain a maximum of information in a short time about individual psychological characteristics of servicemen and civilian youths enrolling in a VVPU. Work on systematization of professional selection data which, whenform methods were used, fell on the shoulders of personnel, is now being accomplished by computers. This allows directing the main efforts of members of professional selection groups to the study of candidates with the help of other methods: observation, conversations, analysis of documents, etc.

Computer equipment, unquestionably, is needed in professional psychological selection; however, the process of putting it into practice in investigating candidates is going unjustifiably slowly. Of course, there are also objective circumstances here. At times, appropriate programs are lacking, and there are few specialists for equipment maintenance. But the main reason is that people got accustomed to working in the old way, and they are not hastening to restructure themselves. And here the political bodies and party organizations are called on to make a pronouncement on the matter and properly concern themselves with the computerization of professional psychological selection.

Professional psychological selection, organized and conducted in higher military political schools on the basis of the latest achievements of military psychological science, is directed at the needs of the troops and the training of highly qualified officer political workers for units and subunits. And therefore one of the most important concerns of commanders and political workers of units and subunits of the army and navy and workers of military commissariats, military scientists, specialists and VUZ faculty members must be the continuous concern about improving the selection of candidates for training in political schools and raising it to a level that meets today's requirements.

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CONFERENCE OF BLACK SEA FLEET PARTY AKTIV

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Mar 87 p 2

[Report by Capt 3d Rank V. Pasyakin: "In the Spirit of the Heightened Demands"]

[Text] The meeting of the party aktiv of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet was held in an atmosphere of increased demandingness and an active search for ways to renew the style and enhance the effectiveness of the work in the spirit of today's demands. Admiral A. Sorokin, First Deputy Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, presented a report at the meeting on the results of the January 1987 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the tasks of navy party organizations with respect to implementing its decisions.

Admiral M. Khronopulo, fleet commander, Rear Admiral V. Nekrasov, member of the military council and chief of the political directorate of the fleet, Comrades V. Kravchenko, Ye. Orlov, A. Tsykalo, A. Chebykin and others who spoke in the discussion stated that positive changes have taken shape in the work of the party organizations but that we still have to work for a decisive turn toward the new way of working. There are still many instances of passivity and sluggishness. Many Communists are finding it difficult to give up accustomed but ineffective methods of accomplishing the tasks. In some collectives attempts are still made to gloss over the situation.

The party organizations whose members include Communists Yu. Shchekoldin, A. Semenovskiy, I. Alesin and V. Sled are not demanding in their assessment of the state of military discipline, and infractions of regulations have sometimes been covered up there. The party aktiv meeting acutely stressed the urgent need for the military cadres to perform in a spirit of learning from the truth and a high level of self-criticism. We cannot move forward if we cover up and do not attach importance to shortcomings.

The names of officers-and-Communists V. Fomin, B. Chernyshkov and a number of others were also mentioned as still preferring the old methods of leadership and training subordinates in the accustomed conditions, which lowers the quality of the combat training. The importance of developing and activating a feeling for the new in every Communist was stressed, and reliance on advanced know-how was discussed. Officers-and-Communists A. Garmashev and I. Palamarchuk, for example, do not have this kind of purposefulness, and the effectiveness of the ship repair work is therefore increasing slowly.

On the other hand, success is in evidence where a climate of great demandingness has been created, where the restructuring is understood as the need to implement the party's specific aims in the collectives, where this matter has been taken under special control, where purposeful organizational and indoctrinational work is performed. This is how the party organizations headed by V. Girushev, S. Nikulin, V. Karpov and V. Zybin operate. This is how all of them must operate.

Many good suggestions were made at the meeting for increasing party influence on the performance of the military cadres.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

MEETING OF KIEV MD PARTY AKTIV

Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 29 Mar 87 p 3

[Ukrainian News Agency report: "At the Level of Party Demands"]

[Text] Positive changes have taken shape in the work of commanders, political organs and party organizations of the Red Banner Kiev Military District. Criticism and self-criticism, objectivity in assessing what has been accomplished, principle and an active search for ways to renew the work style and make the work more effective are becoming the norm. It was noted in the report by Colonel General V.V. Osipov, district commander, and in the speeches by those participating in the meeting of the district party aktiv, which discussed the results of the January 1987 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the tasks of commanders, political organs and party organizations with respect to implementing its decisions, that this is having a positive effect on the combat readiness of the troops, on the strengthening of discipline and the improvement of living conditions and possibilities for rest and relaxation for the servicemen.

The ability to operate in the spirit of the party's contemporary demands is of fundamental importance today. They require that we thoroughly analyze the state of affairs, resolutely abandon the burden of the past, and work with a sense of responsibility to improve the ideological strength of the servicemen, the intensity and the quality of the combat and political training and the socialist competition, and ensure that the officers, the Communists and Komsomol members set a personal example.

It was pointed out at the aktiv meeting, however, that the work of some command and political cadres, including some in the district system, is still characterized by an armchair, check-and-audit work style, paperwork, bureaucracy and a tendency to conduct various meetings and conferences. Arrogance and abuse of service position have still not been completely eliminated. Mistakes are made in the selection and placement of cadres.

District personnel must contribute to the fulfillment of decisions of the 27th party congress and the January Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee with specific action aimed at eliminating shortcomings and providing a fitting reception for the 70th anniversary of Great October.

Army General A.D. Lizichev, chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, spoke at the meeting.

V.D. Kryuchkov, candidate member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, took part in the meeting.

MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

MEETING OF FAR EAST MD PARTY AKTIV

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Apr 87 p 2

[Report by Col B. Karpov, KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Time For Action: A Meeting of the Party Aktiv"]

[Text] Experience in the restructuring in units and formations of the Red Banner Far East Military District, primarily experience in renewing the work style at the supervisory level, was discussed not so long ago in our newspaper. The Communists in charge began by thinking over their own performance, by breaking up persistent stereotypes in their own outlook and developing a new way of thinking. This sort of active stance is the best example for subordinates. The process of reassessing past experience and accepting the concepts of the restructuring is underway even now. It is embracing more and more "levels" of thinking and of life, and increasing the number of people who are gaining an ever increasing understanding of their purpose today.

This is the right way. In order to act, one must understand the essence and the purposes of the action. But one must also not delay with the achievement of results. If one vacillates, one will be left behind. What does this mean for the Communist, however, the one who is expected to be ahead of and lead others?

The answer is clear, and this is why the meeting of the district party aktiv discussed with particular concern the fact that it is now time for everyone to take action, to take perceptible and practical steps—for some, perhaps the first steps—forward. It repeatedly stressed the demand which has been set forth for all the Communists of the army and navy today, which has the sound of a combat motto: that 1987 must be a year of concrete restructuring in the work, a year of holding every individual strictly accountable for his personal contribution to the restructuring and for the specific results achieved in the assigned area. Incidentally, during a break in the meeting, one could hear the participants saying things like "The motto needs to be presented in the form of visual agitation in each collective. Let it be a reminder and a call for action...."

The need for action was also the dominant theme in a report presented by Lieutenant General M. Moiseyev, district commander, on the results of the January 1987 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the tasks stemming from its decisions for commanders, political organs and party organizations. He particularly stressed the importance of stimulating the human factor and renewing methods and

forms in the work performed with the people. In the people lie the energy for the restructuring and reserves for strengthening military discipline and enhancing combat readiness.

Lieutenant Colonel A. Vavulin eloquently affirmed this idea in the discussion. He told how the unit party organization had adopted a great deal from the experience of the party committee in one of the regiments of the Leningrad Military District, of which Guards Captain S. Zholovan is secretary. Among other things, a so-called system of personal evaluation of the Communists was adopted. This greatly altered the attitude of the people toward their service and party duties and the climate in the collective.

"We no longer worry about disruptions of the classes or about poor preparations for them, and do not engage in petty tutelage as we did before, because we know that we can count on every individual. And everyone knows that he is visible, that all of his work will be assessed at the next party meeting," Lieutenant Colonel A. Vavulin said. "This has intensified everyone's attitude toward the common success or lack of success. We have also seen the birth and the strengthening of such a gratifying thing as demandingness among peers, which was lacking before. The Communist is now being demanding of his equals in a totally principled way...."

The report and the speeches by Lieutenant General V. Silakov, member of the district Military Council and chief of the district Political Directorate, Major General V. Korostelev and Colonel A. Zhukov, also named other sources of progressive know-how and stressed the fact that know-how has a particular role today. Not a single example of a creative approach to the accomplishment of the missions should be ignored. Progressive know-how must be actively sought, must be created and extensively disseminated.

The fact was also stressed that changes in the work style, the increasing closeness of those in charge to subordinates, the campaign against excessive paperwork, the elimination of armchair, bureaucratic methods of leadership, the growth of criticism and self-criticism, like many other things which are a part of the restructuring, must not be a goal in themselves. All of the spiritual potential of the restructuring must be focused on the accomplishment of our main tasks. We must resolutely overcome the deficiencies and maladies produced by stagnation and lowered demandingness. These have put down deep roots, and it will not be so easy to destroy them. They show up in many areas, including the combat training. Simplification and sham must be "outlawed." The planning, the organization of the training and the life of the personnel must be improved. Training facilities must be raised to the modern level. We must strive persistently to totally eliminate nonregulation relations. A real increase of effort must be made this year, within the immediate future, in the accomplishment of these and many other specific tasks.

All facets of the tasks involved in the restructuring and improvement of the personnel policy have to do with the strengthening of discipline and regulation order. The meeting of the party aktiv stressed the fact that every commander, ev-political worker and Communist must be more demanding in assessing his work in this area. And each of them must demonstrate the contribution he has made, what he has achieved, what kind of example he is setting.

The speakers stated that far from everyone today is operating in the spirit of the times. Many people have relaxed in their efforts to strengthen discipline, and there has been an unjustified slump in the campaign to eliminate drunkenness. Nothing can justify an infraction of discipline or regulations by Communists, particularly the leaders. There are cases of this, however. Officer V. Babich, for example, arranged a drinking bout with Lieutenant Colonel A. Bezhnar, senior pilot-inspector, in the flight messhall. Their superiors knew about this, but they were not brought to accountability until 2 months later, when it was no longer possible to hush things up, as they say.

The new tasks can not be accomplished with the old methods. The work style must be persistently renewed. Many people still lack this kind of persistence. The names of Communists-and-leaders V. Gubkin, V. Taranov and A. Chernyshev were mentioned, among others. They have not yet "discovered" more effective ways of accomplishing their assigned tasks in all areas, and they sometimes submit exaggerated reports of the results they have achieved in their assigned areas of the work. The old malady still lives.

And there is a lot of talk about the need to resolutely combat the excess paper work, but the staffs and directorates continue to flood the forces with it. Regimental commanders sometimes have to spend up to 30 percent of their time studying documents, compiling reports and writing up (once again, on paper) what they are doing in response to these written instructions.

Speaking at the party aktiv meeting, Major General O. Ilin, Colonel V. Ponomarenko, Colonel A. Zharukhayev and others spoke of the need to reinforce the tradition of Bolshevik truth and self-criticism which has developed under the influence of the concepts and the spirit of the 27th CPSU Congress and subsequent Central Committee plenums. We still have Communists-and-leaders who armor themselves against the influence of party organizations and regard being talked to as equals at a party meeting as damaging to their prestige. This cutting oneself off, insulating oneself, in the past produced bureaucrats, haughty and arrogant people remote from the collective of soldiers and officers. Shortcomings of this kind must be persistently eliminated.

It was also stated in the speeches that we must strictly consider the opinion of the party organizations when we resolve personnel problems, and increase the role of party evaluations. This is a reliable barrier to lack of objectivity, protectionism and favoritism, the transferring of workers who have compromised themselves from one position to another, sometimes even a better one. For example, Colonel A. Perepelitsa, chief of a work supervisor's section, was transferred from a remote garrison to an equivalent position in Khabarovsk for padding figures and deception in the release of projects.

The following example was also cited. Major Ye. Svishchev was transferred from a position as deputy battalion commander to the position of deputy regimental commander for rear services, even though he had a stern reprimand in his party record for unsatisfactory performance of service duties. Furthermore, there were insistent calls "from above," trying to speed up the preparation of documents conferring the rank of lieutenant colonel upon Svishchev. People in the unit were of a different opinion, however. He was not granted the rank. The party organization announced yet another penalty for him, and he was certified as not conforming to his position.

A different conclusion was reached at district headquarters, however: "Measures up to the position but has difficulty coping with it." It is the old situation: they know better at the top when to plow and when to sow, what kind of grain to plant and on which fields.

Commanders, political organs and party organizations, every Communist, the meeting underscored, are expected to persistently renew the organizational and ideological work, to stimulate the competition in honor of the 70th anniversary of Great October, and to make this year truly a year of restructuring and of new achievements in combat readiness.

Army General P. Lushev, First Deputy USSR Minister of Defense, spoke at the meeting of the party aktiv.

G. Borovik, secretary of the Khabarovsk Kray Committee of the CPSU and Lieutenant General N. Smorigo, directorate chief in the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army Navy, took part in the meeting of the party aktiv.

11499

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FORMALISM IN ANTIALCOHOL CAMPAIGN

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Apr 87 p 2

[Article by Lt Col M. Ziyeminsh under the rubric "Suggested by the Editor's Mailbag": "Certain Garrisons Are Conducting the Campaign for a Sober Way of Life on Paper and With Words"]

[Text] The life of the subunits had been filled with assemblies and anticipation of the long trip to the range. Supplies had been checked and packed in accordance with all of the regulations governing life on the march and in the field. The assemblies had gone according to plan. Not until the last minute before loading was there an unexpected hitch. Someone did not like something about the way things were packed, and one of the toolboxes was ordered opened. When it was opened they could not believe their eyes: instead of tools, the usual contents, the box was filled with containers of a gurgling substance. They were containers of various brands of strong drink.

I want to explain at the outset that this story has nothing to do with an interesting subject in the detective genre, where numerous inexplicable circumstances and conjectures arise at the very beginning: Who? What for? Why? In this case the answers to all of these questions were found without great difficulty or an intense search. The alcohol, it was learned, had been purchased out of a pool made up of a one-time contribution of 50 rubles put together by Officer G. Kosteyev.

There was only a vague explanation of the purpose for which the extremely daring project had been undertaken. It was because of some sort of unwritten procedure for "presenting" [alcohol] to the instructors at the range, or the men had simply exercised foresight and cooperated in order to make the evenings go by faster at the range....

Be that as it may, the incident was widely publicized. Both the boozers and those who abetted them caught it. Officer G. Kosteyev and certain other Communists/supervisors were given strict penalties.

One would have thought that the scandalous incident which occurred prior to the departure for the range would have alerted the proper officials and provided motivation to thoroughly look into how the work of establishing a sober way of life was proceeding there. This is what was reported by the authors of a letter to the editor recently received from that same collective, however.

"Strict measures are now being applied in the unit to those who abuse alcohol, even to the point of discharging them from the Armed Forces or demoting them. These are drastic steps, but they are just. Unfortunately, they are not applied to everyone. Superior commanders either do not notice or pretend they do not notice certain people's weakness for alcohol...."

I recently visited the garrison to see for myself whether the conclusion drawn in the letter was fair: drinkers are indeed handled selectively there. Warrant Officer I. Shcherbina, for example, is on the roster as a chemical instructor there. It is clear from his past record that he has demonstrated himself to be a poorly trained specialist, inadequately disciplined and inefficient, that "there have been instances in which he has failed to come to work because of his drinking..."

"Instances" is perhaps putting it too mildly. Failure to show up for work as a result of drinking has long since become a regular thing for Warrant Officer Shcherbina. His service record shows a whole series of penalties for this.

Nonetheless, when the question of extending Shcherbina's service term came up, Officer P. Kravatskiy, one of his superiors, resolved without any sort of doubt: "I'll do what I can...." Another revealing conclusion is one drawn by Major A. Donskikh, Warrant Officer Shcherbina's direct superior. The warrant officer's latest certification does not contain a single positive reference, but the officer wrote at the bottom of the certification: "Measures up to the position held."

This is not an isolated case. The judge advocate's office has warned Warrant Officers V. Khoroshenkiy and V. Zhivotovskiy and certain others about the inadmissibility of violating the anti-alcohol laws. And the drunken night concerts which periodically emanate from Major A. Chernyayev's apartment have long since ceased to be the "purely family" matter which the tenants in the apartment consider them to be. The post community has openly requested a halt to the partying there, which is disturbing the peace at night. The command element sees no reason to intervene, however: "They're drinking at home, within their own four walls, at their own expense." Such is the strange logic of the unit command element. Furthermore, Officer A. Shishkin, known to be one of those actively involved in the collecting of money for alcohol prior to the departure for the range, was soon promoted to a position at higher headquarters. He now visits his former place of service as an inspector.

How does one explain such tolerance for certain lovers of alcohol on the part of senior comrades--Officers G. Kosteyev and Ye. Lobintsev, for example? There is a record of a talk which Officer Kosteyev had with Warrant Officer Zhivotovskiy, for example, which states that the latter was sternly warned that "he would be recommended for discharge into the reserve if he consumed alcohol."

This awesome warning was just empty words, however, because we know that Warrant Officer Zhivotovskiy broke his promise more than once following that discussion. It appears that Officer Kosteyev forgot about his decision. Officer Lobintsev's handling of subordinates who abuse alcohol is equally hard to understand.

Such complacency. On paper, however, an active campaign is underway in the unit for a sober way of life....

Here is another letter to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA from a different garrison. It was written by Captain V. Shcherbakov, chief of the unit club. "In order to keep the officers and warrant officers from looking for diversion somewhere else and choosing certain doubtful ways to relax," the author writes, "they should have a more interesting alternative for spending the evening or a day-off."

We need to give due credit to the activists, the party and Komsomol members: until recently they were making a not-unsuccessful effort in this area. People there still recall the first youth get-together with tea instead of alcohol, at which there was enthusiastic discussion of music and history, there was dancing and poetry was read. A concert was given by Eksprompt, an officers' performing ensemble headed by Captain Ye. Ovcharenko, a great lover of music.

Word of how jolly and interesting it had been at the youth party rapidly spread throughout the post. People other than the young officers wanted to relax in such a "spirited" setting. These get-togethers with a well-planned cultural program were highly successful and promised to become a solid tradition. Then... "V. Kosyachenko, chief of the public dining section of the local military trade organization, visited our garrison," Captain Shcherbakov went on to say. "He talked with messhall personnel and the garrison.... The activities came to a halt after that."

For a long time no one knew what had happened. Where did such an absolute ban originate, and what was the reason for it? A lengthy correspondence and reciprocal exchanges of something like courtesy calls began between the interested parties representing the garrison community and the management of the military trade organization headed by V. Grigoryev, in the course of which the former tried to determine the reasoning and felt out opinions and points of view. Unfortunately, however, they could not resolve the leisure-time problem itself, and no progress has yet been made. The "OK" to renew the evening activities never came from the military trade organization. Not only do the workers in public dining not provide assurances of excellent service at such activities, but they are clearly opposed to them. They have their reasons, which they prefer not to discuss but which it is not difficult to guess.

The matter is primarily the following. In the building housing the present messhall where the evening entertainment was provided, there was once an officers' snack-bar which drew customers with its broad range of drinks. Alcohol came to be regarded as almost the main source of earnings. Following the well-known decree on steps to combat drunkenness and alcoholism, it was decided to replace the snack-bar with a messhall. The latter operated only during the lunch hour, after which it was locked up. The problem also involves the fact that there is no establishment on the post except for that messhall, where the evenings of entertainment could be held. The messhall is the only place on the military post where such leisure-time activities can be organized. One can only regret the fact that the public dining workers were unable to reorganize the operation of their facility and could not find their place in the campaign to establish a sober way of life. They say that they are for the restructuring and for the establishment of a sober way of life, of course.

Two letters. At first glance they would appear to differ, but they are essentially about one and the same thing: formalism in the work of eradicating drunkenness and establishing a sober way of life. Formalism is tenacious and has many faces. It is therefore particularly essential to be intolerant of formalism in every instance, no matter how it is manifested--whether it be the abetment of drunks or obstacles to the organization of interesting leisure-time activities.

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CSO: 1801/167

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA FEATURES LETTERS ON RESTRUCTURING

Cadet Practical Training Criticized

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Apr 87 p 2

[Letter from Cadet S. Kalenichiy, Kiev Higher Military Engineering School of Communications imeni M.I. Kalinin, under the rubric "The Restructuring Is Established With Action": "Formalism Is Tenacious"]

[Text] The "Main Directions for Restructuring Higher and Secondary Specialized Education in the Nation" speak of the need to enhance the role of practical experience for the students and to increase the responsibility of leaders of ministries, enterprises and establishments for the vocational and practical preparation of specialists. As applicable to the military school, as I understand it, this means more active and concerned participation by the forces directly in the training of future officers, and increased responsibility for the quality of that training.

I do not know about other VUZs, but we cadets in our last year at the engineering school do not feel this. Take the following fact. For several years now I have heard from the upper-class cadets that the practical experience and on-the-job training in the forces is frequently a matter of idling the time away, that some commanders of subunits and units regard the cadets as an extra work force to be used at their discretion. Not long ago many of us saw this for ourselves.

A group of comrades and I were getting practical experience in one of the military repair enterprises of the Turkestan Military District. We had barely arrived when we were given the following briefing. Do what you like, but do not meddle with the production process. Do not interfere with our fulfillment of the plan. And despite the efforts of our leader, all of the practical experience mainly consisted in dusting things.

Cadets A. Albanov, V. Pavlutskiy and I. Shalobay "improved" their practical skills in approximately the same manner while in one of the units of the Baltic Military District. Their opinion of that trip fully coincides with ours: regret for the wasted time.

There are exceptions, of course. Cadet A. Frantsev was delighted when he returned to the school. A platoon commander was needed in the subunit, and he was

entrusted with performing the duties of a commander. Frantsev feels that 1 month of practical experience as a commander is worth many months of theoretical training. That is obviously true. Why not adopt this practice universally? When the cadets arrive for on-the-job training, assign them the primary duties of officers on leave. If everything is planned in advance, I believe that this could be done without extra cost. Mostly because the periods of on-the-job training and practical experience in production vary for the different schools. After assigning the cadet to a position, he should not only be helped but also held strictly accountable, of course. The final year is obviously a time when the future officer can be held fully accountable.

This sort of thing is still a rarity, however. Apparently people in the forces still do not trust us, do not believe that we are capable of accomplishing the modern missions. And they operate in the old way, by force of habit.

In conclusion, I would like to say this. There is a great deal of talk about the restructuring at the school, in the units and at the enterprises where we have spent time. And always there was a single dominant theme: that the restructuring must begin with oneself. This is unquestionably true. I think that something should be added, however: in order for every individual to increase his effort in the work and be of maximum benefit to the cause, there absolutely must be conditions which permit everyone to totally realize his possibilities and abilities. Any kind of effort will hardly produce a good end result without this.

Modernization Planned in Billeting Section

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Apr 87 p 2

[Letter from Capt A. Tarabrin under the rubric "The Restructuring Is Established With Action": "Overcome Inertia"]

[Text] I would like to share the feelings of satisfaction and joy which I get from the work today. I get them even though things did not begin smoothly on the new job.

The second day after I was appointed chief of the billeting section for the Tula Higher Artillery Engineering School imeni Tula Proletariat, a commission came to the post from the district billeting directorate to check out a complaint of the residents. Many complaints about the utility service were voiced at a general meeting.

My very first acquaintance with the facilities entrusted to me showed that it could not have been otherwise. The equipment was obsolete, and the pipes were in need of major repairs. It was clear that holes would have to be patched. V. Karev, chief of the heat supply system and Soviet Army employee, and I reported the situation to the school chief. He supported the idea of totally rebuilding all of the systems.

I recall how pleased we were with our first successes. By the beginning of the following winter we had eliminated the shortage of hot water by reequipping the boiler room. We did not know the meaning of breakdowns during this past, severe winter. Fuel, electric energy and water were saved.

We are now thinking about the future. After all, that which meets today's needs will be hopelessly obsolete in a few years. In the near future we want to install a computerized control system for the engineer networks and equipment.

We were helped in this matter by Major A. Tsvetkov, graduate of the Leningrad Higher Military Engineering Construction School imeni Army General A.M. Komarovskiy. It turns out that he participated in research on this subject while still a cadet. We established contact not only with the scientists but with the designers as well.

I am frequently asked why we started all of this. We still do not have enough ordinary faucets in the district, and not everyone knows how to properly handle the iron slide valves, they say, but you come along with your electronics.

I believe that everyone at his own job should try to fundamentally improve things and not simply engage in petty fixing. Experience has shown that this can be done, and can be done rapidly. We simply have to overcome inertia and the habit of looking around at others and traveling the beaten path.

Attitudes Toward Restructuring Criticized

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Apr 87 p 2

[Letter from Maj S. Nekhayev, secretary of a unit party committee, Red Banner Far East Military District, under the rubric "The Restructuring Is Established With Action": "Fewer High-Sounding Phrases"]

[Text] I read with great interest the article "The Letter of the Regulations" published under the rubric "Discipline, Organization and Order" in the 7 March 1987 issue of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. In my opinion, it convincingly describes the progressive experience of officers for whom regulation demandingness has become the main principle in the service. That is not all I wanted to say, however.

What else is of interest in this fairly long article? I believe that it succeeded in departing from the tutelage and edification style which, you will agree, is sometimes characteristic of certain newspaper articles.

Please understand me correctly. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA prints many valuable and useful things. And the newspaper is our loyal assistant in our work. Statements such as "One could see that the restructuring had embraced all members of the collective." will show up in some article. It is doubtful that the reader would believe such an assertion.

Why simplify things? I am convinced that the restructuring--particularly the restructuring in the minds of the people--is a very, very complex process not designed to be accomplished in a single leap. It is premature, of course, to say that we have "restructured" or are completing the job. When we look the truth in the eyes, we can see that many people have not even begun it seriously.

The January Plenum of the party Central Committee stressed the fact that the restructuring process is only beginning, but some of us are already rushing to

"sum up the results." I am resolutely opposed to using the word "restructuring" in a completed sense, opposed to chattering about it, to "political blather."

I understand very well that it is necessary, simply essential, to write about those out front. The work "restructuring" should not be misused, however. In this respect I support the author of the article "The Letter of the Regulations." Tell about the new trends, new forms of work and new approaches to the resolution of pressing problems. But write fewer high-sounding phrases, comrade journalists. Let us conduct the discussion in a serious manner. And there should be more critical articles, particularly about those who artificially run ahead and do not think about what lies behind the restructuring process. This can only harm--I am not afraid to use that word--our state cause.

With respect to myself, I have repeatedly planned to write to the newspaper about the concerns and the deeds of our party committee, about the good people in the regiment, about the changes occurring in the unit today. They are perceptible. Military discipline has been strengthened considerably, living conditions have been improved for the personnel, and the training and indoctrination process has been made more effective. But have we truly restructured, restructured on the large scale? No. It is still too early to report that. There is still a vast amount of work to be done. I believe that all of us have the same problems and are engaged in the same quest today. We have all only begun our journey.

Officer Criticized For Doing Too Little

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Apr 87 p 2

[Letter from Maj V. Kukhta, Air Defense Forces, under the rubric "The Restructuring Is Established With Action": "I Came, I Saw, I Reported"]

[Text] Captain V. Malashenko, an officer in our unit's directorate, recently returned from a trip to a site. He went there as an inspector. The report stated that it had been revealed that certain things needed to be repaired in this or that piece of equipment. The deputy unit commander for armaments listened to the entire report, of course, and then inquired as to whether the problems had been corrected. No, they had not. It never occurred to Captain Malashenko to do that. This was not his job, he explained.

It was strange to hear this from an officer. At our party meetings we have discussed more than once the fact that the restructuring demands maximum vigor, initiative and concern of everyone in the work, that monitoring must be combined with a striving to improve things. Furthermore, Captain Malashenko says, at least, that he is all for the restructuring. In fact, however, he is operating in the old way: I came, I saw, I reported. Let others have the headache for all the rest. We are not talking about some inexperienced officer. Malashenko knows the job and could have provided competent help with the equipment repairs. Furthermore, he was there as an inspector, an officer vested with great trust, considerable authority and duties. What do authority and duties mean, however, when the individual lacks a heightened sense of personal responsibility? Unfortunately, Captain Malashenko is not an exception in this respect.

While working in the company commanded by Captain Ye. Bondar, inspectors headed by Major Yu. Ryabinov, a rear service officer, received many justified requests. They listened to the requests and made a lot of promises, but then they did nothing to fulfill those promises. Cases like this are strange also because most of the officers at our headquarters are honorable and conscientious people.

Major Yu. Rasputin and Senior Lieutenant A. Mazurchuk arrived in the company commanded by Captain S. Simakov. When they inspected the equipment, they saw that there were some defects which the specialists in the sununit could not fix. They summoned to the equipment the fightingmen who had serviced it. Rasputin and Mazurchuk began demonstrating how to service the equipment. The equipment was adjusted as a result, and the company specialists learned a great deal.

This style is also typical of many of our other staff officers. When they inspect, they also help, teach and indoctrinate the subordinates. One would expect their example to motivate Captain Malashenko, Major Ryabinov and others who do not excel in activeness to work in the same manner. This is not the case.

We frequently have conscientious officers redoing the negligent work of others. Why not send Captain Malashenko himself to correct deficiencies which were revealed and hold him accountable for the results of the work? I believe that this would be only fair, would conform to the spirit of the restructuring and contribute to the development of a sense of responsibility.

Criticism of Flight Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Apr 87 p 2

[Letter from Lt Col A. Lobov, military sniper-pilot, Red Banner Central Asian Military District, under the rubric "The Restructuring Is Established With Action": "But the Old Way Is Simpler"]

[Text] I would like to talk honestly about something which is troubling and causes concern. There is a lot of talk at various levels about the restructuring and acceleration in the combat training. Deeds and words still frequently differ markedly, however. Let me cite some instances.

When I recently verified the schedule in the squadron commanded by Major N. Silayev, military pilot 1st class, I could see that it was in great part a repetition of the flight plan for the preceeding shift. I told the squadron commander about this. His answer was the following:

"I see nothing wrong with that. These exercises are covered by the yearly combat training plan, which we are trying to fulfill."

There would appear to be nothing wrong with that. In my opinion, however, this approach to the training smacks of formalism. This is why.

The pilots have performed these exercises repeatedly, and they will contribute practically nothing new to their combat training. Repetition does not always result in learning. I know from my own experience that frequently repeated flight missions simply become a bore. One begins to perform for "checkmarks."

It is possible to considerably diversify the old exercises with new things, however, to complicate the tactical setting, to use different versions of initiating combat, overcoming "enemy" air defenses, and so forth.

The fear of "extra" work causes us to adhere to the routine, however, which retards the improvement of our combat training.

Let me say right off that I am certainly not advocating mandatory changes in the standard flight missions for all airmen without exception. The actual training level of each of them must be taken into account. Changes should be made in the missions for the more experienced air fighters. In the above-mentioned squadron these include Captains L. Shurygin and V. Dorofeyev, military pilots 1st class, and certain others.

The squadron commander does not have to go far for experience in this. The regimental commander and his deputy for political affairs try to complicate every intercept and aerial combat exercise, to make them similar to an actual combat situation. It is a pity that these officials do not demand the same from the others. Unfortunately, the principle of doing things "so that nothing bad comes out of it" is very persistent.

Or take the tactical flight exercises. While they are ordinarily conducted at the required level on the regimental scale, in the squadrons they differ almost none from ordinary flights for combat application. I became convinced of this when I attended a tactical flight exercise in the squadron commanded by Lieutenant Colonel O. Kistinev, military pilot 1st class. For the sake of fairness I should say that all of the documents and flight maps had been made up and filled out. The tactical setting, however, was a conventional one. Simplification was clearly in evidence.

The times demand that we military men resolutely reconsider our attitude toward many accustomed but obsolete forms of training for subordinates. We must adopt everything new, everything which makes it possible to improve the combat training organization and methods and to maintain the combat readiness of the units and subunits at the very highest level. And we cannot achieve this as long as we talk about the restructuring at party meetings but operate in the old way at the airfield and in the classrooms.

Young Officers Set Example

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Apr 87 p 2

[Letters from Maj V. Korolev, Southern Group of Forces, and Senior Lieutenant A. Baranovskiy, Northern Group of Forces, under the rubric "The Restructuring Is Established With Action": "Those On the Right Flank"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] These two letters sound alike in many ways. They are about officers and signalmen, about those for whom the main slogan of the day, "Action, Action and More Action!" has become the guide to action.

Major V. Korolev

The platoon commanded by Senior Lieutenant Syzonyuk was tested literally 2 days ago. At one point the personnel were to meet some difficult standards. As always, Communist V. Syzonyuk faced the testing team first. The commander earned an excellent rating for the performance of his task. Inspired by his example, Private First Class R. Gilmanov, Private L. Klimentyev and other specialists achieved good results and bettered the norms.

The secret of the success is simple: loyal to the motto of action, the senior lieutenant worked painstakingly with the fightingmen. He relied primarily on his own personal example. I believe that we need to emulate such people as Communist Syzonyuk in our work today.

Senior Lieutenant A. Baranovskiy

People of action.... They most certainly include Senior Lieutenant V. Dudko.

An exercise was underway. The signalmen were tired after a march of many kilometers. The officers sensed that they would be unable to set up communications within the time allocated. Senior Lieutenant Dudko, a candidate sports master in the officer's triathlon, encouraged his subordinates with his own personal example. He helped them. He carried the reels, rolled out the cable.... The personnel took heart and set to work with vigor.

Dudko completed a military school 3 years ago. He raises his rating every year. He is now a master. This is enviable drive.

Senior Lieutenant Dudko has performed the duties a level above his position for around 6 months. His company is now in first place in the socialist competition in the unit.

11499

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

BRIEFS

SOKOLOV MEETS WITH PARTY AKTIV--A meeting of the party aktiv of the USSR Ministry of Defense was held. It discussed the results of the January 1987 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the tasks emerging from these decisions for the party organizations. Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Sokolov, candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Minister of Defense, presented a report. A detailed account of the meeting of the party aktiv will be published in the next issue of the newspaper. [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Mar 87 p 1] 11499

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COVERAGE OF JOINT GDE-GSFG NOTIFIABLE EXERCISE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Mar 87 p 1

[Report by Lt Col A. Vasilets, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under the rubric "From the Exercise Area": "Scouts Are in the Air"; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] A joint exercise by units and formations of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and the National People's Army of the GDR to improve the field training of the troops is continuing in the German Democratic Republic.

Observers from states which are members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe have come to the exercise in accordance with the Stockholm Conference agreement.

The pilots could see from the concerned expression on the face of Lieutenant Colonel I. Deshankov when he entered the classroom that there was not yet any good news.

"The fog is interfering greatly," he said in a tired voice as he headed toward the table at which Major V. Datsyuk and Captain A. Shapiro, military pilots 1st class, were sitting. This team would now have to fly out to reconnoiter the "enemy" forces.

"Do you remember how difficult it was to conduct observation from the air in Afghanistan when the wind was raising clouds of dust from the ground?" the veteran air scout and holder of the Order of the Red Star, said to Captain Shapiro, who has also been awarded that combat order. "Smoke could be distinguished even against the background of the dust clouds, however." Deshankov was silent for a while and then added in a quiet voice: "Pay attention to the color of the fog, particularly in low-lying areas...."

...Following take-off Shapiro took his place in the formation. Datsyuk's plane appeared to freeze ahead and slightly to the left. He was the deputy squadron commander for political affairs and one of the best pilots in the unit. Shapiro would need to stick with the leader and help him.

They doubled their attention when they approached the "frontline." They had to cross the "enemy's" air defenses. The pair descended abruptly to bottom altitude and simultaneously took evasive action.

The aircraft flew so low over a river valley that they left eddies on the smooth surface of the water. Flying modern aircraft at this altitude is not an easy thing in and of itself. After a few minutes the pilot would be sweating blood, but in addition he had to perform observation and make calculations for reaching the base reference point with a timing precision counted in seconds. In the target search area they would have to make a "jump" and gain altitude slightly, because it is very difficult to make out anything on the ground from low-level flight.

Finally, the area where the tanks were probably located. Bright and dark spots of various shades flashed by beneath the wing: a swamp, woods, fields covered with thaw water, milky-white patches of morning fog.

After the "jump" in the search area, the horizon expanded with the altitude, and the leader swept an experienced glance over it all almost at once. He practically photographed it with his eyes. Then, after descending again, he began "working out" the details. "That traveled road runs into a grove of trees. The color of the track coming out of it is different, as though it has not been traveled for a long time. What would cause this? One can clearly see through the bare spring woods. No tanks are going to be hidden there. They are not there, that is for sure. The edge of the woods descends into a gully, the size of which it is difficult to judge. It is covered by fog.... Wait! The fog seems to be a different color there than everywhere else. It seems to have a light-blue shade. No, more like dove-colored...."

"I see that!" the terse report came through the headset from the wingman.

"Move out front!" Datsyuk ordered.

Shapiro, who had detected the target first, took the place of the team leader and began to position for a maneuver to approach and photograph the area.

Executing a smooth turn, the aircraft departed toward the sun and then reappeared again a minute or two later, camouflaged by the sun's blinding rays. Upon approaching the target they gained altitude. The cameras were turned on. They could no longer turn off course, and there could be no thought of taking evasive action. From on high the gray-green hulls of tanks concealed in the gully could be seen through the thinning fog. The photography mode lasted only a few seconds, but during that time the airborne scout is not simply a target for "enemy" air defenses. The pilots cover themselves with all kinds of interference. When the photographing had been completed, the aircraft once again abruptly descended to bottom altitude. When the pair had departed the visible range of ground radar, the leader radioed the visual reconnaissance data to the command post.

"Enemy" fighters appeared at that time. It was not necessary to engage in combat, however, because covering fighters cut the "enemy" off from the scouts.

Not just our pilots, but airmen in the fighter-bomber squadron of the National People's Army of the GDR as well, received the information on the precise location of the "enemy" tanks. The squadron is commanded by Major H. Kopec, military pilot 1st class, an accomplished air fighter and master of sniper bomb strikes. In the combat training he and his subordinates adopted the know-how of their Soviet combat friends and willingly shared with them their own tactical innovations. The squadron was now prepared to take off at the very first signal.

After landing, marching across the parking area alongside Shapiro, Datsyuk asked:

"Just how did you detect the tanks"?

"From the dove-colored shade of the fog in the gully produced by the exhaust gases," Shapiro answered.

Datsyuk started to say that he too had almost arrived at the same conclusion, but he kept silent. After reporting to the regimental commander on the completion of their mission, both pilots went to Lieutenant Colonel Deshankov to give a detailed account of their actions in the air.

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CSO: 1801/166

STATEMENT ON PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Mar 87 p 3

[Text] Statement of the Warsaw States on Banning of Chemical Weapons

In the interest of strengthening international peace and universal security and of achieving disarmament, the Warsaw Pact states have spoken out resolutely for the banning of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles of such weapons and industrial facilities for producing them. The earliest possible conclusion of a complete and universal ban on chemical weapons is one of the main objectives of their foreign policy.

The important initiatives put forth by the socialist states for accelerating and invigorating the talks, and the proposals made by other nations taking part in the Disarmament Conference have made it possible to eliminate many obstacles on the path to a mutually acceptable agreement. The necessary preconditions have been created for finding the solution this year to problems not yet resolved in the talks, taking into account proposals put forth by participants in the Geneva Disarmament Conference, and for reaching agreement on an international conference which would effectively provide for a complete and universal ban on the development and production of chemical weapons and the elimination of all stockpiles of such weapons in the immediate future, and would ensure that they are never rebuilt anywhere. The real opportunity to eliminate chemical weapons and put an end once and for all to the chemical threat to all mankind must not be missed.

Plans for the production of the particularly dangerous, binary version of these weapons and their deployment in Europe are a major obstacle to the achievement of this goal. These plans are contrary to the demands put forth by the world community and to UN decisions on the need to ban and eliminate chemical weapons.

For their part, the allied socialist states will continue to do everything within their power to conclude a convention as rapidly as possible. For purposes of finding solutions in the talks to problems which are still preventing the work on a convention from being completed, they have put forth new proposals at the Disarmament Conference for declaring stockpiles of chemical weapons, ensuring that these weapons are not produced in the civilian chemical industry, and for verification, including on-site international verification, and the conduct of inspections by request.

The allied socialist states advocate freeing Europe and its individual regions of chemical weapons. They affirm their support for initiatives put forth by the GDR and Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania for the establishment of zones free of chemical weapons in the central part of Europe and in the Balkans, in which it would be forbidden to deploy, test, produce, invent or stockpile such weapons, regarding them as an important contribution to the effort to eliminate the threat of the use of chemical weapons.

Proceeding from their basic position, the Warsaw Pact states advocate the establishment of a most rigid monitoring system, including international monitoring, of the observance of commitments accepted under the convention by the participating states. They affirm their preparedness to seek on this basis mutually acceptable solutions to problems having to do with ensuring observance of the convention by all the parties and with strengthening trust among the participants.

Guided by a desire to complete as rapidly as possible the development of a convention on the banning and elimination of chemical weapons, and for the creation of the conditions necessary for this, the states represented at the meeting call upon all states:

--not to take any steps which could complicate the achievement of mutually acceptable agreements in the talks or slow the process;

--not to produce chemical weapons, including the binary or multicomponent variations, not to deploy chemical weapons on foreign territory and to remove them from foreign territory on which they already exist, and for states on whose territories there are no chemical weapons not to permit their deployment there.

In order to have a decisive advance toward agreement on the elimination of chemical arsenals, it is particularly essential right now for all of the participants in the talks to demonstrate political will, realism and a high level of responsibility.

The Warsaw Pact states urgently appeal to the NATO nations and to all the participants in the Disarmament Conference to join them in a joint effort to overcome all the remaining obstacles in the talks, and to complete the development of a convention banning chemical weapons this year, in order in the near future to begin the complete and universal elimination of chemical weapons and industrial facilities for their production.

The states represented at the meeting believe that 1987 can and must be the year for the beginning of complete and universal chemical disarmament.

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CSO: 1801/167

WARSAW PACT

PACT MILITARY COUNCIL SESSION

Delegates Arrive

Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 17 Apr 87 p 3

[Belorussian News Agency report: "Guarding Peace and Socialism"]

[Text] The following people arrived in Minsk on 16 April to take part in the regular session of the Military Council of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact States: Marshal of the Soviet Union V.G. Kulikov, Commander in Chief of the Joint Armed Forces; Army General A.I. Gribkov, Chief of Staff of the Joint Armed Forces; and delegations from the Bulgarian People's Army headed by Colonel General Kh. Dobrev; the Hungarian People's Army, headed by Lieutenant General L. Moroc; the National People's Army of the GDR, headed by Colonel General F. Strelets; the Polish People's Army, headed by General of Armor A. Jasinski; the Army of the Socialist Republic of Romania, headed by Colonel General M. Nicolescu; the Armed Forces of the USSR, headed by Army General I.M. Tretyakov; the Czechoslovak People's Army, headed by Colonel General K. Susov; and members of the Military Council—Chief Marshal of Aviation A.I. Koldunov, Colonel General of Aviation V.K. Andreyev, Admiral N.I. Khovrin, and Lieutenant General P.A. Mamchur.

The leaders and members of the delegations placed flowers at the monument to V.I. Lenin and laid a wreath at the foot of the memorial obelisk in Victory Square.

The session of the Military Council of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact States opened that same day. It was chaired by Marshal of the Soviet Union V.G. Kulikov, Commander in Chief of the Joint Armed Forces.

Results of Session

Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 19 Apr 87 p 1

[Belorussian News Agency report: "On the Results of the Regular Session of the Military Council of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact States"]

[Text] The regular session of the Military Council of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact States was held in Minsk from 16 to 18 April. It was chaired by Marshal of the Soviet Union V.G. Kulikov, Commander in Chief of the Joint Armed Forces.

The session discussed certain current questions pertaining to the work of the Joint Armed Forces, agreed upon and approved recommendations.

The session took place in an atmosphere of seriousness, in a spirit of friendship and mutual understanding.

Military Council, Belorussian CC Meeting

Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 19 Apr 87 p 1

[Belorussian News Agency report: "A Meeting in the Belorussian Communist Party CC"]

[Text] A meeting with participants in the regular session of the Military Council of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact States in Minsk was held on 18 April in the Central Committee of the Belorussian Communist Party.

Ye.Ye. Sokolov, First Secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party CC welcomed the guests and talked about the republic and the achievements of the Belorussian people in the family of fraternal peoples during the 70 years of Soviet power, and about the work performed by the labor collectives to implement decisions coming out of the 27th party congress and the January 1987 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

Marshal of the Soviet Union V.G. Kulikov, Commander in Chief of the Joint Armed Forces, spoke at the meeting and reported on the results of the Military Council session.

Members of the Bureau of the Belorussian Communist Party CC--Comrades G.S. Tarasevich, M.V. Kovalev, G.G. Bartoshevich, N.I. Dementey, Yu.B. Kolokolov, V.A. Pechennikov and V.M. Shuralev--participated in the discussion, which took place in a warm and friendly atmosphere.

The participants in the session of the Military Council of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact States were acquainted with the training facilities of one of the military units in the Red Banner Belorussian Military District and with the combat training of the troops.

The delegations which took part in the session of the Military Council of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact States departed Minsk that same day.

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CSO: 1801/170

CEREMONY ON SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM MONGOLIA

Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 17 Apr 87 p 7

[Report: "Send-Off for Soviet Soldiers"]

[Text] There was a farewell ceremony yesterday in Sukhe Bator, a border town in the northern part of the nation, for Soviet troops temporarily stationed in the Mongolian People's Republic. They are being withdrawn in accordance with a decision by the Soviet leadership and by agreement with the government of the MPR.

There was a mass meeting in the city square. T. Namsary, member of the Politburo, secretary of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and chairman of the Central Council of the Mongolian-Soviet Friendship Society, spoke at the meeting. He stated that the unity of the peoples and parties and military cooperation of the two fraternal armies are a guarantee of victories and accomplishments at all stages of Mongolia's revolutionary struggle and its socialist development.

The speaker stressed the fact that the withdrawal of part of the Soviet forces is a concrete, practical step toward the creation of the foundation for an all-embracing system of international security in the Asian-Pacific Ocean region.

The send-off developed into an exciting demonstration of the growing Soviet-Mongolian fraternity.

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CSO: 1801/170

COL GEN GORYAINOV ON FAILINGS OF HIGHLY RATED AVIATION REGIMENT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Apr 87 p 2

[Article by Col Gen Avn A. Goryainov, Commander of Aviation of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, under the rubric "The Restructuring Is Established With Action": "Without Indulgences"]

[Text] Higher headquarters unexpectedly inspected the excellent Guards air regiment, one of the best in the group's air forces, commanded until recently by Guards Colonel V. Myagkov. The inspection produced no grounds for concern, but then suddenly, like a bolt from the blue, came the news that the regiment had barely accomplished the assigned mission at the range. How could this be? All of the pilots in the regiment had operated smoothly and justifiably received excellent marks in a recent tactical flight exercise. What had caused the failure?

To the honor of the commander and his deputies, they did not claim that there were "objective" reasons. Together with representatives of the staff of the group's air forces, Guards Colonel Myagkov was able to self-critically analyze the organization of the combat training in the regiment. The analysis showed that the level of training of the pilots was indeed high, and the ratings which they had previously received conformed to the actual state of affairs. The only thing which was not consistent were the conditions under which previous inspections had been made. They had flown from their own airfield, where everything was smoothly organized, adjusted and familiar. At the range, with every detail of which the pilots were familiar, they could see the target arrangement with their eyes closed, unerringly approach the target and destroy it literally from looking at the poles and bushes. In the inspection mentioned above, the range was an unfamiliar one, and the airfield from which they departed to execute the combat mission and all of its equipment were not in perfect condition by far. When the programs were fed into the airborne computers on ground prior to taking off, there was a breakdown in the functioning of the electric power sources there. This led to an inaccuracy in the data inserted, with resulting malfunctions of certain airborne equipment units. This was an unexpected difficulty for many of the pilots. They hesitated and wasted time in switching to backup instruments.

Pilots in the squadron commanded at that time by Guards Lieutenant Colonel A. Davidenko found themselves in this situation because during their daily combat training they had done little to prepare for operating in a complicated situation. Airmen in the squadron commanded by Guards Lieutenant Colonel G. Verevkin trained

differently, and none of them was taken by surprise by the increased complexity of the situation. They all switched to the backup mode immediately and destroyed all of the targets. The regiment's overall rating was lowered, however.

Life dictates that the airmen be prepared for battle always, at any moment. Not for an inspection, not for a test at the range, but for combat. We will then understand that we must organize the daily training to teach our pilots to take advantage of the possibilities embodied in the equipment.

In the regiment mentioned above, the commanders, the political workers and the party organization were able to derive a lesson from the error, to make the necessary adjustments in the organization of the training and rapidly rectify the situation. The regiment regained its reputation as an outstanding one. But this incident, something of an emergency, did not have to happen.

Airmen in the group of forces persistently seek ways to accelerate the restructuring, although this process is proceeding with difficulty. Experience has shown that talk about restructuring and appeals for restructuring on the part of many officers are not backed up with action. One hears statements to the effect that restructuring means doing a better job of training the pilots and specialists in the Air Force Engineer Service, and strengthening discipline and combat readiness. That would seem to be accurate.

But did these requirements not exist in the past? Did we not have the very same missions? Yes, we did. The way they were accomplished did not always satisfy us, however. But we reconciled ourselves to this. It was even said that the process of improving is a continuous one, that it is impossible to achieve the absolute and that reserves will never be exhausted in any case. Now, however, paramount importance is attached to the specific result of each person's work. The contribution of each individual to the work of the entire collective is more apparent in this situation, because the time has arrived for accountability for work performed and for end results, and not for length of time on the job or past merit.

The squadron commanded by Guards Lieutenant Colonel V. Sazonov has not had brilliant successes in the air training. The bombing and navigational training is not very good there, methodological errors are made, and there has been a relaxation of the monitoring of preparations for the performance of flight assignments. One of the causes of this situation is the fact that the subunit's leading personnel do not set a personal example.

Guards Major L. Lyakhov's crew was unable to detect the assigned target under extremely easy conditions at the range. It locked onto a dummy target and actually failed to accomplish the mission. The crew is considered to be highly trained in every respect, however, and both the pilot and the navigator have a first-class rating. In this case, however, Lyakhov and the navigator counted on their old skills and did not properly prepare to carry out the assignment. The responsible chiefs did not check the crew's preparation. These people's sense of responsibility had been dulled. The restructuring should be started by restoring it. This opens up a broad range of action also for the party organizations.

It is equally important to spot bits and pieces of progressive know-how, to understand them and make them available to all of the pilots and all of the personnel in the units and formations. The flight commanded by Captain A. Vodyanitskiy performed the combat training mission better than the others in an exercise, for example. In a difficult situation the commander competently set up a maneuver, and the pilots detected and destroyed all of the targets by taking full advantage of the possibilities of the airborne equipment.

Vodyanitskiy develops independence in the pilots. This does not mean that he becomes a sideline observer, however. The flight commander demands that his subordinates creatively carry out every assignment, no matter how simple or familiar it might seem. During flight preparations, even for regular exercises, he not only tests the pilots on their knowledge of the methods for performing them but also develops in them the ability to foresee the most unexpected changes in the situation. He assigns hypothetical problems for this purpose and motivates the pilots to think, to come up with possible tactical decisions about what to do should they encounter an actual enemy in the air. I should add that Vodyanitskiy himself is the best bomber in the regiment. Captain V. Bagmutov and Captain V. Sokolov are his subordinates. They are respectively the best at piloting techniques and the best at firing the airborne weapons. These are real results. This is the restructuring in action.

The experience of the unit in which Lieutenant Colonel A. Golod serves is worthy of attention. It has resolutely rejected simplifications and placed the main stress on training the pilots to operate in a complex, rapidly and unexpectedly changing situation involving the use of radioelectronic counteraction by the "enemy." The aim of mastering the complex types of combat employment required extra effort. The fire, tactical and psychological preparation of the airmen had to be improved. The party organizations focused on developing in the pilots activeness, aggressiveness, boldness, determination and the ability to take a justified risk. A great deal of effort was spent in restructuring the thinking of both those in charge and those actually performing the work. They planned thoroughly, reduced the amount of time spent in the air for a single combat employment mission and the time spent regaining lost skills, began more decisively to combine exercises on a single sortie, and loaded the trainers to the maximum. Particular attention was given to the study of tactical procedures for executing strikes, methods of overcoming air defenses in the target area, and making maximum use of the maneuvering capabilities of the aircraft.

It is possible that there is nothing particularly new in the way things were organized in the regiment, but the people succeeded in motivating such people as the flight commanders to become more active, and this made it possible to give new stimulus to the effort to improve the combat training. Increasing the creative principle and thoroughly developing initiative in the performance of one's duties is one of the most important focuses of the restructuring. In principle, the flight commander is always supposed to operate this way, but experience has shown that the flight commanders are still frequently reduced to the position of rank-and-file pilots, and the squadron commanders take their place. A squadron commander is not in a position to pay attention to every air fighter the way a flight commander can, however--if the latter fully measures up to his purpose and performs with initiative, of course.

As a rule, only the average marks for combat employment are taken into account for assessing a unit's level of combat training. These may be fairly high, while at the same time the number of direct bomb and shell hits can be counted on one's fingers. Each regiment has acknowledged masters of bomb and missile strikes. It also has so-called mediocrities. They both wear the badges of pilots 1st class, however. Why is there such a marked difference in the level of their preparedness? Some of them perform in the upper range of the qualification for their rating, while others perform in the lower range. We can therefore not flatter ourselves with good average indices. While this situation might have suited us in the past, it is not acceptable today.

In order to improve the combat training of the personnel and to develop in the air fighters initiative, boldness and the ability to operate rapidly and correctly in a difficult situation, we need to constantly alter and complicate the conditions in which the combat training is conducted. First of all, at the ranges. The subunits and units are forced to constantly operate at ranges where the target arrangement is changed very rarely, however, and the directions for approaching are always the same. This results in a situation in which the personnel develop routine actions and lose interest in demonstrating initiative.

There are two ways to eliminate this shortcoming. One of them is to change the target arrangement more frequently. This would require additional outlays and additional efforts by the range services, but all of the expenditures would be repaid by a significant improvement in the combat training. Another way would be to alter the ranges more frequently, but this would require coordinated efforts at various levels.

The quality of the airmen's combat training is not an abstract concept. The combat readiness of the unit is based on it. We therefore see our task as one of persistently and purposefully seeking reserves for improving the training process and enhancing its effectiveness in accordance with the demands of the restructuring.

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CSO: 1801/172

WARSAW PACT

BRIEFS

GSFG-GDR EXERCISE NOTIFICATION--By agreement with the government of the GDR the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and the National People's Army of the GDR will conduct a joint exercise to improve the field training of the troops. It will be conducted between 23 and 30 March of this year in the area of Gardelegen, Magdeburg, Wittenberg, Luben and Brandenburg in the German Democratic Republic. Units and formations of ground and air forces will be involved in the exercise. A total of around 25,000 troops will take part. In accordance with the Stockholm Conference agreement the government of the GDR has invited to the exercise observers from all the states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Mar 87 p 1] 11499

CSO: 1801/167

KAZAKH SSR CONFERENCE ON PRE-DRAFT TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Mar 87 p 2

[Report by Lt Col A. Ladin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Our Common Concern: Comments From a Conference of Kazakhstan's Party and Soviet Aktiv"; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] We have already reported that there was a conference of the republic's party and soviet aktiv in Alma-Ata, which discussed the matters of improving the military-patriotic indoctrination and preparing the youth for military service. Taking part in it were leaders of republic ministries and departments, responsible workers from party, soviet, trade union and Komsomol organs, DOSAAF committees and sports committees, workers, oblast health, public and vocational and technical education agencies, and military commissariats.

Below are the comments of our correspondent on certain problems brought up at the conference.

More than once I have heard speeches given to the pre-draft youth by reserve military men who performed their international duty in Afghanistan in a worthy manner. I noticed this typical feature. Almost every one of the speakers had something good to say about his school or SPTU [special vocational and technical school?] and about the military instructors who provided them with a solid basis in military affairs and helped them to acquire the qualities essential to a soldier.

I recall what Private (Reserve) Nurzhan Chupekov, holder of the Order of the Red Star, who was in many dangerous predicaments, had to say:

"It is difficult to be a real soldier without good initial military preparation. I do not know whether our encounter would have been the same if I had not been taught back at the school how to handle a submachine gun, had not become accustomed to sports there...."

This automatically came to mind at the conference, when the participants discussed ways to restructure the military-patriotic indoctrination and how to implement the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers on further improving the preparation of the youth for military service. The majority spoke with concern about the fact that the work with the youth lacks a planned basis and purposefulness.

"The military-patriotic indoctrination and preparation of the youth to serve in the army and navy is frequently conducted in a haphazard way in the republic, without adequately clear objectives or monitoring," G.V. Kolbin, First Secretary of the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee, said in his speech. "Instead of coordinated efforts on the part of all the organs and organizations responsible for this matter, one sees mutual lecturing."

Are disunity and haphazardness not the main factors preventing the elimination of existing shortcomings in the military-patriotic indoctrination of the youth and the training of the pre-draft youth?

Many educational institutions in the republic do not yet have modern training facilities for the initial military training. Physical culture and sports are poorly developed in a number of rayons, particularly the technical and practical military sports. The situation is not good with respect to the development of small-arms sports, multi-event parachute and naval sports, the breeding of work dogs, and modeling.

The remarkable thing is that many new and valuable things have recently appeared in the republic in the work performed with the youth. Take Alma-Ata's Middle School No. 45. The main enterprise of the Soyuzsteklomontazh SMU [Construction and Installation Administration] helped the school build a 50-meter shooting range. Lieutenant Colonel (Reserve) G. Zagorulko, the military instructor, immediately began forming rifle sections. Not very many people wanted to participate at first, but the enthusiast organized things in such a way that the prestige of small-arms sports grew by the day. Yu. Lekutov and M. Dzhatkabayev, trainers with the Burevestnik DSO [Voluntary Sports Society], had to be called upon to help out. They are training more than 100 students in grades 2 through 7, and the military instructor himself is training 200. This does not include those participating in initial military training. The result is that almost every graduate has a sports rating and can fire accurately.

Why has this experience not been adopted universally? Unfortunately, the matter frequently does not go beyond the point of talk. And for now it has to be said that many students at schools, SPTU and tekhnikums are unable to engage in sports on a regular basis.

The organization of the initial military training itself also needs to be improved. What is preventing this? Some of the speakers named poor training facilities for NVP [initial military training] as just about the main reason, claiming that there are objective difficulties with respect to setting them up. But are these difficulties so insurmountable? The following example was cited at the conference. Many schools in Ural Oblast were able to provide everything necessary for quality training for the future fightingmen within a period of 5-6 months.

On the other hand, is it valid to attribute all of the deficiencies to poor training facilities? The main thing is how they are used. It is frequently the case that numerous training facilities are built at a school but they are used only 2 or 3 hours a year, and frequently very poorly even then.

In his report, V.I. Yefimov, department head of the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee, cited the following facts. Half of the military instructors at republic educational institutions do not have a higher education. The same number lack an officer's rank. The methods experts with the city and rayon education departments and the administrations of vocational and technical education, those who are supposed to direct the initial military training process, frequently do not have a special education or the required knowledge.

The military departments established at the Karaganda and Taldy-Kurgan teachers' institutes are expected to improve the training of regular military instructors. The needs of educational institutions for military instructors still considerably exceed the number of graduates from those VUZs, however. How can the problem be resolved? Obviously, by more thoroughly selecting military instructors from among the reserve officers, particularly those with an education in teaching.

The army and navy expect thoroughly trained, physically strong and healthy youth capable of rapidly adapting to service conditions and of staunchly withstanding the difficulties. The report presented by Colonel General A.V. Kovtunov, commander of the Central Asian Military District, was imbued with this thought.

In reality, however, some of the youth are not accepted into the military for reasons of health. This is a direct result of deficiencies in the medical and health-improvement work performed with the youth. In many cases adolescents between the ages of 11 and 14 years receive no attention from the medical establishments. Only 14-17 percent of the offices for adolescents are staffed with specialists in Chemkent, Dzhambul and Dzhezkazgan oblasts. These alarming facts were cited in the report.

The district commander also focused attention on the need to rapidly eliminate the lag of some of the draftees of local nationalities in their mastery of the Russian language, and to improve the moral and international indoctrination of the youth.

Many of the speakers spoke of this. They all agreed that we must abandon routine in the indoctrination, become less involved with mass activities, coordinate the indoctrination more closely with the study of military affairs and with the involvement of the youth in active participation in technical and sports sections and groups. The best results are achieved with precisely this approach. It is this approach which promotes a more specific military job orientation for the youth.

For a fairly long time now I have followed with interest the functioning of the Ikar Military-Patriotic Club set up at ZhEU [Billeting and Maintenance Directorate]-51 in Alma-Ata. It is directed by Lieutenant (Reserve) V. Prokopenko. The kids there participate in young pilot, young cosmonaut and young airborne troop sections. It is slanted toward aviation. But this is not what is remarkable about the Ikar. It is the fact that the club mainly works with problem adolescents. This term is only justified up to a certain point, however. After that.... Better that I mention a few figures. During its 5 years of existence the club has "graduated" 280 young people, of whom 32 have entered military schools, six have become pilots in the GVF [Civil Air Fleet], two are DOSAAF pilots, and 83 have served out their term or are serving in the VDV [Airborne Troops].

I learned at the conference that there are many such examples. They include the Young Pilot Club in Chemkent and the Future Motorized Rifleman Group at School No. 39 in Ust-Kamenogorsk, which is directed by N. Pavlov, an officer from the local garrison. Incidentally, around 20 of his graduates have entered military schools in the past 2 years. And what good results well-conceived military sponsorship work could produce if the ties between educational institutions and military units were to become truly serious and solid!

When you think about it, it is not so very difficult to universally disseminate the experience of the best or to establish ties of military sponsorship. But this has not been difficult in the past. Then why has everything not yet been done?

The conference did increase confidence that the situation would change, however. This was due to the mood and the heightened attention to negative phenomena, to the focus on the improvement of matters and the accomplishment of specific tasks.

It was recommended that party, soviet, trade union and Komsomol organs, and party committees of enterprises, establishments and educational institutions work out problems pertaining to the impending induction campaign and to the organization of formal send-offs of the youth into the military service.

Those fightingmen who have decided to enter VUZs or tekhnikums after being released into the reserve will receive assistance and support.

A few days after the conference, a constituent assembly of fightingmen who have fulfilled their international duty in Afghanistan was held in Alma-Ata's Sovetskii Rayon. A public council was set up. Under the supervision of party and Komsomol organizations, the fightingmen-and-internationalists will take an active part in the performance of indoctrinational work with the student and working youth. Special sections in the council will assume sponsorship over the activities of all the military-patriotic youth clubs, groups and sections in the rayon.

In short, the decisions of the republic's party and soviet aktiv are being implemented without delay.

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CSO: 1801/166

ARMED FORCES

LT GEN PANKRATOV ON ARMY, NAVY DAY

Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 26 Feb 87 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen V. Pankratov, Chief of Staff of the Red Banner Baltic Military District, under the rubric "23 February is Soviet Army and Navy Day": "Guarding Peace and Socialism"]

[Text] "Any revolution is only worth anything if it is able to defend itself...." That statement by Lenin extracted the essence of the main tasks facing the Bolshevik Party and the liberated people during the very first months following the October Revolution.

The January 1987 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee specifically defined ways to accomplish the restructuring and inspired the Soviet people to achieve a qualitatively new condition for the Soviet society. The Communist Party cannot ignore the fact that its program objectives have to be set forth and achieved in a complex and tense international situation. The CPSU is strengthening the Soviet Armed Forces, whose 69th anniversary we are preparing to formally celebrate, for a peaceful life and labor, for the security of the Soviet state.

Having defended the workers' and peasants' republic, the Soviet people began restoring the economy and building socialism. The party took into account the fact that our nation was in capitalist encirclement. It was constantly guided by Lenin's conclusions to the effect that as we engage in our peaceful construction, we need to be alert and to protect the nation's defense capability and our Red Army as our most cherished treasure.

The industrialization of the nation and the successes achieved by the defense industry made it possible to technically rearm the army and navy.

The world's best tanks, the KV heavy tank and the T-34 medium tank, were designed in the Soviet Union prior to the war. Thanks to the day-to-day assistance of the party Central Committee, Soviet aircraft designers accomplished the large task of creating new, first-class aircraft and engines.

The small-arms weaponry was upgraded with the submachine guns designed by V.A. Degtyarov and G.S. Shpagin. Production of the first-class RPB machine gun continued, and other models of small arms were created.

Various branches of the defense industry steadily developed. Plants were built and large energy and fuel reserves, powerful metallurgical and petroleum bases were built in the eastern part of the nation. All the branches and troop arms were enlarged, and their organization was improved.

Despite the enormous efforts of the party and the people, however, we were unable to accomplish what was planned, completely and in good time.

The Great Patriotic War was a rigorous test for the new system and its army. Intense and diverse work by the party, massive heroism on the part of the Soviet people, and an enormous amount of work at the front in the rear area were required to route the aggressor and defend the freedom and independence of the Soviet Nation.

The enemy's treacherous attack placed our nation into a difficult position. The Soviet people did not flinch, however. They were inspired by the great Lenin's ideas, by their devotion to communism, their awareness of the justness of a war in defense of the homeland, and their faith that victory would be achieved.

The national economy was placed onto a wartime footing under party leadership within an extraordinary short time. The nation was able to meet the vital needs of the front and the rear area, to concentrate material, financial and human resources in the crucial sectors of national economic production, and flexibly maneuver the personnel and equipment in order to wage the most effective possible struggle against the enemy.

The strengthening of the army and navy was at the center of party attention. The CPSU's unweakened attention to and wise leadership of the Armed Forces and their combat operations, military organizational development, the training and indoctrination of Soviet fightingmen, the preparation of command, political and engineer cadres, the development of military theory and the summarization of the enormous practical wartime experience were clearly manifested.

The historic victory achieved by Soviet forces at Moscow was the most important event during the initial period of the war. The strategic initiative was grabbed from the enemy, the myth of the German army's "invincibility" was dispelled, and plans for a Blitzkrieg against the USSR were frustrated. The foundation was laid for turning the war around.

The Battle of Stalingrad had a crucial impact on the course of the entire World War II.

The Soviet Armed Forces inflicted another powerful strike against the fascist Wehrmacht in the summer of 1943. The backbone of the aggressor's army was broken in the hugh battle on the Kursk Salient. Launching an offensive on a broad front, our forces liberated the Left-Bank Ukraine, entered the eastern areas of Belorussia and destroyed the enemy's defense on the Dnepr.

The enemy's total exulsion from Soviet soil was completed in 1944. Loyal to their international duty, Soviet forces helped the peoples of Europe liberate themselves from the fascist yoke. The Berlin strategic offensive operation conducted from 16 April to 8 May 1945 was the finale of the war.

"With our victory," the CPSU Program states, "the Soviet Union made the crucial contribution to the liberation of the peoples of Europe from Nazi enslavement and to the salvation of world civilization. The defeat of fascist Germany and militaristic Japan opened up new possibilities for a struggle by peoples for peace, democracy, national liberation and socialism. The Soviet people's victory raised the Soviet state's prestige up high."

The high points of the historically unprecedented feat are recorded in the skimpy language of statistics. More than 7 million fightingmen were awarded orders and medals of the Soviet Union for heroism and bravery. More than 11,600 were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. Awards were conferred upon members of all of our country's nations and ethnic groups. Fightingmen of the 8th Estonian Rifle Corps and the 7th Estonian Rifle Division surrounded themselves with unfading glory.

The feat of the front merged with the feat in the rear. The latter's selfless workers provided the army and navy with everything necessary. More than 16 million workers were awarded the medal "For Valorous Labor in the Great Patriotic War" for their enormous contribution to the victory over the hated enemy.

The results of the Great Patriotic War, a harsh and unforgettable lesson of history, were convincing evidence of the strength and invincibility of socialism, and an awesome reminder to imperialism's aggressive circles.

The lovers of military adventures are not gone, however. They are alive and active. Frightening peoples with the fabricated "Soviet military threat," reactionary circles of the West have launched an unprecedented arms race. They are promoting a militaristic psychosis and attempting to destroy the strategic military parity between the USSR and the USA, between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. American imperialism, going against world public opinion, is continuing to test nuclear weapons in Nevada, pressing into space and developing plans for "Star Wars." The Communist Party and the Soviet state cannot ignore the situation which has developed in the international arena.

The party Program states that the party will continue unvaryingly to see that the combat capability of the Soviet Armed Forces consists of a solid alloy of military skill and good technical equipment, ideological steadfastness, organization and discipline on the part of the personnel, and loyalty to their patriotic and international duty.

The Red Banner Baltic Military District is an inseparable part of the Soviet Armed Forces. Continuing and adding to the glorious combat traditions, the Baltic fightingmen are working hard to accomplish the assigned missions and are reliably protecting our homeland's northwest borders. Having launched socialist competition with the slogan "We shall fulfill decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and greet the 70th anniversary of Great October in a worthy manner with selfless military labor." district personnel are improving their field and air training and achieving new heights in the combat and political training, in the enhancement of their military skill and the strengthening of military discipline. The military units and formations are greeting the 69th anniversary of the establishment of the Soviet Armed Forces in a worthy manner.

Outstanding personnel in the district include representatives of Estonia—Lieutenant Colonel Yu.-E Kh. Kalit, Privates M.A. Puks, M.B. Veskimeyster and R.A. Nymm, and many others.

Fightingmen of various nationalities, soldiers of the '80s, are united by a single desire to continue the work of the older generations in a worthy manner and to vigilantly guard the peaceful labor of the Soviet people. Therein lies the great historical purpose of the Soviet Armed Forces.

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CSO: 1801/170

ARMY GEN YAZOV ON WOMEN IN OFFICER CORPS

Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 1 Apr 87 p 2

[Commentary by Army Gen D.T. Yazov, Deputy USSR Minister of Defense for Personnel, under the rubric "An Authority Replies": "Permit Us to Join the Formation: What Young Women Who Want to Become Officers Say"; first two paragraphs are KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA introduction]

[Text] Until recently the Future Officer's Club at the DOSAAF Club in Kuybyshev had 10 young women as members. The number gradually dropped, however. The young women began to doubt that they could become regular military personnel, and they stopped attending the classes. And 17-year-old schoolgirl Margarita Rezun became the only girl among 300 guys. Rita scored at the top in a recent test in initial military training. She is presently commander of a platoon in her initial military class and studying successfully at a future fightingman's university. She never misses a class at the future officer's club.

But perhaps Rita, like the other girls, dreams in vain of wearing the officer's shoulder-boards?—special TASS correspondents O. Moskovskiy and B. Belyakov

Commentary by Army General D.T. Yazov, Deputy USSR Minister of Defense for Personnel:

Women up to the age of 30 years may be accepted into active military service as officers on a voluntary basis on the condition that they have completed a higher educational institution and received training in the military department or have completed a higher educational institution in a civilian specialty related to a military specialty.

Women may serve as officers, for example, at computer centers, in radiotechnical flight support units, in legal or medical establishments, in the Signal Troops, in the editing and publishing system, and other positions. Women officers have performed well in office work, in military psychology and sociology, and in many other fields.

There is a specific procedure for granting extra leave time and other benefits to women serving on active military duty in accordance with current laws on the protection of mothers and children.

And what about the dream of some young women of training at military schools and serving as commanders? This is of interest to Yelena Shaytanova from Novokuybyshevsk, who dreams of becoming a military pilot, and Natalya Baykova of Saransk, who has applied for admission to an officers' school. We understand the desires of these young women perfectly well, but our laws do not provide for their training at military schools. Military service as commanders involves great stress. Furthermore, there is no need for the centralized training of female military personnel at military educational institutions in peacetime.

Young women may submit all specific questions pertaining to their acceptance for active military duty to the military commissariat at their place of residence.

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CSO: 1801/170

REVIEW: PREPARING YOUNG PEOPLE FOR MILITARY SERVICE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Mar 87 p 2

[Review by Col (Retired) V. Malinin, Honored Cultural Worker of the RSFSR, under the rubric "New Books" of "Podgotovka molodezhi k zashchite sotsialisticheskogo Otechestva" [Preparing the Youth to Protect the Socialist Homeland] by B.P. Yatsuba, edited by V.F. Molchanov, Prosveshcheniye Publishing House, 1986, 224 pages]

[Text] To Assist Military Instructors and Teachers

The Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Main Directions for Reform of the General Education and the Vocational School, the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Party Supervision of the Komsomol and Enhancing its Role in the Communist Indoctrination of the Youth," and other basic documents speak of the importance of military-patriotic indoctrination of the youth and of their preparedness to perform feats to defend the homeland. I have some good things to say about the book "Podgotovka molodezhi k zashchite sotsialisticheskogo Otechestva" published by the Prosveshcheniye Publishing House.

This very useful and needed aid was written for military instructors and for all teachers who organize military-patriotic indoctrination of the youth as part of the initial military training or in the form of extracurricular activities.

The book contains four chapters. The first three chapters cite statements by V.I. Lenin, excerpts from decisions of party congresses, plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, and other party and state documents, memoirs of and works by prominent military chiefs and teachers on the need to defend the socialist homeland, to increase the nation's defensive strength, to enhance the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces, and to prepare the youth for service in the army. The fourth chapter contains recommendations for military instructors on the use of the information contained in the book in the initial military training program and in other military-patriotic indoctrination measures for students.

I can say with confidence that the aid published as part of the "Library for the Initial Military Training Instructor" will help military instructors and teachers to organize the initial military training classes for the youth in a purposeful and well-reasoned manner.

The introduction to the aid correctly states that the use of the information contained therein will help to make the students more interested in military affairs, promote their mastery of military and technical military specialties, help to develop in the youth a desire to enter a military school and become a Soviet officer, and develop a willingness, once they have entered the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR, to fulfill their duty to defend the socialist homeland in an exemplary manner.

It would be a good thing for the Prosveshcheniye Publishing House, in one of the future books for the aforementioned library, to permit the best military instructors and teachers to exchange know-how in initial military training. It would unquestionably be of benefit for them to tell about how they develop in the future fightingmen devotion to the communist ideals, a great sense of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, class hatred for the enemies of socialism, and loyalty to the revolutionary, combat and labor traditions of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces, and how they help the trainees to master military skills and develop in them a preparedness to defend the homeland skillfully and courageously.

I would also like for all military instructors to have the books included in the "Library for the Initial Military Training Instructor."

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CSO: 1801/166

ASSISTANCE FOR DEPENDENTS OF DRAFTEES

Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 7 Apr 87 p 4

[Article by Legal Expert V. Vandyshev under the rubric "Advice From the Legal Expert," a column written by the Legal Department of the USSR State Agroindustrial Committee: "Aid for Children"; first paragraph is SELSKAYA ZHIZN introduction]

[Text] A. Kochetova of Pskov Oblast asks: "What is the procedure for the payment of aid for children of first-term servicemen"?

As of 1 January 1986 aid to children of first-term soldiers, seamen, NCOs and warrant officers is paid in the amount of 35 rubles per month for each child, regardless of the place of residence of the serviceman's family (rural or urban) or of its connection with agriculture. Aid is also provided for children of military construction workers serving in military construction detachments or units; for children of cadets and students among the first-term servicemen and the civilian youth studying at military educational institutions and receiving student rates of pay; for children of first-term servicemen and individuals called up from the reserve who are studying at schools for seagoing and shore-based warrant officers; and for children of reservists called up for training assemblies, who were temporarily unemployed at the time of their call-up. Aid is also available and paid for the children of first-term servicemen in disciplinary units. (Decree No. 58 passed by the USSR Council of Ministers on 9 January 1986)

Assistance is also available for and paid to wives of servicemen and reservists. In the case of dissolution of the marriage of a first-term serviceman, when paternity is established by the joint declaration of the serviceman and the mother of the child or by a court (either prior to his being drafted for active military duty or during the term of service), aid for the child is specified for the mother of the child if the child resides with her. When the child of a serviceman is being brought up by a guardian, assistance is provided and paid to the guardian.

The amount of assistance is specified by commissions under the ispolkoms of rayon (or city) soviets of people's deputies at the place of residence of the serviceman's (or draftee's) family. Applications for assistance are submitted to the rayon (or city) military commissariats, and decisions on the applications are made no later than 7 days after they are received.

Assistance is provided for children born or adopted before the father is inducted into the military service and is paid from the day the draftee reports to the military commissariat to depart for a military unit; for children born or adopted before the father was called up for active military duty and is paid from the date of birth (or adoption) of the children. When a first-term serviceman registers his marriage after being inducted into the military, assistance for a child born before the marriage was registered is provided from the date of registration of the marriage, and in the case of establishment of paternity, from the date the serviceman is registered as the father of the child.

Payment of assistance ceases on the date servicemen are released from active first-term military duty into the reserve or leave the military service for other reasons, as well as when they reenlist or enlist for active military duty as seagoing or shore-based warrant officers, and when they are appointed to officer positions with a corresponding rate of pay.

Aid for children of servicemen not working at the time of call-up for assemblies is paid during the entire period of the assemblies, including the time spent traveling to and from the military unit, on the 20th day of the month following the month in which the serviceman was called up for the training assemblies.

Assistance is not provided and is not paid for children totally dependent upon the state.

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CSO: 1801/170

EDITORIAL ON DRAFT NOTES SHORTCOMINGS IN PRE-DRAFT TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Mar 87 p 1

[Editorial: "The Spring Call-Up"]

[Text] Replenishments are merging into the formation of the homeland's defenders. Yesterday the USSR Minister of Defense published an order on the release from the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR into the reserve of servicemen who have served out their prescribed terms of active military duty, and on the next call-up of citizens for active military duty.

The present induction of the youth into the formation of the homeland's defenders is particularly significant. The 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution is approaching. October is a subject of the greatest national pride on the part of the Soviet people. It continues in our affairs today. The restructuring, a truly revolutionary creative job, is underway in the nation. Openness, intolerance of shortcomings and a striving to improve things are increasingly becoming established as the active principles. It is therefore particularly important right now for the party and soviet organs and the military commissariats to perform the work involved in drafting the replacements and sending them into the military formation in a climate of patriotic enthusiasm, great seriousness and responsibility.

Our party and the Soviet people show great concern for preparing worthy replenishments for the Armed Forces. This is a state job of enormous importance. The CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers have passed a decree aimed at further improving the preparation of the youth for military service. Spiritual readiness for action, a preparedness for possible rigorous trials, solid moral-political and psychological preparation, a firm knowledge of and skills in military affairs--these are the main criteria which determine the productiveness of the military-patriotic work performed with the upcoming generation today, particularly that performed with the pre-draft and draft-age youth. These are the things which raise them up to the level of the contemporary demands. A comprehensive approach to the organization of pre-draft training performed under the supervision of party and soviet organs, and the establishment of permanent, strong connections in this important work among Komsomol and DOSAAF organs, agencies of public education, vocational and technical education, military commissariats, military subunits and units are one of the requirements for achieving this.

It is the duty and obligation of the military commissariats to improve the work performed with the pre-draft youth. They are expected to work to enhance the ideological conditioning of the future fightingmen and their military and physical training, and jointly with local authorities and public health agencies, to perform medical and health-improvement work among the youth. A precisely organized call-up and ceremonies for sending the youth off into the army also have great indoctrinational value. This work is organized well in many military commissariats in Moscow and Gomel oblasts, the Chuvash ASSR and the Moldavian SSR. Many young people will remember the send-off into the army as a festive and exciting event demonstrating the inseparable linkage between the army and the people.

Unfortunately, however, activities related to the send-off of the youth into the army and the send-off ceremonies themselves are not always brightened by our best socialist traditions. In a number of places "drunken send-offs" are arranged. This evil must be resolutely combatted. The community, parents and the draftees themselves must oppose it on a united front.

The medical and induction commissions have a large role along with the military commissariats in conducting the call-up for military duty. It is no secret that there have been serious deficiencies in the work of some of them. There have been violations of the Law on Universal Military Duty, and the commissions have included people of inadequate competence and principle. Everything necessary must be done to see that the current call-up and send-off of the youth into the forces are conducted on a good organizational level, in precise accordance with the spirit and the letter of the Law on Universal Military Duty.

Commanders, political organs, party and Komsomol organizations of units and ships are facing some big tasks in connection with this call-up. The most important one is to see that the young fightingmen immediately feel that they are full members of the military collective, that they sense the attention and concern of their seniors and the warmth of the army family, and that they absorb the glorious traditions of army and navy comradeship. The work of preparing to receive the young replenishments must be organized right now. Lieutenant Colonel S. Sokov has reported to the editors that in the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District, for example, the tasks involved in the spring call-up of the youth for active military duty have been discussed at a district assembly on training methods. Staff workers of the district, the formations and units, and workers with the oblast military commissariats, together with medical workers, have made a detailed study of the state of the induction work and discussed deficiencies in the job-orientation of the pre-draft youth, and errors in the medical certification of the youth and in the selection of future specialists and junior commanders.

It is the primary duty of the military commissariats and all of the military communication services to make arrangements in advance for good passenger cars, aircraft and buses to be allocated for the draftees, many of whom will have to travel great distances, to see that there are no cases of disorganization or confusion on the route, and that the established procedure is strictly observed. Order depends in great part on those entrusted with accompanying the young replenishments to their stations. They must be experienced officers, seagoing and shore-based warrant officers, NCSs and petty officers capable of performing productive political and indoctrinational work with the draftees and of maintaining a high level of discipline and organization.

Naturally, as we prepare to receive the new replenishments, we must also not relax in our work with the fightingmen who will soon be released into the reserve. It is the duty of commanders and political workers to do everything possible to see that during their final weeks of service, at the conclusion of the winter combat training, the experienced fightingmen consider it a matter of honor to prepare worthy replacements and to fulfill their own obligations in an exemplary manner.

A successful call-up of citizens for active military duty and the successful discharge into the reserve of servicemen who have served out their established terms will help to enhance the fighting strength of the Armed Forces and to accomplish the tasks involved in reliably defending the gains of Great October.

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CSO: 1801/166

DEATH OF ARMY GEN A.L. GETMAN

Sokolov, Others Sign Obituary

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Apr 87 p 3

[Text] Army General Andrey Lavrentyevich Getman, prominent Soviet military leader, died on 8 April 1987 following a lengthy and difficult illness. The Armed Forces of the USSR have lost a loyal son of our people, a veteran of the Great Patriotic War who devoted his entire life to selflessly serving the socialist homeland and the cause of the Lenin party, of which he had been a member since 1927.

A.L. Getman was born on 5 October 1903 in a peasant family in the village of Klepaly, Sumy Oblast. The 17-year-old youth began his working career at one of the stations on the Moscow Railroad. He joined the Red Army as a volunteer in 1924 and traveled a glorious combat path in it, from cadet to army general.

After completing the Military Academy of Motorization and Mechanization of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army in 1937 he successively occupied a number of staff and command positions. He was assistant commander of a mechanized brigade and took part in the routing of the Japanese invaders on the Khalkhin-Gol River in August of 1939.

A.L. Getman's military and organizational abilities were demonstrated particularly brilliantly during the Great Patriotic War, however. He commanded a tank division and a tank corps, and served as deputy commander of a tank army. He took part in the fighting at Moscow and in the Western, Northwest, Voronezh, First Ukrainian and First Belorussian fronts. A.L. Getman demonstrated firmness, personal courage and valor in the most difficult combat situations.

After the war A.L. Getman commanded the armored and mechanized troops of a number of military districts, served in important positions in the USSR Ministry of Defense, and commanded a separate mechanized army. He became commander of the Carpathian Military District in 1958. He became chairman of the DOSAAF Central Committee in 1964 and military inspector-advisor for the Group of General Inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense in 1972.

A.L. Getman honorably justified the great trust of the party in all of the positions it entrusted to him. He devoted all of his knowledge, his extensive front-line experience and his organizational abilities to the cause of enhancing

the fighting strength of the Armed Forces. He was distinguished by a great sense of responsibility for his job, by profound and diversified military knowledge, principle, demandingness and sensitivity to people, and personal modesty.

A.L. Getman took an active part in the nation's public-political life. He was elected a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee at the 22nd, 23rd and 24th party congresses, and served as deputy at a number of convocations of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The Communist Party and the Soviet state greatly appreciated A.L. Getman's service to the homeland. He was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. He was awarded four Lenin Orders, the Order of the October Revolution, six Orders of the Red Banner, the Order of Suvarov, 2nd degree, the Order of Bogdan Khmel-nitskiy, 2nd degree, the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st degree, the Order of the Red Star, "For Service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR," 3rd degree, and many medals. A.L. Getman was awarded many orders and medals by foreign states.

We shall always have in our hearts bright memories of Andrey Lavrentyev Getman, loyal son of the Communist Party and the Soviet people, fervent patriot of the socialist homeland.

S.L. Sokolov, S.F. Akhromeyev, V.G. Kulikov, P.G. Lushev, A.D. Lizichev, N.I. Savinkin, Yu.P. Maksimov, Ye.F. Ivanovskiy, A.I. Koldunov, A.N. Efimov, V.N. Chernavin, I.M. Tretyak, S.K. Kurkotkin, V.M. Shavanov, N.F. Shestopalov, F.L. Govorov, D.T. Yazov, G.M. Yegorov, A.I. Sorokin, V.I. Petrov, S.G. Gorshkov, V.F. Tolubko, I.G. Pavlovskiy, A.S. Zheltov, A.P. Silantyev, I.N. Shkadov, S.I. Postnikov, A.P. Belogorodov, I.I. Gusakovskiy, D.D. Ledyushenko, O.A. Losik

Commemoration by Gen Gusakovskiy

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Apr 87 p 3

[Article by Army Gen I. Gusakovskiy, twice Hero of the Soviet Union: "In Memory of a Combat Friend"]

[Text] Army General Andrey Lavrentyev Getman, loyal son of the Communist Party and Hero of the Soviet Union, has left this life. His name is well known in our nation. His service to the socialist homeland received universal recognition. The 63 years of life of this prominent Soviet military chief, member of the CPSU since 1927, was inseparably linked with our glorious Armed Forces. He entered the ranks of the homeland's defenders in the fall of 1924.

Andrey Lavrentyev took over a tank division in September of 1941. At the beginning of November the division took up a defense southwest of Podolsk in a state of readiness to repel enemy attacks. Its combat operations began not with a defense, however, but with an offensive. An operational group of forces commanded by Major General P.A. Belov was set up for purposes of eliminating a breach created by the Hitlerites in the area of Kashira. The 112th Tank Division commanded by Colonel Getman was among the formations in it. The group was assigned the mission of withdrawing from the battle near Serpukhov, executing a march to the area of Kashira and preventing the enemy's 17th Tank Division from advancing toward Moscow.

By the morning of 26 November the 112th Tank Division's main forces had concentrated southwest of Kashira and joined battle with the enemy. The tankmen firmly held their defense line for a day and a night. Colonel Getman was in the most dangerous sectors, firmly and skilfully directing his subordinates and mobilizing them with his personal example to accomplish the assigned mission. When additional forces arrived from the area of Serpukhov, the operational group with air support carried out a counterattack against the 17th Tank Division on 27 November and drove it back.

During the Soviet counteroffensive in December 1941, the 112th Tank Division, operating as part of a mobile group of the 50th Army, carried out a bold raid on Kaluga, thrust its way into the city and held the city until the main forces arrived.

For its successes in the fighting at Moscow, the formation commanded by Colonel Getman was one of the first to be awarded the Order of the Red Banner. After the war the residents of Tula and Kaluga elected A.L. Getman an honorary citizen of their cities.

In April 1942 Andrey Lavrentyevich took command of a tank corps, which took part in the routing of the German fascist forces on the Kursk Salient in the summer of 1943 as part of the 1st Tank Army. Andrey Lavrentyevich's talent as a military leader was revealed most brilliantly there.

Getman was awarded the Order of Suvorov, 2nd degree, for his skillful command of the corps during the Battle of Kursk. He was promoted to Lieutenant General of Tank Troops on 21 August 1943. The tank corps was given the Guards title.

The formation commanded by General Getman took part in the Zhitomir-Berdichev, Korsun-Shevchenkivskiy, Proskurov-Chernovtsy and Lvov-Sandomierz operations.

In command of large tank formations, General Getman skilfully directed them during their entry into the breach and in operations in the operational depth. Andrey Lavrentyevich's extensive combat experience helped him to successfully accomplish the missions as deputy commander of a Guards tank army.

Andrew Lavrentyevich worked selflessly as befits a Communist also in the years following the war in all the positions entrusted to him by the party and the people.

We fighting comrades mourn the painful loss. Bright memories of Army General Getman will always remain in the hearts of the Soviet people.

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CSO: 1801/172

OBITUARY: LT GEN M.P. KLIMOV

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Mar 87 p 4

[Text] Lieutenant General (Reserve) Mikhail Petrovich Klimov, holder of the State Prize of the USSR, Honored Construction Worker of the RSFSR and former Deputy Chief for Construction and Billeting of Troops of the USSR Ministry of Defense, has died unexpectedly.

M.P. Klimov devoted his entire aware life to selflessly serving the socialist homeland, the Soviet people and the cause of the Communist Party, of which he had been a member since 1943.

M.P. Klimov was born in 1922 in the city of Nizhniy Tagil, Sverdlovsk Oblast. He was drafted into the Soviet Army in 1940 and moved up from private to lieutenant general in its ranks. He completed the Military Engineering Academy imeni V.V. Kuybyshev. He worked in design organizations and served as chief of the central design organization. He was Deputy Commander in Chief for Construction of the Strategic Rocket Forces. He served as Deputy Chief for Construction and Billeting of Troops of the USSR Ministry of Defense from 1981 to December 1985.

The Communist Party and the Soviet state valued M.P. Klimov's service to the homeland highly. He was awarded the Orders of Lenin, the October Revolution and the Labor Red Banner, two Orders of the Red Star and many medals, and received awards from the socialist nations.

Bright memories of Mikhail Petrovich Klimov, loyal son of the Communist Party and the Soviet people, will always remain in our hearts.

N.F. Shestopalov, H.S. Kovalenko, L.V. Shumilov, V.I. Ivankov, N.V. Chekov, S.A. Apirin, H.G. Tyurin, I.T. Chernyshov, G.I. Domanin, K.I. Kukhin, A.G. Zhoromskiy, S.A. Voinov, V.S. Grigorkin, N.V. Gryaznov, V.N. Charkin, K.F. Pogorelov, V.I. Bychenko, A.S. Mikhaylovskiy, Ye.I. Maykov

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CSO: 1801/166

ARMED FORCES

BRIEFS

OBITUARY: MAJ GEN S.A. NIKIFOROV--The leadership of the directorate of the State Defense Committee of the USSR, combat friends and comrades announce with deep sorrow the sudden death of Major General Stanislav Alekseyevich Nikiforov, CPSU member since 1944, honored state security worker and deputy chief of the directorate, and express their condolences to the family and friends of the deceased. [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Mar 87 p 4] 11499

RECENT VOYENIZDAT PUBLICATIONS--"Tekhnicheskiye sredstva propagandy v armii i na flote" [Technical Equipment for Propaganda in the Army and Navy] by V.I. Kondyurin and Ye.G. Tyutyunik, 3rd edition, revised and supplemented, 1987, 352 pages, 1 ruble and 10 kopecks: The book is intended for cadets at higher military-political schools. It will be of interest to commanders and political workers of units and ships, and workers with cultural and educational institutions. "Infrakrasnyye lazernyye lokatsionnyye systemy" [Infrared Laser Radar Systems] by V.V. Protopopov and N.D. Ustinov, 1987, 176 pages, 70 kopecks: The book discusses the physical bases and principles of laser radar in the infrared range. It was written for specialists, VUZ instructors and students, and individuals interested in laser technology. "Giperbaricheskaya terapiya v voyenno-meditsinskoy praktike" [Hyperbaric Therapy in Military Medicine] by Ye.V. Yermakov, S.B. Gatagov, B.R. Glants et al., edited by Ye.V. Yermakov, 1986, 300 pages, 1 ruble and 40 kopecks: The book, which deals with modern methods of treatment using pressurized oxygen, is intended for military doctors and other medical specialists. [Excerpts] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Apr 87 p 2] 11499

CSO: 1801/166

GROUND FORCES

LT GEN LUBGAN ON IMPORTANCE OF RAPID MOVEMENT, MANEUVER

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Apr 87 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen L. Lubgan, Deputy Commander for Combat Training of the Red Banner Kiev Military District, under the rubric "Field Training: Lessons of the Winter Exercises": "Readiness For a March"]

[Text] When one analyzes the combat training and the fulfillment of commitments in the socialist competition by the personnel, one becomes convinced over and over again of how much depends upon the technical training of the subunits and units, and upon the approach taken by the commanders and staffs to its improvement. And this is only natural. Modern combat is such that one cannot count on success without a high level of technical training. Nonetheless, many drills and exercises, including those taking place right now, in the concluding phase of the winter training, show that this is far from always taken into account in the training of the personnel.

I recall a tactical exercise in tank regiment "X."

The subunits were to carry out a march by combined means. The tankmen were to travel part of the way by rail, part of it under their own power.

When the equipment was actually being loaded onto the railcars, it was learned that not all of the personnel were prepared for the march. In the company commanded by Lieutenant A. Solovyev, for example, only two of the mechanic-drivers were able to move the tanks onto the cars. They had to load all of the equipment for the subunit. The rest of the mechanic-drivers were observers. Naturally, not just the company but also the battalion of which it is a part did not complete the operation within the allocated time.

Thinking about this incident, I have come to the conclusion that it was not just inertia at work. A lack of knowledge of the real state of affairs with respect to march preparations in the subunits also made itself felt. It is therefore not surprising that these matters were dealt with in the regiment simply from one exercise to the next.

Unfortunately, this kind of frivolous, frankly speaking, attitude toward march preparations is not such a rare thing. Certain commanders seem to forget the simple fact that the dynamic nature of modern combat calls for the troops to be in a constant state of readiness for maneuvering. This requirement has long been

valid, however. We know of many examples from the Great Patriotic War in which formations and units or even subunits had to enter into combat right off the railcars. How could we forget this?

One could name many commanders who, relying on the front-line experience, make creative use of it and skilfully resolve the entire range of problems pertaining to march preparation of the personnel. A number of units have specially equipped training stations for preparing the specialists for hauling the equipment by rail. I also know commanders who do not consider it a disgrace, when necessary, to ask the commandant for help. Getting two or three railcars placed at their disposal, they drill the mechanic-drivers. In short, the commander who truly strives to teach his subordinates that which is needed in combat will always find a way to do so. He only needs to demonstrate creativity, initiative and persistence. Then, the kind of situations discussed above will not be encountered on the march.

Yes, the subunits and units have good march possibilities today. The subunits of all troop arms are actually capable of covering hundreds of kilometers in a day, and not just dozens as in the last war. The increased maneuvering capabilities of the forces permit them to rapidly outflank the enemy, make swift raids on his rear services, and efficiently regroup personnel and equipment. The mounted and built-in engineer equipment and the modern navigational gear which motorized rifle and tank subunits of the Ground Forces have today enable them to move rapidly through practically any terrain, under any climatic conditions, day or night.

It should be pointed out, however, that all of this is possible only when the personnel have good march training. It should also be noted that the level of march training of the unit or subunit is defined not just by the ability of the drivers and mechanic-drivers to operate the vehicle in a column or load it onto a railcar. There are many other factors. Experience has demonstrated, among other things, the fact that the rigid time limitations of combat demand greater concern for the organization of marches and for their technical support.

In my opinion, the following example is a good illustration and further proof of this. One of the vehicles in the company commanded by Captain V. Kolomiytsev suddenly stopped during a march. It turned out that the fuel had been used up in the tanks, and the crew could not take any from the spare containers because they had neither an ordinary hose nor a funnel. Some of the other vehicles were subsequently found not to have an entire set of spare tools and accessories. Were the subunit's preparations for the march not checked then? Yes, they were. The equipment was inspected the day before. All of the vehicles were totally equipped. Then what happened? Captain Kolomiytsev had simply "outwitted" the inspectors by borrowing spare parts and tools from neighbors. The officer did not prepare for combat, it turns out, but only for the inspection.

Organizational hitches of a different kind also occur. I witnessed the following incident during one exercise, for example. The battalion commanded by Major G. Gnezdilov had finished unloading from the railcars ahead of the others and was prepared to move out under its own power. For tactical reasons, however, the unit commander did not permit it to move out. A representative of higher headquarters who unexpectedly showed up in the unloading area insisted that the battalion begin the march.

Subsequent events showed that this was far from the best decision. In the first place, it significantly complicated control of the subunits. In the second place, organizational hitches prevented the tankmen from replenishing their fuel supply in good time. Many of the vehicles came to a halt several kilometers before they reached the field refueling points. The willful decision of a chief who did not think about the consequences of his interference in the organization of the march was actually a precondition for failure to complete the combat training mission. The tankmen were very late in arriving at the area where they were to enter into combat.

We can see that the success of a march depends upon the resolution of a large group of questions, and, naturally, on the conscientious and coordinated work of many people. Everyone who takes part in a march or has something to do with the preparations needs to keep this in mind.

In my opinion, the experience of the company commanded by Senior Lieutenant A. Fedorov is instructive in this respect. In the last exercise this company completed a march rapidly and in an organized manner, and reached the lines designated for it without any delays during the battle. In short, it demonstrated good maneuverability. As far as I know, Senior Lieutenant Fedorov has no secrets. He simply tries to combine the tasks involved in making a march with improvement of the overall technical level of the personnel. And he tries to take into account the individual traits of the trainees. The specialists are worked with literally as soon as they arrive in the company. The officers keep a personal record of the newcomers' training and get them involved in technical groups. This also helps them to acquire skill more rapidly.

The experience of this company could unquestionably help not only the other subunits in its regiment. Company commanders in other units could also learn something from Senior Lieutenant Fedorov. Neither the regimental nor the division staff is seriously studying and disseminating his experience, however.

Specialists in the district combat training directorate should also take a more active stance in this matter. Experience has shown that the situation with respect to march preparation is far from the best in a number of units. Not all of the officers at the battalion or even the regimental level are adequately skilled in rapidly organizing a march or directing columns at high speeds. Some of the officers clearly have difficulties in organizing reconnaissance, engineer support for the march and protection from weapons of mass destruction for the personnel and equipment. Naturally, all of this makes it necessary for us to pay closer attention to problems of march preparation.

This was discussed at a recent meeting of the Communists in our directorate. Steps were outlined which should be expected to produce positive results right now, in the concluding phase of the winter training, and in the future. The fact that we need to hold commanders at all levels more accountable for march preparation was also discussed. It is a known fact, after all, that not so long ago we ourselves were making allowances for commanders who had to organize a march in bad weather or during the spring thaw, for example. This must not be done, because it only undermines the people's confidence in the equipment and in their own capabilities.

We have earnest hopes that officers in the district combat training directorate will improve the march training of the subunits and units in the final exercises. Each of them has been assigned the specific task of studying positive experience in organizing march training for the personnel. I believe that if we summarize this experience we can work out more effective recommendations for further improving the march training of the troops.

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CSO: 1801/172

HELICOPTER TRAINING AGAINST TANK COLUMNS NOTED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Apr 87 p 1

[Report by Gds Maj N. Mikhachenko, Central Group of Forces: "The Young Ones Are Tested"]

[Text] Springing out from behind the ridge of a hill, the rotary-wing aircraft suddenly appeared over the positions of the defending "enemy." And the fiery arrows of missiles immediately swept toward the ground. The crew of the helicopter commanded by Senior Lieutenant O. Samoylov accurately destroyed the targets.

The airmen led by the young officer had to carry out more than one difficult mission that day. The helicopter crewmen precisely bombed a column of "enemy" tanks and successfully destroyed all targets with a machine gun. Another crew, the one commanded by Senior Lieutenant V. Voloshenko, achieved the same good results in the exercise.

Senior Lieutenants Samoylov and Voloshenko were taking their first important test as helicopter pilots. The success of the young officers is due to the fact that a great deal of attention is given to the training of this category of airmen in the regiment. The more experienced specialists conduct exercises and drills with them.

At first the young commanders lacked precision in directing the work of the crew, and they sometimes got in too big a hurry. Their persistence in the training, however, and the assistance of the unit's best airmen helped them to master their new duties within a short time. The exercise results showed that the young officers had passed the test of their maturity as commanders.

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CSO: 1801/172

REVIEW: 600 YEARS OF RUSSIAN, SOVIET ARTILLERY

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Mar 87 p 2

[Review by MSU V. Petrov of book "Otechestvennaya artilleriya. 600 let" [600 Years of Russian and Soviet Artillery] by a group of authors under the editorship of G.Ye. Peredel'skiy, Voenizdat, 1986, 365 pages]

[Text] From the Harquebus to the Missile: 6 Centuries of Russian and Soviet Artillery

Many books have been written about the artillery, one of the oldest troop arms. This new book by the creative team traces the history of the development of Russian and Soviet artillery during its 6 centuries of existence, from the primitive barrel secured in a log to modern artillery systems and missile launchers.

The book convincingly demonstrates the independent path of development of our artillery, and the preeminence of Russian and Soviet military science in many areas pertaining to the improvement of the weapons themselves and the ammunition, firing and fire control methods, organizational forms and methods of training the personnel, and combat application.

Back at the beginning of the 18th century, during the period of reforms under Peter I, Russian armorers rejected the multi-caliber principle. They began to produce guns strictly according to blueprints and to use special firing tables. The artillery was subsequently raised to a qualitatively new level as a result of the development of steel, breech-loaded guns, the replacement of the fixed carriage with a carriage with recoil, the introduction of smokeless powder and oblong, rotating shells, the improvement of sights, and the development of communication and reconnaissance equipment.

A large part of the book is justifiably devoted to Soviet artillery, to the period in which many new artillery systems were developed and accepted into the arsenal in our nation, systems which played an important role in the build-up of the fire power of the Armed Forces and in the defeat of the Hitlerite invaders.

Our artillerymen successfully resolved many problems involved in improving fire control, the effectiveness of artillery preparation, support of an attack and accompaniment of the infantry into the depth of the enemy's defense, and the concentration of fire. Artillery formations--brigades, divisions and corps--

were established in the Soviet Army. This was in keeping with the principles involved in concentrating artillery weapons for purposes of breaking up the enemy's defense. A new method of employing the "god of war," the artillery offensive, was also implemented in full on 19 November 1942, when our forces began the counteroffensive at Stalingrad.

The book uses the most important battles and engagements for explaining the methods and praxis of combat employment of the artillery in the Great Patriotic War. It thoroughly reveals the multifaceted, directing role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its efforts to turn the artillery into a powerful and awesome troop arm, and to develop good moral-political qualities in the Soviet artillerymen. One cannot read without excitement the accounts of little-known examples of heroism and courage set by the artillerymen--the feat performed by the gun crew made up of Komsomol girls of the 148th Rifle Division's 226th Anti-tank Battalion, and many others. The authors have clarified certain details about the feats performed by twice Heroes of the Soviet Union A.P. Shilin and V.S. Petrov.

The book also discusses the development of Soviet artillery in the postwar period, which, I would note, has not yet received fitting coverage in military historiography. The authors have convincingly described the improvement of the artillery and the development of missile weaponry during the postwar years, which led to the establishment of a new troop arm, the Missile Troops, in the Ground Forces.

I should note the smoothly arranged structure of the book, its clarity of exposition, and the authors' use of extensive factual material. There are some shortcomings, however. In my opinion, the first part of the book is somewhat overburdened with general historical facts. There are also gaps in the chronology. Although the book is well illustrated in general, it could only have benefited had a place been found in it for diagrams of the most important operations of the war.

In general, the new theoretical military work dealing with Russian and Soviet artillery will undoubtedly help to expand the military-historical perspective and draw the attention of officers and the general reading public.

11499

CSO: 1801/167

AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

SOKOLOV ATTENDS AIR DEFENSE DAY CEREMONY

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Apr 87 p 1

[Report by Col V. Skrizhalin: "Guarding the Air Borders"]

[Text] A formal meeting dedicated to Air Defense Forces' Day was held on 9 April at the Central Academic Theater of the Soviet Army. Taking part in it were representatives of Moscow's workers, fightingmen from the capital's garrison, veterans of the Great Patriotic War and of the Air Defense Forces.

The following were members of the presidium: Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L. Sokolov, candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Minister of Defense; O.S. Belyakov and N.I. Savinkin, heads of departments of the CPSU Central Committee; Yu.D. Maslyukov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; A.S. Systsov, USSR Minister of Aviation Industry; Marshal of the Soviet Union V.G. Kulikov, Commander in Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact States; Army General A.D. Lizichev, chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy; Army General Ye.F. Ivanovskiy, Chief Marshal of Aviation A.I. Koldunov, Marshal of Aviation A.N. Yefimov, Army General V.M. Shabanov and Army General D.T. Yezov, deputy USSR ministers of defense; Colonel General V.M. Arkhipov, commander of the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District; Colonel General S.A. Bobylev, member of the Military Council and chief of the Political Directorate of Air Defense Forces; generals, admirals, officers, veterans of the Air Defense Forces, defense industry workers, designers and representatives of the Moscow community.

The formal meeting was opened by Yu.A. Belyakov, Secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU.

N.I. Kovalchuk, a brigade leader from the Kosmos Sewn-Goods Association, V.I. Fedosov, secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee, and A.G. Basistov, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, presented salutations to the air defense fighters.

Chief Marshal of Aviation A.I. Koldunov, Commander in Chief of the Air Defense Forces and Deputy USSR Minister of Defense, spoke at the meeting.

There was a festive concert following the formal meeting.

11499

CSG: 1801/172

AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

AIR DEFENSE FORCES' DAY ARTICLES

Col Gen Avn Maltsev Interview

Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 11 Apr 87 p 4

[TASS interview for SELSKAYA ZHIZN with Col Gen Avn I.M. Maltsev, Chief of Main Staff of the Air Defense Forces, under the rubric "12 April is Air Defense Forces' Day": "Sentries of the Air Borders"]

[Text] Colonel General of Aviation I.M. Maltsev, Chief of Main Staff of the Air Defense Forces, Answers Questions From a Correspondent

[Question] The celebration of Air Defense Forces is very "young" compared with the holidays of the other branches of the Armed Forces of the USSR, although the biography of the forces covers several decades. Please tell us about their history.

[Answer] Air Defense Forces' Day was indeed established only recently. The ukase was passed by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 20 February 1975. This branch of the Armed Forces came into being back in 1917, however.

The Great October Socialist Revolution had just been completed, and the enemy immediately began to attack the cradle of the revolution. On the night of 28 October Vladimir Ilich Lenin traveled to the Putilov Plant to confer on the best way to protect revolutionary Peter. The idea of armored sites with antiaircraft guns was brought up in the lively discussion there. The Putilov workers built two armored trains and made up teams for them from among the workers, and this combat unit came to be known as the Putilov Iron Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion. It engaged in combat for the first time on 3 March 1918 in the fighting at Pskov, shooting down two German aircraft. A month later there were around 200 antiaircraft artillery batteries and 12 fighter detachments in the young Red Army.

The first air defense formations honorably fulfilled their duty during the civil war, earning the great appreciation of the people. They underwent their most rigorous tests during the Great Patriotic War. The Hitlerites dominated the air at first, as we know, and constantly bombed our cities, industrial facilities and communications. The enemy did not go unpunished even then, however.

During the war air defense units and formations destroyed 7,313 Hitlerite aircraft, more than 1,000 tanks and around 1,500 guns and mortars. A total of

A total of 26 units and three formations were awarded the Guards title for their heroism and combat skill, 80,000 soldiers and commanders received orders and medals, and 93 fightingmen were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

[Question] The war ended for everyone with the victory. Only the Air Defense Forces continue to be in a state of combat readiness.

[Answer] Yes, it became far more difficult to protect the air borders after the war. Scientific and technological progress was developing rapidly. The imperialists were trying in every possible way to use it for their vile purposes. Go back to May of 1960. The Americans specially developed the high-altitude U-2 Lockheed aircraft. They were confident that we would not even be able to detect this aircraft, let alone shoot it down. They miscalculated. Others who like to look through other people's doors have also always been bitterly disappointed. The air borders of the USSR have been and remain inviolable.

[Question] Your confidence is understandable. Nevertheless, let us consider a hypothetical example: there is an enemy air raid against one of our particularly important facilities. What will the Air Defense Forces do?

[Answer] Our eyes and ears, the Radiotechnical Troops, will begin their combat first. They will issue a thorough and complete description of all the targets, no matter how many there are: altitude, speed, course and coordinates. The radar facilities with their modern electronics are capable of successfully accomplishing all of the missions.

The necessary number of our supersonic, all-weather interceptors, which have the latest intercept missile systems, will be sent into the air on alert. Our modern aircraft are a mass of the most advanced scientific and technological thinking. Their electronic gear makes it possible to repel an air enemy at the farthest approaches to the facilities they are protecting.

The ground-to-air missile troops will be placed on combat readiness status at the same time. They constitute our main fire power. The troops are armed with powerful systems with a great destructive capacity over the entire range of altitudes and speeds of flight of airborne weapons.

All of the weapons will be controlled from command posts also outfitted with the most modern electronic and other equipment.

[Question] Let us be objective. The likely enemy is also armed with the most modern equipment. His aircraft, for example, can fly at supersonic speeds in both the stratosphere and at extremely low altitudes of 25-30 meters. He also has very powerful means of radioelectronic counteraction....

[Answer] We assess the likely enemy with maximum objectivity. None of us--from the rank-and-file soldier to the commander in chief--tolerates complacency in this matter. That is one thing. In the second place, the diverse equipment we have makes it possible to cope with the most difficult missions which could arise in an actual situation. I stress once again the fact that the inviolability of the skies over the homeland is sacred to us, and the constant readiness of the Air Defense Forces ensures an immediate rebuff to any aggressor.

[Question] We still have cases, however, in which foreign aircraft penetrate into our air space. The South Korean air liner which bourgeois propaganda used for its own vile purposes for a long time comes to mind, as an example.

[Answer] We do have such cases, of course. The violations most frequently occur because of a malfunctioning of navigation systems or due to the pilot's lack of experience. During all of the many years of our forces' history, however--and I particularly stress this fact--there has never been a case in which fire was opened at a target simply because we had the formal, legal right to do so. We are well aware of the seriousness of all the possible consequences and therefore exercise the necessary restraint. It is always explained to the transgressor by all available means that he is a transgressor. Depending upon the circumstances, it is suggested either that he leave our air space or that he land at a designated airfield.

With respect to the above-mentioned liner, the Air Defense Forces treated it with the highest degree of precaution. As we know, however, it failed to respond to all of the warnings and was in no hurry to abandon the air space of a sovereign nation. This was because it was on an intelligence mission. This was indisputably proved long ago.

[Question] Right now, as we talk, antennas are rotating, aircraft are taking off and landing. It is difficult even to imagine how many of them are activated to protect the more than 60,000 kilometers of air borders.

[Answer] I can only say: exactly as many as are needed to reliably protect the skies over the homeland. Some of our radar sites, ground-to-air missile battalions and airfields are located in the most remote and inaccessible places. This is so that they can perform the combat mission with absolute certainty.

[Question] Igor Mikhaylovich, you mentioned the high level of technical equipment of the forces and stressed the fact that it is constantly being raised and improved. But what about the personnel? Do they measure up to the great demands of service in air defense subunits?

[Answer] Our people are truly remarkable. I could mention dozens, even hundreds, of names of soldiers, sergeants and officers who have distinguished themselves in the performance of alert duty, in exercises and in the performance of other important missions in peacetime. I know many of them personally and have seen them in action.

All of the fightingmen in most of our subunits have a secondary education, and many of them have VUZ diplomas. Their young, inquiring and flexible minds can master the most complex systems provided us by Soviet industry. It is not difficult to imagine what the level of training and culture of the officers-and-teachers must be in order for them to effectively influence the minds of their subordinates.

The majority of our officers measure up to their great purpose. What I have said certainly does not mean that we do not need to restructure in accordance with the spirit of the expanding and intensifying changes occurring in the society and in

the army. The restructuring is needed, and it is proceeding in the Air Defense Forces. We still have a great deal to do to intensify the individual work performed with the fightingmen, to give it specific focus and substance.

In order to maintain the equipment in exemplary condition, to prepare it well for combat and make effective use of it, we must also constantly improve the technical sophistication, the training and the practical skills of the personnel. A number of other problems also must be resolved as part of the restructuring. We know what they are, and we are working on them.

[Question] You began by talking about the glorious combat traditions of the Air Defense Forces. Tell us how they are being enriched today.

[Answer] The great force of traditions lies in their continuity. Our fightingmen feel with all their hearts their involvement with the past. They have someone from whom to take an example, have something to inherit. Emulating the combat valor of the older generations, fightingmen of the '80s are successfully accomplishing the combat training missions and standing tireless watch over the homeland's air borders. At the beginning of our talk I mentioned the Putilov Iron Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion. I want to report to the readers that there is in our forces today the Guards Ground-to-Air Missile Putilov-Kirov Order of Lenin Air Defense Regiment, the direct heir to that iron battalion. The traditions live on.

Maj Gen Reshetnikov Article

Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 12 Apr 87 p 4

[Article by Maj Gen Avn G. Reshetnikov under the rubric "Today is Air Defense Forces' Day": "In a Constant State of Readiness"]

[Text] The Soviet people and fightingmen of the army and navy are celebrating Air Defense Forces' Day today. These forces were formed in 1954 as a separate service of the Armed Forces. Their combat history began immediately after the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, however. The first air defense subunit, the Iron Antiaircraft Battalion, was formed at the Putilov Plant at V.I. Lenin's instruction.

The civil war produced many examples of courage and heroism on the part of defenders of the skies over Moscow, Petrograd, Tula, Astrakhan and other cities of the young Soviet Republic. The antiaircraft batteries were awarded honorary Red Banners of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee in recognition of their combat service.

The Air Defense Forces honorably fulfilled the missions assigned to them also during the Great Patriotic War. Their vigorous combat actions contributed to the victories in the battles fought at Moscow and Stalingrad, in the fighting at Kursk and in other large operations. They made it possible to save the nation's most important centers and ensured the normal and interrupted operation of the rail transport system. During the Great Patriotic War air defense formations and units shot down more than 7,300 enemy aircraft and destroyed more than 1,000 tanks, around 1,500 guns and mortars, and a large quantity of other combat equipment and enemy personnel.

Many fighter pilots, antiaircraft artillerymen and machine-gunners glorified their names with immortal feats. More than 80,000 soldiers, sergeants, officers and generals of the air defense forces were awarded orders and medals. A total of 93 were awarded the great title Hero of the Soviet Union, and Captain A.T. Karpov, a fighter pilot, was awarded the title twice.

V.V. Talalikhin, the first person in the history of aviation to ram an enemy aircraft at night, performed his immortal feat in the skies over Moscow. Senior Lieutenant B.I. Kovzan performed four air ramblings.

As a result of the heroic effort of the party and the entire Soviet people, the air defense forces grew into a qualitatively new and awesome force after the war. They became forces maintaining a constant state of readiness. They are armed with the latest missiles and radioelectronic combat equipment with good combat features. Automatic control systems have been extensively adopted in the forces. All of this provides the foundation for their constant state of readiness to successfully carry out the combat missions.

The present generation of defenders of the homeland's skies are preserving and adding to the glorious traditions of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces.

Many first-class air snipers, masters of missile fire, alert and vigilant radar operators and fightingmen in other specialties serve in the Air Defense Forces. The enemy cannot penetrate to our cities and villages and disturb the peaceful labor of the Soviet people in any kind of weather, day or night, on holidays or ordinary work days, beneath or above the clouds, or concealed by interference.

A complex air situation was created in a recent tactical exercise. Aircraft of the opposing side did everything possible to penetrate to an important facility. The "enemy" employed feinting actions, used powerful radio interference, took advantage of cloudiness and changed altitudes abruptly. In short, he did everything possible to carry out a "bomb" strike. In that situation the fightingmen of Officer N. Khokhodzilo's subunit performed smoothly and demonstrated excellent training and tactical maturity. The missilemen successfully accomplished the assigned mission. The "enemy" did not achieve his objective and was "destroyed" on the distant approaches to the facility being guarded.

The socialist competition which has developed in the units and subunits today is contributing greatly to the successful accomplishment of the missions. Commanders, political organs, party and Komsomol organizations are taking maximum advantage of this movement to improve the quality and effectiveness of the combat training. The intensive winter combat training is coming to an end. The vast majority of air defense subunits are achieving excellent results in the competition with the slogan "We shall fulfill decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and commemorate the 70th anniversary of Great October with selfless military labor."

The air defense troops, like all personnel of the Armed Forces of the USSR, are proud of the great trust vested in them by the Communist Party and the Soviet people in assigning them the mission of protecting the sacred borders of our great homeland. Carrying out their combat missions, missilemen, pilots, radar operators, signalmen and fightingmen in the other specialties are vigilantly

standing combat alert to protect the southern borders of our homeland. They are filled with resolve to fulfill their constitutional duties, to reliably protect the socialist homeland and to be in a constant state of combat readiness ensuring an immediate rebuff to any aggressor.

Maj Gen Kalyakin Article

Dushanbe KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 12 Apr 87 p 3

[Tajik News Agency article by Maj Gen G. Kalyakin under the rubric "Today is Air Defense Forces' Day": "Guarding the Air Borders"; first paragraph is KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA introduction]

[Text] This holiday was established to commemorate the great service of the air defense forces in the Great Patriotic War and their performance of especially important missions in peacetime. It reflects the great attention and concern of the CPSU and the Soviet government for thoroughly strengthening our homeland's defensive might and increasing the fighting strength of the Armed Forces. The Soviet people view it as a review of our achievements in the creation of a reliable air defense for the USSR and of the successes of the defenders of our air borders, of the scientists, designers and workers in many branches of industry.

Comrade M.S. Gorbachev evoked a vital response in the hearts of sentries of the air borders when he said that in the complex international situation it is important as never before to maintain our homeland's defense capability at a level which lets potential aggressors understand well that an encroachment upon the security of the Soviet nation or its allies, upon the peaceful life of the Soviet people, will meet with a devastating retaliatory strike.

The birth of the Air Defense Forces is inseparably linked with the Great October Socialist Revolution and with the work of Vladimir Ilich Lenin. Immediately following the victory of the October armed uprising V.I. Lenin personally headed the work of organizing the defeat of the first counterrevolutionary revolts and protecting Petrograd, cradle of the revolution, and constantly concerned himself with the city's air defense. Because there were many aircraft of the officers' air school and powerful artillery in rebel-held Gatchina, Lenin assigned workers at the Putilov Plant the task of accelerating the dispatch of an antiaircraft armored train to the front.

When the antiaircraft armored train arrived in the area of Pulkovo, it and an antiaircraft motor vehicle battery located near Krasnoye Selo actually became the young republic's first air defense formation.

The antiaircraft gunners fought the ground enemy many times. They helped to repel 35 attacks on the station of Plesetskaya between 9 and 20 October 1919 alone. During the night of 12 October 1919 the enemy succeeded in driving our infantry back and cutting off the railroad batteries' route of withdrawal by blowing up the tracks behind them. The Red Army men did not flinch, however. All day long they fought in semi-encirclement, shelling armored enemy trains and cars almost point-blank. The 2nd Antiaircraft Battery was awarded the honored revolutionary Red Banner of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee for this feat by a 7 February order of the Revolutionary Military Council.

Antiaircraft gunners of the 2nd Battery traveled a glorious path with that banner. After the interventionists in the north were defeated the battery followed units of the 11th Army to Baku, where it laid the foundation for creating an antiaircraft defense district. Transformed into a separate antiaircraft artillery battalion and then an antiaircraft artillery regiment, the unit arrived in Moscow in July of 1939 and merged into the capital's air defense system. Bravely combatting the Hitlerite aviation during the Great Patriotic War, personnel of that regiment wrote some brilliant new pages in the annals of combat. Today, as in previous years, the Guards Antiaircraft Missile Putilov-Kirov Order of Lenin Air Defense Regiment is on the right flank of the combat formation.

Thanks to the constant concern of the Communist Party and the Soviet government and to the Soviet people's outstanding successes in the development of the economy, science and culture, at the beginning of the war the air defense forces had considerable strength and were well prepared to combat the air enemy.

Fascist Germany made the treacherous, predacious attack on our homeland on 20 June 1941. The Hitlerite army with more than 5 million men, created and armed with the active assistance of world imperialism and with 2 years of combat experience, inflicted a surprise attack of enormous force, raining fire and death down upon our nation's cities and villages.

Fighters of the 87th Separate Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion's 3rd Battery surrounded themselves with immortal glory on the second day of the war by defending the approaches to Lutsk. The German tank spearhead was pointed at their positions. The antiaircraft gunners boldly accepted battle. The gun crew commanded by Sergeant M.F. Pakhomov withstood an attack by 12 German tanks and destroyed two of them.

The courage and skill of defenders of the homeland's air space frustrated the fascist command's plans and inflicted irreplaceable losses upon the enemy. Suffice it to say that the fascist aviation lost 1,100 aircraft during less than 1 month of the war, 22 June to 10 July 1941. Never before had the enemy experienced such losses.

Many Soviet women fought heroically alongside the men in the ranks of the air defense personnel. They rapidly acquired military specialties and became good pilots, scouts, signalmen, operators of range-finders and other instruments, machine-gunners, balloonists-- even gun crew members.

The 586th Antiaircraft Fighter Regiment manned by women fought its way from the banks of the Volga to Vienna, the Austrian capital. The pilots of that regiment carried out 4,419 combat sorties, conducted 125 air battles and shot down 38 fascist aircraft.

The main result of the combat work of the air defense forces was that, under party leadership and operating jointly with other services of the Armed Forces of the USSR, they defended the socialist homeland's freedom and independence and protected the cause of October. The air defense forces prevented the German fascist aviation from damaging or destroying the nation's large administrative-political and industrial centers, many communities and communication facilities, and reinforced the air cover for our groupings of forces and their rear services in defensive and offensive operations.

The homeland greatly appreciated the military feat performed by the air defense forces on the battlefields. Three formation and 26 units of the air defense forces were given the Guards title. Many corps, divisions and regiments were given honorary names and were awarded orders of the USSR. More than 80,000 soldiers, sergeants, officers and generals of the air defense forces received high government awards. A total of 93 fightingmen were awarded the great title Hero of the Soviet Union, and Captain A. Karpov, a fighter-pilot who fought heroically in the skies over Leningrad, was awarded the title twice. The names of 34 military heroes were listed in perpetuity on the rosters of military units.

The Soviet people's victory over Hitlerite Germany and militaristic Japan had a profound effect on the entire course of world development. It was a powerful accelerator of the international revolutionary movement. The positive changes occurring in the world evoked rabid anger in the camp of imperialism, particularly oversea imperialism. As early as November 1945 the American command established a list of 20 Soviet cities as targets for atomic bombs. At the end of 1948 the U.S. administration approved a plan for carrying out now 70 atomic strikes against the USSR. A year later it approved a new and more barbaric plan for an atomic war, code-named "Dropshot," against the Soviet Union and other socialist states. Only the economic, political and defensive strength of the socialist nations cooled off the militant ardor of the oversea strategists.

Washington is developing high-precision nuclear weapons systems in an attempt to achieve military superiority over our nation. An entire system of first-strike nuclear weapons is being created. They include both strategic weapons--MX and Trident-2 missiles, B-1B bombers and long-range cruise missiles--as well as the Pershings and Tomahawks deployed in Europe, new submarine-based ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles based on combat ships in the Pacific Ocean.

The growing military threat from the USA and its NATO allies demands that we constantly strengthen our homeland's defense capability and the fighting strength of the Army, the Navy and the Air Defense Forces.

We can say without exaggeration that our remarkable fightingmen, infinitely devoted to the Communist Party and the Soviet government and ensuring that all the missions facing the forces are accomplished with their day-to-day, selfless labor, are the main strength of the Air Defense Forces and of the Armed Forces as a whole. Members of all nationalities of our great people are hard at work in the unified combat formation.

Personnel of the Air Defense Forces perform their service with endurance and skill. The Communist Party and the Soviet government have fittingly noted the successes achieved by the defenders of the homeland's air borders. Many of them have been awarded orders and medals for special merit in the mastery of the equipment, in the training and indoctrination of subordinates, and for many years of irreproachable service. They include Guards Lieutenant Colonel T. Gafarov, holder of the Order of the Red Star; Major A. Lobanov, master of combat skills; Captain V. Prineslikov; Senior Lieutenant V. Grafchikov, chief of an excellent radar station; Junior Sergeant V. Sizov, delegate to the 20th Komsomol Congress and best speaker in one of the subunits, and others.

It is the law governing the life of the Air Defense Forces to be in a constant state of combat readiness. The high level of that readiness is demonstrated by examples such as the destruction of the American U-2 spy plane on 1 May 1960 and the American RB-47 reconnaissance plane which intruded into the polar air space on 1 July 1960. Those who are fond of military adventures know that the borders of the USSR are securely locked.

Personnel of the Air Defense Forces, like all the fightingmen of the Armed Forces, are working persistently to master the modern equipment and weapons, and striving to further strengthen military discipline, organization and order.

The missilemen, pilots, radar operators, signalmen and fightingmen in other specialties are vigilantly performing alert duty to guard the homeland's air borders.

11499

CSO: 1801/170

STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES

ARMY GENERAL MAKSIMOV INTERVIEWED FOR VICTORY DAY

Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 9 May 87 p 2

[Interview with Army Gen Yu. P. Maksimov, chief commander, Strategic Rocket Forces, Deputy Minister of Defense, by TASS correspondent: "The People's War Was Going On"; date and place not specified]

[Text] [Question] Years come and go, generations change, and Victory Day remains for all honorable people on the planet an event of unsurpassed value, a feat for the ages. Why is this, in your view?

[Answer] Most of all, because mankind had not known such a powerful upheaval as World War II. When, over a six year period, 61 countries are at war and 50 million people die, the majority of whom, 28 million, were peaceful civilians, this will never be forgotten.

On the other hand, a historic phenomenon of such scope is perceived more clearly and profoundly with the passage of time. Whereas, at the start and even the end of the war, there were those who could perceive it merely as a conflict between two groups of states, today it is clear to every unbiased thinking person that victory over Hitler's Germany and her allies signified the liberation of the peoples of Europe from Fascist enslavement, and the salvation of world civilization.

The Soviet people have every justification to feel that they and their armed forces made the decisive contribution to the defeat of Fascist Germany. But there are still those in the West who assert that it was not at all the Red Army which decided the outcome of the war, but the participation in it of the Western allies.

Every time that I am confronted with such a distortion of the truth about the world war, I recall the statement by Winston Churchill, who could never be suspected of sympathies toward our country or the Soviet system. "Future generations," he asserted, "will acknowledge their debt to the Red Army just as unconditionally as do we, who live to witness these magnificent victories... It was namely the Russian army which knocked the guts out of the German military machine..."

Today, Western falsifiers of history turn facts on their head and consciously lie and slander our people and our army. But, this does not keep facts from being facts. And they are these. On the Soviet-German Front 607 Wehrmacht divisions were destroyed, while the allies defeated 176 Fascist divisions.

One must also consider the fact that the allied operations in North Africa, Italy, as well as the Normandy Invasion could not compare in size with the battles on the Soviet-German Front, which extended over thousands of kilometers. Yes, and the Second Front was opened only in June 1944, when it became clear to the entire world that the USSR could defeat Fascist Germany on its own. And, no matter how refined the falsifiers were after this, it turns out objectively that, by pulverizing the most combat effective enemy units, it was the Soviet army that deprived the Hitlerites of their main forces and resources for waging war, and forced the Fascist command to remove more and more divisions from the other fronts, take them out of the occupied countries and transfer them to the east. Favorable conditions were thereby created for the success of the resistance movement in the occupied countries and those dependent on Fascist Germany, as well as for the operations by the allied Anglo-American forces.

[Question] In this regard, it is necessary to dwell on the great liberation mission of the Soviet Army. How was it expressed?

[Answer] The glorious revolutionary traditions of proletarian internationalism and international solidarity were multiplied during the war time period. During the war, the fulfillment by the Soviet people of their national tasks and their international duty with respect to the other peoples that had fallen under the Fascist yoke were organically combined.

In 1944 our army began the direct liberation of the peoples of Europe from Hitler's occupiers, reaching the borders of neighboring states. For more than a year over seven million Soviet soldiers waged fierce and bloody battles on the territories of these countries. During the years of World War II the Soviet armed forces liberated 13 European and Asian states from the invaders, which had a population of approximately 200 million people.

This is how unparalleled was the international feat of the Soviet soldier, which brought him immortal glory as liberator.

Our great victory had the most profound effect on the entire course of world development. The sphere of imperialist domination narrowed, the world socialist system was formed, favorable conditions were created for the struggle by the working masses for their liberation, the positions of the progressive, democratic and peace loving forces were strengthened, the influence of the Communist and Workers parties grew, and the disintegration of the colonial system was hastened, concluding in its collapse.

[Question] Reactionary Western propaganda asserts that the Soviet Union deliberately did not allow the topic of the past war to be forgotten. They say that by constantly opening old wounds and simultaneously emphasizing the

results of the victorious battles, we are consciously bringing up unforgiving, aggressive and perfidious people, ready to fall upon the Western "free world" with sword in hand...

[Answer] And, therefore, the West should tirelessly arm, and place their trust in nothing at negotiations with the Russians, as nothing will come of them just the same. It is a staggering lie, but, let us say for the sake of fairness, that it is a very tenacious one, as in general is the myth about the "Soviet military threat."

Let us begin by saying that the millions of victims of Fascism, the up to now unprecedented destruction and the unheard of human suffering and torment are impossible to forget, for failure to keep this memory would create conditions under which new crimes could arise.

As for our anxious and solicitous attitude toward the memory of the fallen, it comes primarily from the profound essence of socialist society, where man, his life, health and happiness are the most valued national property. Could we, who lost in the past war 20 million of our fellow citizens, really contemplate aggression?

Our memory about the war, heightened by each victorious date, has been and will be our eternal, uneffaceable weapon. It is not only a grateful and noble tribute to the fallen and the living, who accomplished the immortal feat. It is also a glorious and real part of all our being. When anyone of us looks at himself and at the reality around him he will always see and feel the interconnection of his fate with those who gained victory.

And I would like to also tell about one more very important lesson. Our social system cannot be destroyed by force. The path of aggression, which Fascism took, will inevitably lead to the failure of anyone who encroaches upon socialism. The world cannot be remade by force. Reliance on it, especially in our nuclear age, is equivalent to suicide. Qualitative new thinking is required. Therefore, people all over the world now look to our country with such hopes, and display exceptional interest in the new constructive initiatives of the Soviet leadership, the chief and only goal of which is to ensure the peaceful and secure future of the planet.

9069

CSO: 1801/184

CIVIL DEFENSE

VINNITSA OBLAST KOLKHOZ EXERCISE

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Mar 87 p 2

[Report by TASS Correspondent Ye. Zakharyash, Vinnitsa Oblast: "Readiness"]

[Text] The order to "begin immediate evacuation" broadcast over the radio found the workers of the village of Ivankov at their jobs. Their knowledge of what to do in case of danger helped them to quickly assemble their families, reliably cover belongings and prepare the livestock to be hauled away. An hour and a half later more than 30 families from the low-lying streets had already been moved to temporary housing in a zone safe from flooding.

This is how the civil defense formation on the Kolkhoz imeni 40-letiya Oktyabrya in Yampolskiy Rayon conducted the latest exercise. The farm's civil defense staff prepared the exercise program together with the commission on flooding. Similar exercises were conducted by the civil defense formations of farms and enterprises in Mogilev-Podolskiy, Bershadskiy and other rayons in Vinnitsa Oblast. The warning equipment was checked, and there was a practical test in mopping up after a natural disaster.

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COL GEN ISAYENKO INTERVIEWED ON MILITARY SOVKHOZES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Mar 87 p 1

[Interview with Col Gen I. Isayenko, Chief of the Central Food Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, by Maj S. Kalinayev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under the rubric "A Topical Interview": "Military Sovkhozes: The People and the Work"; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] An All-Army Conference on the Fulfillment of the USSR Food Program in the Army and Navy was held in the Soviet Army's Central Club imeni M.V. Frunze. Commanders and political workers, servicemen, workers, specialists and leading personnel from agricultural enterprises, establishments, military educational institutions, enterprises and organizations of the USSR Ministry of Defense shared their experience in the restructuring at all levels of agricultural production and outlined specific steps to accelerate the social and economic development of the farms and to enhance the labor and social activeness of the people.

Major S. Kalinayev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, asked Colonel General I. Isayenko, Chief of the Central Food Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, to answer a number of questions.

[Question] Comrade Colonel General, what could you tell us is typical of the current stage of development of army and navy agricultural enterprises?

[Answer] First of all, I would say that all of our military sovkhozes and subsidiary farms, like the entire nation, are involved in the restructuring. People are self-critically assessing the results of their work and revealing "bottlenecks" still retarding the growth of agricultural output. The seriousness and the focus on concrete results inherent in the moral climate of many collectives have made it possible basically to ensure that the targets for the production of produce and livestock products and their delivery to the troops are fulfilled. The materials and equipment base has been strengthened. The lives of and personal services for blue- and white-collar workers are being improved. Today our sovkhozes and subsidiary farms have a productive herd of cattle and a large number of hogs, sheep and poultry. They are raising fish and rabbits and are growing hothouse greens and vegetables.

All of this has made it possible to reduce the amount of agricultural products shipped to remote garrisons, to improve the diet of servicemen and their families and of patients in hospitals and sanatoria, and to make the troops more self-sufficient. I would like to name those which serve as models in the forces, those which have stable results year after year. They include the sovkhoses directed by V. Ivanovskiy (North Caucasus Military District), V. Pavlov (Pacific Fleet), B. Silyuk (Far East Military District), G. Simanko (Kiev Military District), M. Melnik and I. Pribula (Carpathian Military District), N. Grigoryev (Leningrad Military District), O. Kangiyev (Turkestan Military District), and others.

[Question] We know the view point which has persisted for many years that the situation in agriculture depends in great part upon "objective factors," which include rain and drought, a shortage of fertilizers, inferior equipment, and so forth. But are many of the problems not due to specific leaders who are still just overcoming their fear of responsibility, and passivity?

[Answer] One can agree with that. While giving due credit to the outstanding, we still frequently lose sight of, leave out of the sphere of party and public attention, those collectives which constantly perform at less than their best. There are still many farms in the districts and the fleets, which would appear not to be lagging but are also not advancing. And these have a good potential for increasing output.

This is why the All-Army Conference frankly mentioned many negative phenomena resulting in low productivity from the farm land and the farms, losses of products on the way to the consumer and of funds, and unproductive outlays. Several military sovkhoses are still achieving low profits.

The causes of this lag are to be found in poor organization, in the incompetence and sluggishness of the directors, and in the resulting passivity of the collectives. We have serious grounds for complaint against sovkhos chiefs Captain V. Petukhov (Central Asian Military District), Captain L. Novikov (Far East Military District) and I. Khakhanov (Pacific Fleet).

[Question] The Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress stressed the fact that in order to ensure a food supply for the population, we have to use the production capability in the agroindustrial complex more efficiently and to concentrate personnel and equipment in the most important areas, those which will provide the greatest return. How do these tasks appear as applicable to the military sovkhoses?

[Answer] It is primarily a matter of enhancing the fertility of the land and creating the conditions necessary for a stable agricultural operation. It is a well-known fact, after all, that the amount of arable land per person is constantly being reduced. While there was more than 1 hectare per resident in the nation in the '50s, the figure is now only 0.81 hectare. It is therefore essential not only to use the land more effectively, but also to constantly improve its quality and increase its fertility. Unfortunately, not all of the military sovkhoses are treating this matter with a proper sense of responsibility. We will have to achieve a change in the minds of the people, however, since this is necessitated by the demands of the times.

[Question] We should obviously also discuss such an extremely important factor in agriculture as the caliber of the cultivation....

[Answer] Absolutely. This concept covers a great many things, after all. It includes seed quality, the amount of organic and mineral fertilizers applied to the soil and when they are applied, and the use of intensive technologies. And, of course, it includes land reclamation, the performance of the work at the best times, measures to protect the crops against pests and diseases, and other things.

This reminds me of the military sockhozes in the Kiev Military District which sow their own high-grade seed every year. Then there are farms in the Central Asian and Transbaykal Military Districts and the Pacific Fleet, which require a large quantity of seed from state stocks. Because of poorly organized seed production, a significant portion of the seed potatoes in those districts are of low quality. The schedules for applying fertilizers and planting the crops, and the quality of the crop care do not yet in all cases meet the requirements of [good] agricultural practices. This results in crop shortfalls and failure to meet the targets.

[Question] What is the situation on the military sovkhoses with respect to livestock raising?

[Answer] Plans in this area are being fulfilled for the Ministry of Defense as a whole. Once again, however, this is because of the better farms. Livestock farming produces a loss on many sovkhoses of the Central Asian Military District, on five sovkhoses in the North Caucasus Military District and on four sovkhoses of the Pacific Fleet.

I go back to the human factor. These farms have a good feed base, but average daily weight gains are still low there. This must be attributed to irresponsible upkeep of the animals and poor organization of production.

[Question] Today we consider the success of our plans and initiatives to be directly dependent upon concern for the working, living and leisure-time conditions of the people. How are questions of social, cultural and living conditions being resolved on the military sovkhoses?

[Answer] Certain advances have been made in this area. We cannot yet be satisfied with the state of social, cultural and living conditions, however. The amount of capital invested, including capital spent on social facilities, has increased considerably on the military sovkhoses in recent years. Despite the steps taken, however, a number of farms have not fulfilled the construction plan. This prolongation of construction does not improve the people's morale, and it affects the quality and quantity of their work. I would like to take advantage of the opportunity to appeal to the command elements of the military districts in which this situation exists and ask them to help the sovkhoses to apply the funds allocated, to accelerate the completion of projects under construction, and to increase the percentage of the jobs performed under the contract system.

In conclusion, I would like to stress the fact that success in any area depends upon the cadres.

The military sovkhoses now have highly skilled specialists with something to pass on to the youth. It is important for them to skillfully combine closeness with the people and a high level of demandingness, to constantly seek new forms and methods of management, and to actively implement the party's general line of restructuring.

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MOBILE FACTORY CALLED CONSTRUCTION INNOVATION

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Mar 87 p 1

[Report by Maj A. Kosyuk and Capt G. Verves under the rubric "For Construction-- a Modern Technical Level": "And Time is Passing..."; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] At the VDNKh [All-Union Exhibition of Achievements of the National Economy] of the USSR last year, the attention of many visitors was drawn to a mock-up of a mobile concrete plant displayed by the Main Construction Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense. The project was awarded a 2nd-degree certificate, three silver and seven bronze medals. It was of interest also to the specialists. Orders for the plant came in from various sectors of the national economy.

This innovation was mastered at the enterprise directed by Colonel Ya. Chemov.

"Those who took part in the development and the building of the plant," he says, "tried to take into account all the wishes of builders and to eliminate 'sore spots' typical of units of its kind."

This was reflected in the plant's technical features. Specifically, it increased the plant's productivity. Its capacity was increased markedly without increasing the number of servicing personnel, which saves a total of 115,000 rubles annually. The plant's mobility is one of its main merits. It consists of 18 sections, and when necessary it can be rapidly dismantled and moved to a new location.

The concrete plant was designed by a group of engineers led by Colonel (Reserve) V. Shablevskiy, holder of the State Prize of the USSR. A united team of like-minded people was selected. It included Lieutenant Colonel Ye. Kuznetsov, Major G. Osipenko, Captain M. Korostelev and Reserve Officer M. Shtypulyak. Each of them was assigned a specific area of the work but was given extensive independence.

They were pressed by rigid deadlines. These appeared unrealistic to many people. After all, they had not merely to improve upon an existing model but to create a fundamentally new, highly automated, mobile concrete plant making it possible not only to increase concrete production, but also to improve its quality. The task was accomplished within a year.

"We tried to incorporate original ideas in the plant's design," says Major G. Osipenko, holder of the Lenin Komsomol Prize and one of its builders. "The general design of the plant and the designs of the batching hoppers and the mixing section are protected by patents, for example."

The concrete plant is frequently called the heart of a construction project. A smooth operating rhythm depends in great part on it. How was the innovation received by those for whom it was intended? This is what Soviet Army employee Sergey Petrovich Sudakov had to say:

"I have also worked at other plants. This one is superior to them, and more economical. It is simply indispensable at construction sites where a great deal of concrete is needed. It does need a high caliber of maintenance and well-trained servicing personnel, to be sure. But this is inevitable in the case of all achievements of scientific and technological progress."

It is ordinarily not easy for something new to come into being. At first there were difficulties with the production of an experimental model of the concrete plant. There was a question about how its production could be set up in the future without detriment to the enterprise's main product. Where would they find the necessary manpower, materials and equipment? These and other questions troubled Colonel Ya. Chemova and Major R. Gataullin, chief engineer at the enterprise, as well as the developers. They too were undergoing a unique test. Most of the time while the experimental model was being assembled, they were therefore alongside the workers in the shops and in the [assembly] areas. All technical questions were decided promptly, on the spot. This is when the effectiveness of close cooperation between scientists and production was truly felt at the plant.

The enterprise management assigned the best specialists to master production of the new item: cutters, welders, stamp operators, fitters and assemblers. The newly formed, comprehensive brigade was headed by veteran worker N. Ushakov.

"In 2 years now," Major R. Gataullin says, "our enterprise has not received a single complaint or replacement claim from the people operating these plants. And I do not expect any."

This is the enterprise today. But what about the future? We were surprised when we heard the answer: "As of now, there is none." No, the plants are operating. Experienced designers are continuing to work on their improvement. Major S. Pushkarev is now in charge of coordinating all of this work. The problem lies elsewhere. The design organization is demanding additional work on the documentation, taking into account suggestions made by the developers at the manufacturing plant. The designers have agreed, but they operate on a cost-accounting basis. It is valid to ask who will pay for the extra work. Furthermore, such instructions have not yet been received from the Technical Directorate for Capital Construction of the Ministry of Defense. Because of this the work has come to a standstill right at the finish line. And time is passing....

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LACK OF SOFTWARE PLAGUES COMPUTERIZATION

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Apr 87 p 1

[Report by Maj. V. Shchepilov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "There Are Enthusiasts, But...: What Is Hampering Computerization of the Training Process at the VUZs"]

[Text] Colonel V. Zakharov, Doctor of Technical Sciences and Professor, is chief of the Department of Software for Automatic Control Systems at the Military Academy imeni F.E. Dzerzhinskiy. He showed me an electronic lesson "synopsis," a soft magnetic disc reminiscent of a small record produced by the Melodiya firm.

"One such program for an electronic computer makes it possible to save a considerable amount of training time and to ensure that all of the students without exception will grasp the subject well," he said. "I would add to this the important fact that after only 6 hours of special classes the students themselves can help to develop simple programs for electronic computers."

Yes, computerization is entering into the training process with increasing persistence and becoming an integral part of it. The "Main Directions for Restructuring Higher and Specialized Education in the Nation," approved by the CPSU Central Committee, stress the fact that computerization is a reliable means of thoroughly intensifying and enhancing the training process.

The introduction of electronic computers at military educational institutions and their use is being held up by several significant factors, however. Extremely poor software for the electronic computers is perhaps the main one. I refer to those "synopses," to those programs without which the most "intelligent" computer becomes a useless technical device.

As of today computer software is the Achilles' heel of computerization of the training process at the VUZs. There are not enough programs, not enough because their centralized production (for at least certain subjects) has not been set up. The instructors themselves are preparing the programs. And this is a complicated and demanding job. I was given the following figures at the academy. An instructor must spend 50-60 hours to produce a proper program for a 1-hour class using electronic computers. This is at best. In the worst situation, months or even years are needed. Far from every program created always works, as the say, however. Various difficulties have resulted in a situation in which there are very few finished and adjusted programs in the departments of the military academies and schools today.

Added to this is the fact that the VUZs do not have enough calculators (mini- and mikro-EVM) or personal computers, and large--and therefore expensive--electronic computers have to be used for producing the programs.

The time spent writing programs is ordinarily not included as part of the teaching load. This is why the computerization process presently rests mainly on the enthusiasts, on those military teachers who not only talk about the importance of this matter but also try to make their own contribution to scientific and technological progress.

It is precisely because of the enthusiasts that the military academies, schools and military departments of institutes presently have a certain selection of various programs, which make the training process better, more effective and more interesting. The task of computerization can hardly be accomplished with enthusiasm alone, however. The work should obviously be placed onto a planned basis and centralized, and of course the VUZs should be provided with everything necessary for economical and productive work by the teachers.

It is necessary right now to make the decision to create a single center to coordinate and direct this work.

Insularity and the absence of close ties among the VUZs leads to the duplication of programs, to the creation of that which has not only already been created but is being successfully employed. I was told about precisely such a case by Colonel A. Ivanko, Candidate of Technical Sciences, Docent and chairman of the Military Science Society of the Kiev Higher Engineering Radiotechnical Air Defense School imeni Marshal of Aviation A.I. Pokryshkin. He spent a great deal of funds and effort to set up programs for a course on radiotechnical devices, only to learn by accident later that such programs were already in use in a number of departments at other military educational institutions.

"It turns out that I spent several months inventing the wheel," Ivanko said with regret. "So much time and effort was spent...."

Colonel V. Vasilenko, Doctor of Technical Sciences, Professor and chief of one of the courses in the military department at the Moscow Higher Technical School imeni N.E. Bauman, and numerous other military teachers have also found themselves in the role of "inventor of the wheel." And who can say how many instructors are even now working on programs for identical or similar subjects, wasting valuable time on this work?

The existence of a coordination center would obviously eliminate all of these losses. The center could also assume the functions of establishing a program bank and producing the programs. Lacking such a bank today, we cannot speak seriously about computerizing the training process at the VUZs. The Main Directions state that the technical reequipment of the higher and secondary specialized school, including the establishment of inter-VUZ programing centers, the organization of a unified stock of algorithms and programs for the higher school, and setting up their reproduction constitute an absolute requirement for making the school more effective.

Where would the coordinating center and the program bank be located? Who should be in charge of all this work? These things are not clear. Most of those with whom I spoke agreed that the Main Directorate for Military Educational Institutions of the USSR Ministry of Defense should obviously be the head organization. It is essential, however, for this directorate to have the necessary facilities and the required number of specialists. The question is still open. The times dictate that we resolve it right now, however.

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MILITARY EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES

CONFERENCE OF MILITARY SOCIOLOGISTS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Apr 87 p 2

[Report by Capt 1st Rank L. Yegorov: "Conference of Military Sociologists"]

[Text] A report and election conference of the Military Section of the Soviet Sociological Association was held at the Military Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin. A report was presented by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences and Professor S. Tyushkevich.

Those speaking at the report and election conference stressed the growing role of sociology in the restructuring occurring in the society and in the Soviet Armed Forces. They also noted deficiencies of scientific recommendations for the practical level.

Colonel Yu. Deryugin, chief of a group of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, was elected chairman of the newly elected bureau of the Military Section of the Soviet Sociological Association. Delegates elected at the conference of the Military Section took part in the 6th All-Union Conference of the Soviet Sociological Association held at the Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee. Colonel Yu. Deryugin and Professor S. Tyushkevich became members of the board of the Soviet Sociological Association.

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MILITARY EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES

EDITORIAL: PROBLEM OF FINDING, TRAINING QUALIFIED CADETS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Apr 87 p 1

[Editorial: "Into the Military Schools--the Worthy"]

[Text] The selection of servicemen and members of the student and working youth for military educational institutions of the USSR Ministry of Defense continues. It is a matter of great state importance because of the large demands made of the cadres by the party as defined in decisions of the 27th party congress and the January 1987 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

The new cadets will be in training at a time of restructuring of the military school. The military educational institutions are faced with raising the organization of the training and indoctrinational process to a higher level, vigorously applying the latest achievements of military science and technology, and intensifying the practical focus of the training.

A broad range of officials take part in the selection of candidates. The leading role, however, is assigned to the chiefs of the military educational institutions, who are charged with direct responsibility for making a good selection of cadets and filling the military schools and institutes with them. They are required to organize the work in such a way that the selection is made in close interaction with the command element, political organs and personnel agencies of the army and navy, military commissariats, local party and soviet organs, Komsomol and DOSAAF organizations, production collectives, directors and military instructors of schools, tekhnikums, vocational and technical schools. This is the approach which makes it possible to thoroughly study the candidates locally and pick out the most worthy.

Errors made in the selection work in past years must be avoided. One of these was the fact that certain military educational institutions relied entirely upon the results of the selection process carried out in the units and at military commissariats, and did not provide assistance to the commanders, political organs and military commissariats at the site. As a result, the cadets included young people who did not fully measure up to the military school's requirements. Many of them became disillusioned with their selected occupation after their very first months in training and requested to be released from the schools. Furthermore, due to inadequate ties between those VUZs and the enterprises, sovkhoses and kolkhozes, rural schools and SPTU [special vocational and technical schools?],

there was a marked drop in the influx of rural and working youth, and first-term servicemen released into the reserve. For example, fewer workers and peasants than usual registered as freshmen last year at the Military Institute and the Kiev Higher Combined-Arms Command School imeni M.V. Frunze.

Commanders, political workers and staffs of formations, units and ships are expected to make a significant contribution to the filling of the military educational institutions with new replenishments. Experience has shown that those young people who have been able to test themselves and verify their selection in the army or navy make the best cadets and subsequently the best officers. And those military schools and institutes are doing the right thing which recommend outstanding soldiers, seamen, NCOs and petty officers who have excelled in the combat and political training, who have been Komsomol activists and are highly rated specialists. A number of units and formations of the Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev military districts take a responsible attitude toward the selection process. The experience of those units and ships where the selection of candidates takes place in an atmosphere of extensive openness and considers the opinion of the military collectives is worthy of attention.

The selection of cadets for military educational institutions is still handled in a formal manner in some places, however, just as it has been in the past. Certain commanders do not consider state interests, use various excuses for preventing the best servicemen from being sent for training, and force upon subordinates schools and institutes other than those which they would like to enter. And the senior chiefs, political organs and party organizations sometimes take the position of sideline observers. It was only a year ago that consideration of narrow local interests and irresponsibility resulted in a situation in which a considerable part of the servicemen selected in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, the Southern Group of Forces and Far East Military District, as an example, turned out not to be worthy of being cadets and left the schools for various reasons. Important conclusions must be drawn from this lesson.

One of the important tasks today is to conduct good monthly training assemblies arranged for the servicemen who are cadet candidate for purposes of thoroughly preparing them for entering VUZs. Everything possible must be done to see that the time allocated for the assemblies is utilized with maximum effectiveness. For this purpose we should concern ourselves right now with creating good conditions for the training of the servicemen and providing them with the necessary training aids, and select experienced teachers to conduct the classes and consultations.

Republic rallies of students from schools and SPTU and defense society trainees who have decided to enter military educational institutions, meetings of these individuals with cadets and officers, and open-door days at schools and institutes have recently been held on an extensive basis, particularly since the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers passed the decree aimed at further improving the preparation of the youth for military service. This practice must be supported and developed. A lot depends upon the performance of purposeful and well-conceived work on the part of the military commissariats and the rayon and city induction commissions, which bear responsibility for the quality of the preliminary selection process.

In the course of the selection process an extensive and thorough study and assessment must be made as to the firmness of a young man's decision on what he wants to do with his life, his moral-political and work qualities, his moral makeup, his physical conditioning and psychological strength.

As always, the reception commissions of VUZs and the circuit reception commissions have an extremely large role. They have the task of making the selection in the final phase of providing the replenishments for the military schools. They should be made up of the best trained and most competent commanders, political workers, instructors and specialists in occupational selection, people who are capable of demonstrating maximum objectivity and party principle, and of ensuring that the reception rules are strictly observed.

Concern for providing the VUZs with quality cadet replenishments is concern for the future of our military cadres. And this work must be performed at all stages in a manner which ensures that the best representatives of the Soviet youth, those capable of justifying the great calling of an officer in the Soviet Armed Forces, end up in the cadet ranks.

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

VINOGRADOV COMMENTS ON U.S. NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN PERSIAN GULF

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Mar 87 p 5

[Article by V. Vinogradov under the rubric "Military-Political Commentary":
"They Are Preparing to Spring"]

[Text] According to U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger, the USA has offered to escort Kuwaiti tankers in the Persian Gulf in order to ensure their safety. Let us recall that the same offer was made to Saudi Arabia last year by U.S. Vice President Bush during a visit there. Washington's offer was rejected then, as it has been this time. It is only too obvious.... The objective of this zeal on the part of Washington is clear: "to permanently register" its fleet in the Persian Gulf in order to use force or the threat of force to dictate its terms to states in the region.

The Pentagon has already initiated feverish activities there. Observers believe that the USA is preparing to carry out armed intervention in the Persian Gulf. The American television company ABC reports that the details of precisely such an operation were discussed during a trip to a number of nations of the Arabian Peninsula and Pakistan by Admiral Crowe, highest ranking military man at the Pentagon and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk's tour in the region has been extended to provide support for such an action. At the beginning of summer, Crowe has announced, it will be replaced by a ship of the same class. The decision by the command element of the U.S. Navy to transfer an aircraft carrier to permanent patrol duty in the northern part of the Indian Ocean will thus have been realized.

A naval battle group consisting of 18 ships has recently been concentrated near the entrance to the Persian Gulf. Furthermore, the newspaper NEW YORK TIMES reports, citing officials of the U.S. Navy, the Kitty Hawk has moved up to battle lines from which it can strike at targets in Iran, for example.

It is significant that two other highly placed Washington emissaries made a visit to the region almost simultaneously with Admiral Crowe. Pentagon chief Weinberger himself visited Turkey. He made the visit immediately after the extension of the American-Turkish agreement on defense and economic cooperation, which governs also the use of military bases on Turkish territory by the United States. According to Pentagon plans, these military facilities can also be used to support actions of the Rapid-Deployment Force in the Near and Middle East. Incidentally, the Pentagon recently moved to Turkey several squadrons of its F-16 and F-111 fighter-bombers, which are designed for inflicting strikes upon "distant targets."

In its plans for armed intervention in the area of the Near or Middle East, the USA counts on Israel, its "strategic ally." U.S. Secretary of the Army Marsh visited that Zionist state. There was no detailed report on the issues which he discussed with the Tel Aviv leaders. It can hardly be coincidence, however, that soon after he visited Israel extremely large reservist exercises were conducted there. According to the Beirut newspaper AN NIDAL, this always indicates that Israel is preparing aggression against its Arab neighbors.

We know that the situation in the Persian Gulf region, where the Iranian-Iraqi war has lasted so many years now, is already heated up to the maximum degree. The "Irangate" disclosures have shown that Washington has greatly contributed to the fact that the flames of the conflict have flared up even more by supplying weapons to one of the combatants. It is now preparing for direct armed intervention in that region, cynically stating that the USA "is obligated to ensure the free flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz and attaches great importance to freedom of navigation in international waters." Attempts by the USA to impose its unrequested protection are rejected by nations of the Persian Gulf, however. It is exclusively a matter for the states located in that region to provide security there.

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

U.S. COMMAND, STAFF REORGANIZATIONS SAID DESTABILIZING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Apr 87 p 3

[Article by Lt Col B. Rozhkov under the rubric "The Facts Are Abundant": "One More Dangerous Step"]

[Text] In its global military preparations the USA gives a great deal of attention to the leadership of the groupings of its personnel and equipment located in many areas of the planet. A branching system of command and control of forces in a state of readiness to begin military operations has been created for this purpose in peacetime. The system includes the joint commands in Europe, in the Atlantic and Pacific zones, in Central and South America. It also includes the joint Central Command (CENTCOM), whose zone of responsibility includes the territories of 19 states in Southwest Asia and Northeast Africa.

In addition to this, the Pentagon is completing the establishment of a joint command for special operations, which will take in all of the personnel and equipment for special operations of the branches of the U.S. armed forces designated for conducting reconnaissance, diversionary and subversive and other similar operations--and not just in time of war but in peacetime as well.

Even this is not enough for the U.S. military-political leadership, however. The facts convincingly show that it intends to continue weaving the ominous web. U.S. Army Secretary J. Marsh recently announced a decision to reorganize the command element of the American ground forces in the Pacific Ocean region, with the main headquarters in Hawaii. The Kiodo Tsusin agency has reported that U.S. troops located in Japan, in the Philippines and in other nations of the region will be subordinate to this headquarters.

It should be mentioned that the second most important grouping of U.S. general-purpose forces is concentrated in nations of the Pacific basin today. It numbers 500,000 servicemen, around 180 combat ships and more than 1,100 combat aircraft. A study prepared by a group of authoritative U.S. experts (the information went into the collection "The Pacific Basin: New Problems For the United States") states that Washington's course of confrontation with the Soviet Union is one of the reasons for such a build-up of American military might in the Asian-Pacific Ocean region.

Washington's new move, depicted by the Pentagon as only a "renaming" of existing staffs, is in no way consistent with the strengthening of military stability or

the relaxation of tensions in the region. The actions of the U.S. administration have the absolutely specific, provocational objective of increasing the "restraining effect," in the language of the Pentagon strategists, of the American armed forces on the USSR. It is actually to agitate the international situation in the Asian-Pacific Ocean region even more and to create yet another large military threat to the USSR on the eastern sector.

This is how Washington responds to the Soviet Union's initiatives for improving the international situation in the Asian-Pacific Ocean region. These extremely dangerous acts are contrary to numerous statements by the U.S. administration about its devotion to peace.

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IZVESTIYA ON U.S. TALKS WITH SPAIN ON BASING RIGHTS

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Apr 87 p 4

[Report by IZVESTIYA correspondent V. Vernikov under the rubric "International Commentary": "No One Wanted to Compromise"; first paragraph is IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] Madrid—The fifth round of Spanish-American talks on reducing the U.S. military presence has ended. Like all the previous rounds, it was reminiscent of a dialog between deaf people: each side continued to defend its own position and did not take seriously the objections of the opposite side.

The discussion this time was mainly about the American response to Spain's main demand put forth back in June of last year at the first meeting of delegations of the two nations—that the 72 F-16 aircraft be removed from the base at Torrejon and the refueling aircraft be removed from the base at Saragossa.

The State Department and the Pentagon spent almost 7 months preparing the response. It was not made public until the beginning of this year, at the fourth meeting, but "the elephant gave birth to a mouse": Washington magnanimously agreed only to transfer its aircraft from near Madrid to another of its bases in Spain, the one at the town of Moron, calling this counterproposal "the greatest acceptable effort it could make to meet Madrid halfway."

Washington hedged on even this "effort," by demanding in return the right to employ its aircraft from other bases "to carry out missions" beyond the borders of Spain, which were previously assigned to the base at Torrejon. It also demanded that no time limit be set on the Spanish-American agreement if it is extended in 1988. In other words, the U.S. wants to obtain even more advantageous—and most important, practically unregulated—terms for the presence of American bases and servicemen in Spain. Spain figured out this move, however, and rejected it as "grotesque and a mockery of common sense."

The newspaper stressed the fact that this proposal had not been officially rejected until the current meeting in Washington, to be sure, which provided grounds for speaking of possible reciprocal concessions, although no one knows what those concessions could possibly be. Nonetheless, it has now become absolutely clear that the American counterplan is, the head of the Spanish delegation at the talks announced, "unacceptable even for preliminary discussion, that Spain's position remains unchanged, although certain elements have emerged which are encouraging with respect to achieving a compromise."

Local political observers state that the U.S. is in no hurry to make concessions, asserting that the base at Torrejon is "vitally essential to the defense of NATO's southern flank," and is waiting for a softening of the Spanish government's position following the June elections in municipalities and certain autonomous regions.

What is more, the U.S. authorities are so confident that they will remain at Torrejon that they have even begun the construction of expensive underground hangars for all their aircraft at the base, are adding a whole kilometer to the length of the runway, which is already the longest at any of the NATO airfields in Europe, and are modernizing other facilities as well. There is every indication that at Washington's bidding the USA's NATO partners have begun applying pressure to the government of F. Gonzalez, calling upon it for "Atlantic solidarity, restraint and respect for the common goals and interests." These intrigues have not met with understanding in Madrid, however.

Now what? We can only wait for the next--apparently, next to the last--round of talks, scheduled for June, to see who has finally compromised "in the interest of Atlantic unity."

11499

CSO: 1801/170

ISRAELI 'LAVI' SAID TO BE FINANCED BY U.S.

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Apr 87 p 5

[Article by A. Kapralov under the rubric "Behind the Scenes": "The Lion's Share, or Serving Two Masters"]

[Text] They say that whoever pays calls the tune. It has been just the opposite with the creation of the Israeli Lavi fighter, however.

An Israeli military band played when the first Lavi was rolled out of the hangar at Ben-Gurion Airport near Tel Aviv to the applause of U.S. and Israeli officials on 21 June of last year. The local press reported the event with pomp. It failed to mention only the fact that the entire aircraft--right down to the last rivet--was paid for with American aid allocated for its development.

The Lavi ("lion" in Hebrew) proved to have a truly lion's appetite. Israel initially stated that the cost of each aircraft would not exceed 7 million dollars. A few years went by, and Israel increased the amount it was demanding from the USA to 15 million. According to Pentagon figures, the amount will ultimately reach 22 million dollars for each aircraft. As the WASHINGTON POST reported, however, the history of the Lavi is not just a tale about money. It is also "a story of a political struggle and personal relations," "an illustration of the numerous ties which bind the USA to Israel."

The idea of creating the Lavi, the WASHINGTON POST states, had been pushed by Israel since the end of the '70s. Not until the spring of 1983, however, was serious attention given to the Israeli "lion." Moshe Arens, who was appointed Israeli Minister of Defense at that time and had served as ambassador to the USA prior to that, succeeded in interesting member of the U.S. House of Representatives Charles Wilson in the Lavi project. During a trip by the latter to Tel Aviv with a Congressional delegation, Arens asked his Washington acquaintance to introduce a bill which would permit the use of American aid for creating the Lavi.

Several days later, on 13 April 1983, Arens held a 7-hour meeting with 20 of those involved in designing the aircraft. It was attended, among others, by M. Klemow, who flew in from the USA specially for the meeting, and D. Halperin, representing the builder of the Lavi, Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI), in Washington and economic attache at the Israeli Embassy.

Klemow advised Arens to bypass Pentagon officials and go directly to the State Department and the White House. Halperin, in turn, recommended that the Minister of Defense telephone U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz, a friend of Arens, and ask him to speed up the authorization of three extremely important licenses, which the Pentagon had been holding up and which the American companies needed in order to transfer their technological secrets to Israel. Arens made the call. A few days later, the WASHINGTON POST states, the licenses were approved.

In the meantime, member of the House of Representatives Wilson fulfilled his promise to Arens. In a restaurant on Connecticut Avenue he met with a lobbyist for Israeli business circles named (Rafiyakh) and (Dzh. Bond), member of the secretarial staff of the Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Operations. At the table in the restaurant these three compiled a plan for introducing an amendment which would make it possible to use American aid in Israel for developing the Lavi fighter.

Wilson asked the Committee on American-Israeli Relations (an influential lobbying organization in Washington) to draw up the amendment. The lobbyist asked Klemow exactly how much money would be needed. He named the first figure which came to mind. Wilson ostensibly did not understand the IAI representative and requested 150 million dollars more than was needed to build the Lavi. As a result 550 million of the 1.7 billion dollars in military assistance allocated for Israel that year went for the Lavi project.

The "lion's share" has increased from one year to the next and amounts to 2 billion dollars today. One has to ask the question: Did people in Washington actually not understand what an expensive toy Israel was giving them as a gift? They did. Only isolated individuals sought to object, however.

In 1984 member of the House of Representatives N. Rahall introduced an amendment calling for canceling all American allocations for the Lavi. This was a voice crying in the wilderness, however. In 1985 R. Badham introduced and then withdrew an amendment which called for a study of the economic effectiveness of the Lavi project. Explaining his actions later, he said: "I knew that I did not have the votes. I did not want to be a kamikaze."

At first glance, this subject of the "story" which appeared in the WASHINGTON POST appears quite simple. And one might get the impression that the restaurant table on Connecticut Avenue was the launching pad for the Lavi. There is a reason why 300 pages of a secret Pentagon report is devoted to the Lavi project, however.

Some time ago a Pentagon representative visited Israel and attempted to demonstrate the feasibility of replacing the Lavi with the American prototype, the F-16. The U.S. Defense Department is concerned that the Lavi will displace American aircraft in the Israeli market. In the second place, it is alarmed by the ever-increasing cost of the Israeli fighter, which is called the most expensive aircraft of its class in the world. The people in Tel Aviv are not planning to restrain the lion's appetite of their militaristic machine, however, particularly since American attempts to curtail the project have not gone beyond the point of cautious persuasion. There are important reasons for Israel's intransigence and the mildness of American pressure.

The American-Israeli agreement "on strategic cooperation" is the basis for the Lavi adventure. It calls for the all-around strengthening of Israel's military power by the United States and its achievement of superiority over all of its potential enemies put together. And this "agreement," which protects U.S. military-strategic interests in the Near East, is more precious to it than money. As they calculate the financial losses--both those already suffered and potential losses--from the building of the Lavi, people in Washington today are therefore not dis-regarding the benefits and advantages promised both partners by the creation of a fighter not inferior to the F-16.

Clearly, the presence of Israel's own fighter, one not inferior to American models, will make the Israeli warriors even more brazen in their acts of aggression against the Arab neighbors. Washington can merely wash its hands of the matter and play the role of patrician observing the Israeli "lion's" aggressiveness in the Near East theater.

Apparently the fact is also not being discounted that Israel plans to export the Lavi to the Republic of South Africa, Chile and Taiwan--that is, those nations to which the USA would like to sell weapons but is refraining from doing so openly because it knows of the unpopularity of these regimes in the international community. The Tel Aviv transit is a convenient cover for such transactions.

...That summer evening in July when the Israeli military band played and 1,500 guests applauded the first Lavi brought out of the hangar, American Congressman Jack Kemp told the crowd that the Lavi represented "a real and graphic demonstration of the partnership of our two democratic nations." He then pointed at the aircraft fuselage and said "Leave a little room for the stars and stripes." thereby confirming that the role of servant to two masters had been prepared for the Lavi.

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA NOTES SIZE OF NATO FORCES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Apr 67 p 3

[Report: "Potential For Aggression"]

[Text] At the beginning of the '80s NATO's Supreme Command in Europe had at its disposal 94 divisions of ground troops (the equivalent, taking Spanish forces into account), including 15 tank divisions; more than 4,000 tactical aircraft based at 150 airfields; more than 17,000 tanks; around 12,000 guns and mortars; more than 1,800 launchers for ground-to-air guided missiles, and other weapons.

There are more than 7,000 units of nuclear ammunition at depots located within the zone of NATO's Joint Armed Forces in Europe and in Turkey. There are more than 2,800 various delivery units--aircraft, missiles and artillery pieces capable of firing shells with nuclear charges. NATO's Supreme Command in Europe also has control over mobile forces designated for rapid intervention in any conflict which might occur in that or other theaters of military operations.

According to a U.S. State Department brochure, "Europe's Defense," the total numerical strength of the forces of NATO's Eurogroup members is 1.85 million. They are armed with 10,400 battle tanks, 10,000 artillery barrels, 2,300 combat aircraft, 730 military ships and 120 submarines. In peacetime the USA's European allies provide around 90 percent of the bloc's ground forces located in Western Europe, 80 percent of the combat aircraft and tanks, and around 90 percent of the armored divisions.

11499

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IZVESTIYA: NATO STILL SEEKS LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR CAPABILITY

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 May 87 p 4

[Unattributed report: "NATO: A Strategy With a Nuclear Accent"]

[Text] "NATO has carried out modernization of its nuclear forces in order to be prepared to wage limited nuclear war in Europe, despite the assurances of its officials." This conclusion, writes Agence France-Presse, is contained in research by (Dan Plesh), a scholar from a university in Bradford, England, published on 14 April.

According to Plesh, NATO "beginning in 1980 produced more than 600 enhanced radiation nuclear warheads (neutron bombs)." They are stored in New York State. However, stresses the British researcher, they can be delivered to Europe in several hours by military transport aircraft.

The neutron warheads are intended for W-79 artillery rounds and Lance operational-tactical missiles, of which there are 325 and 380 respectively. M-110 artillery weapons, also deployed in Western Europe, also serve as launch platforms.

As if responding to his possible opponents, who denied the fact that there has been a buildup of nuclear potential, citing the anticipated withdrawal, widely publicized in 1983, of 1,400 nuclear warheads from the European NATO states over the course of several years, D. Plesh states: this measure concerns only obsolete models, which will be or are already replaced by modern types of weapons. This is also confirmed by the statements he cites by U. S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger of February 1987, that the replacement of rounds presupposes "new types of more accurate and longer range munitions."

There was one more important topic of research. The phrases heard frequently in NATO that the Atlantic Alliance will never be first to use nuclear weapons are unconvincing, considers the expert from Bradford. As justification for his doubts he cites American General B. Rogers, supreme commander of Combined NATO Armed Forces in Europe. In February 1986, in a statement for the journal INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEW, he acknowledged that NATO headquarters, in response to a contemplated attack with the use of conventional weapons, intends to employ its nuclear arsenal at the very outset of the conflict.

It remains to add that the Agence France-Presse correspondent in London preparing this report prefaced it with the heading: "British researcher asserts that NATO is intensifying its preparation for nuclear war in Europe."

AWACS IN PAKISTAN 'UNFRIENDLY' TOWARD NEIGHBORS

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 May 87 p 1

[Article by Aleksandr Kapralov: "Rent for the AWACSS"]

[Text] "If AWACSS will be immediately sold or rented to Pakistan, the rebels (dushman -- A.K.) will prepare accordingly to make rocket strikes against Kabul..."

According to the WASHINGTON POST, this dispatch, with a demand to give Pakistan E-3A (AWACS) long range radar detection and control aircraft was sent a few days ago from Islamabad to the U. S. capital.

The objectives for the strikes, writes the newspaper, are the houses of Soviet civilian representatives, residential complexes and stores.

American Senator Gordon Humphrey even arrived in Washington with his own photograph of these "strategic" objectives and the ally's request for AWACSS. The request from Islamabad did not lay on the shelf. It was expected, and it was immediately appended to a request sent by the administration to congress to allocate Pakistan \$4.02 billion in the form of military and economic aid for 1988-1993.

Strictly speaking, in order to satisfy the demand of the administration in the White House, the American legislators have to step over two laws: the Glenn and the Symington amendments. The latter prohibits American military aid to countries that are on the threshold of creating nuclear weapons.

However, what is a law, when it interferes with the implementation of U. S. military strategy. In the light of neo-global plans, prohibitions lose force, the norms of human morality and international law fade, and the fates and lives of hundreds of thousands of people, thousands of kilometers from the shores of America become cheaper than the smallest small change.

The secret dispatch from Islamabad is the echo of secret directive No 166 by Ronald Reagan to prevent by any means the establishment of peace in the DRA [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan] and the end of the bloodshed there.

Washington does not want to give national reconciliation a chance in Afghanistan. This means that the chances for the Pakistani authorities to obtain AWACSs are very high.

The E-3A, if they are leased to Pakistan, will enable Washington to have approximately 400 military personnel in Pakistan on a permanent basis, who will exert control over the territories and air spaces of neighboring countries, especially Afghanistan, India and the USSR.

This is not a bad return for the leasing of the spy aircraft.

If AWACSs appear in the skies of Pakistan, the arms race in the region and the military threat here will rise to a new level. "Our response will be adequate to our understanding of this threat," stated India's defense minister, Krishna Chandra Pant.

Pakistan's escalation of unfriendly actions against its neighbors cannot remain unnoticed.

9069

CSO: 1801/184

IZVESTIYA REACTS TO FRG DEFENSE MINISTER ON EUROPEAN BALANCE

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 April 87 p 5

[Article by A. Grigoryants: "A Victim of Superstition"]

[Text] Lothar Ruhl, state secretary, FRG defense ministry, is a victim of the same belief, about which Goethe once stated, that it "is not the beginning, but the end of all wisdom." More accurately, Ruhl is a victim of superstition: all his life, and he began as a journalist, Ruhl tried to infect others with this superstition and inculcate in them that the Russians are aggressive.

It is not easy to do this today, when a series of bold, large scale and innovative initiatives by the USSR, including the elimination of intermediate range missiles in Europe, has shown every intelligent person the true and honest desire of our country for peace and disarmament. But the preacher of callous superstition does not even assert that the Soviet Union wants to attack Western Europe. It does not want to, but it may. In one of his articles in the (Springer) newspaper WELT, Ruhl writes about the "ability of the Warsaw Treaty Organization forces to carry out aggression" due to their "offensive tank power," and about the "ability in the shortest period of time to bring its armed forces in Eastern Europe to a state of combat readiness," in order "to create massive strike wedges to break through Saxony to the west toward the Rhine and La Mancha," and about the threat that they will "carry out a prior camouflaged deployment of forces in offensive positions and reinforce attack forces through deployment of reserves brought in ahead of time from the east."

All these prophecies of the home-grown strategist derive from the fundamental premise of Western propaganda about the a priori, so to speak, predetermined aggressiveness of the USSR, for which no proof is required. The primitivism of such thinking is striking. We are depicted as capable of acting without consideration for our own vital interests and the interests of universal security, the real correlation of forces in the world and the catastrophic consequences of any use of military force in Europe.

As for the nightmares which torment Ruhl, they can bring only a smile to military specialists. As far as that goes, the Bonn state secretary knows perfectly well that a rough balance exists in Europe in armed forces and conventional weapons between the blocs.

Now about the "secret" preparations for an attack. Can they be possible in our age? And what about the agreements reached in Stockholm about notification of military exercises, movement, transfers and concentrations of forces, about the exchange of annual plans for military activities, and about strict control, including on the ground inspections? And all of this in a vast zone reaching from the Atlantic to the Urals!

Of course, Mr. Ruhl is well informed about this. Nevertheless, he asserts that "the waging of defensive battles" using conventional weapons in densely populated and built up territory has certain limits. Therefore, NATO defensive forces "must have nuclear weapons at their disposal." Ruhl calls for retaining regional nuclear weapons in Europe, "so that in case of war the Soviet Union will not be unaccessible for retaliatory strikes by NATO forces in Europe." Therefore, concludes Ruhl, "in negotiations on intermediate range nuclear weapons there cannot even be discussion about a so-called zero option.

Nevertheless, the views of L. Ruhl are not so static as they may seem. They change, but according to laws of distorted logic. Whereas, not long ago the state secretary rejected the "zero option" on Pershing-2, Tomahawk, and SS-20 missiles under the pretext that the USSR still has shorter range missiles, today the "zero option" on this class of missiles does not suit him either. Recently Ruhl told WELT that Bonn had a negative attitude toward the proposal to sign a subsequent agreement on shorter range intermediate range weapons (up to 1,000 km) after a "European zero option decision" on longer range intermediate range nuclear weapons. "This would not be an acceptable proposal to us," he stated.

Essentially Ruhl is demonstrating blind-alley thinking, which states that without nuclear weapons it is impossible to prevent war. This is an old, obsolete approach to solving the problems of security, which is built on "nuclear deterrence" and "nuclear retribution," and is an approach that does not exclude war as an instrument of policy.

Ruhl, as we see, is defending the positions of those who do not like the Reykjavik agreements, and who are afraid of the prospects for constructing a nuclear-free world initiated by the Soviet Union. The preachers of superstitious fear of the "threat from the east" do not want to rid our continent either of the "burden of nuclear weapons." They are against the "zero option." Any "zero option."

Lothar Ruhl, it seems, actually believes the myth about the "Soviet threat." How else can one understand the poverty and sterility of the thinking he illustrated in his latest statements in WELT? Truly such a belief is not the beginning, but the end of all wisdom.

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CSO: 1801/184

FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

IVANOVSKIY DEPARTS FOR ADEN--Army General Ye.F. Ivanovskiy, Commander in Chief of the Ground Forces and Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, departed Moscow for an official visit to Aden on 1 April. Army General Ye.F. Ivanovskiy was accompanied to the airport by Fleet Admiral V.N. Chernavin, Commander in Chief of the Navy and Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR. A.A. (Illya), ambassador from the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen to the USSR, was among those seeing him off. [Text] [Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Apr 87 p 3] 11499

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